New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Executive Law § 383 (2026)

Construction with other laws; severability

✓ text as retrieved May 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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§ 383. Construction with other laws; severability. 1. The provisions
of this article and of the uniform fire prevention and building code
shall supersede any other provision of a general, special or local law,
ordinance, administrative code, rule or regulation inconsistent or in
conflict therewith provided however:
  a. Nothing herein shall impair the validity of any action taken
pursuant to or in compliance with such law or regulation before the
effective date of the uniform code; and
  b. Any improvement, modification, alteration, adaptation, redesign or
repair required by or pursuant to any general, special or local law,
administrative code, rule or regulation enacted and effective before the
effective date of the uniform code shall be made in the manner and
within the time so required.
  c. That, in cities with a population of over one million, the existing
building and fire prevention codes shall continue in full force and
effect beyond January one, nineteen hundred eighty-four unless the
council, after analysis and consultation with the building and fire
officials of such cities, shall determine that said local code
provisions are less stringent than the uniform code. Existing local
statutory, regulatory and administrative laws and provisions of such
cities shall continue in full force and effect unless the foregoing is
determined by the council. Notwithstanding this paragraph, when such
factory manufactured homes are intended for use as one or two family
dwelling units or multiple dwellings of not more than two stories in
height, provided such multiple dwellings are not intended for use as
hotels or motels, the provisions of this article and of the uniform fire
prevention and building code pertaining to factory manufactured homes
shall supersede any other provision of general, special or local law,
ordinance, administrative code, rule or regulation inconsistent or in
conflict therewith.
  2. Nothing herein shall be construed as affecting the authority of the
state labor department to enforce a safety or health standard issued
under provisions of sections twenty-seven and twenty-seven-a of the
labor law.
  3. Nothing herein shall be construed to relieve a person from
complying with a stricter standard issued pursuant to the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended.
  4. If any section of this article or the application thereof to any
person or circumstances shall be adjudged invalid by a court of
competent jurisdiction, such order or judgment shall be confined in its
operation to the controversy in which it was rendered, and shall not
affect or invalidate the remainder of any provision of any section or
the application of any part thereof to any other person or circumstances
and to this end the provisions of each section of the article are hereby
declared to be separable.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2022 · leading case: People v. Oceanside Institutional Indus., Inc., 15 Misc. 3d 22 (N.Y. App. Term. 2007).
People v. Oceanside Institutional Indus., Inc., 15 Misc. 3d 22 (N.Y. App. Term. 2007). “(An exception is for cities with a population in excess of one million people with an existing code in place [Executive Law § 383 (1) (c)].) Section 379 (4) of the Executive Law provides a mechanism that allows a local governmental ordinance that is not less stringent to remain…”
Maurice John v. City of Salamanca & Norris Stone, 845 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988). “N.Y.Exec.Law § 383. 3 The Salamanca municipal ordinances at issue are *41 part of this enforcement mechanism.”
Morrison v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Cmty. Renewal, 241 A.D.2d 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1998). · cites it 4× “2 The IAS Court granted mandamus against the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, concluding that Executive Law § 383 required the Code Council to convene to consider whether the City Code was less stringent than the State Uniform Code.”
New York State Soc'y of Prof'l Engineers, Inc. v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2010). “Furthermore, it cannot be said that the state law has preempted the City of New York from establishing the qualifications for the offices of Commissioner and First Deputy Commissioner of Buildings, as the City is specifically permitted to set and enforce its own building code…”
Panattieri v. City of New York, 53 Misc. 3d 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). “v City of New York, 78 AD3d 477 [1st Dept 2010] [state law does not preempt City from regulating practice of engineering as state law specifically permits City to set and enforce its own building code], citing Executive Law § 383 [1] [c] [in cities with population over one…”
Roxanne Delgado v. State of New York, 206 N.E.3d 598 (N.Y. 2022). “throughout the State” (cf Tarquini v Town of Aurora, 77 NY2d 354, 359 [1991] [speaking about the scheme broadly though not addressing supersession]; see generally Executive Law § 383 [1]; Labor Law § 275; People v Oceanside Inst.”
Rabinor v. City of Ithaca Bldg. Code Bd. of Appeals, 252 A.D.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998). “Indeed, Executive Law § 383 (1) unequivocally states that “[t]he provisions of [Executive Law article 18] and of the uniform fire prevention and building code shall supersede any other provision of a general, special or local law, ordinance, administrative code, rule or…”
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