N.Y. Laws » CHAPTER Judiciary / ARTICLE General Provisions Relating to Courts and Judges
New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Judiciary Law § 14 (2026)

Disqualification of judge by reason of interest or consanguinity

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 14. Disqualification of judge by reason of interest or
consanguinity.  A judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in
the decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which
he is a party, or in which he has been attorney or counsel, or in which
he is interested, or if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to
any party to the controversy within the sixth degree. The degree shall
be ascertained by ascending from the judge to the common ancestor,
descending to the party, counting a degree for each person in both
lines, including the judge and party, and excluding the common ancestor.
But no judge of a court of record shall be disqualified in any action,
claim, matter, motion or proceeding in which an insurance company is a
party or is interested by reason of his being a policy holder therein.
No judge shall be deemed disqualified from passing upon any litigation
before him because of his ownership of shares of stock or other
securities of a corporate litigant, provided that the parties, by their
attorneys, in writing, or in open court upon the record, waive any claim
as to disqualification of the judge.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 445 cases (59 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case: Schwarz v. Schwarz, 2017 NY Slip Op 3789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
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Schwarz v. Schwarz, 2017 NY Slip Op 3789 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). “Contrary to Simon’s contention, Justice King providently exercised her discretion in declining to recuse herself, since Simon did not establish that there was a basis for recusal pursuant to Judiciary Law § 14 and failed to set forth demonstrable proof of any bias or prejudice…”
People v. Saunders, 301 A.D.2d 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). · cites it 3× “The record does not support a finding that any of the express statutory disqualifications set forth in Judiciary Law § 14 are applicable. 2 “Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, * * * a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in…”
People v. MacShane, 17 Misc. 3d 78 (N.Y. App. Term. 2007). ““Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]; see also People ex rel.”
DeRosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 54 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). · cites it 3× “Andrias, J, dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: Because the motion court did not disclose its interest in Chase to the parties, under the express terms of Judiciary Law § 14, it was without power to hear the case and the orders appealed from are null and void.”
Levi v. Levi, 46 A.D.3d 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). ““Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturned [citations omitted].”
People v. Brims, 2016 NY Slip Op 8877 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016). · cites it 2× ““Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a Trial Judge is the sole arbiter of recusal” (People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).”
People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200 (NY 1987). “Defendant argues that his right to a fair trial was violated because recusal is required to avoid the appearance of impropriety based on the bench Trial Judge’s pretrial acquired knowledge of defendant’s record and of inadmissible evidence of his involvement in the crimes…”
Gonzalez v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 92 A.D.3d 1158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). ““Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, which is not at issue here, a .”
Matter of Patrick UU. v. Frances VV., 2021 NY Slip Op 06733 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021). · cites it 2× “" "Recusal, as a matter of due process, is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion, or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist" ( People v Alomar , 93 NY2d 239, 246 [1999] [citations…”
Mokay v. Mokay, 124 A.D.3d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). “) partially granted plaintiffs’ motions to quash the subpoenas and denied the affirmative relief sought by defendant. Defendant now appeals. None of the arguments advanced by defendant warrant extended discussion.”
People v. Alomar, 711 N.E.2d 958 (NY 1999). “While “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness” (In re Murchison, supra, at 136; see also, Judiciary Law § 14 [forbidding New York Judges from taking part in proceedings in which they have an interest in the outcome]), the bias which…”
Schwartzberg v. Kingsbridge Heights Care Ctr., Inc., 28 A.D.3d 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). · cites it 2× “In the absence of a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of the need for recusal, and his or her decision is a matter of discretion and personal conscience (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).”
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