New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 150.05 (2026)

Arson in the fourth degree

✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 150.05 Arson in the fourth degree.
  1. A person is guilty of arson in the fourth degree when he recklessly
damages a building or motor vehicle by intentionally starting a fire or
causing an explosion.
  2. In any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense
that no person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary
interest in the building or motor vehicle.
  Arson in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 46 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Northrip, 945 A.2d 198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
Commonwealth v. Northrip, 945 A.2d 198 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). · cites it 2× “N.Y. Penal Law §§ 150.05 ,150.15. ¶ 25 The Pennsylvania statutes at issue are subsections (a) and (c) of Pennsylvania Crimes Code Section 3301 (Pennsylvania section 3301), which provide: (a) Arsons endangering persons.”
People v. Harris, 72 A.D.3d 1110 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). “As the defendant contends, and the People correctly concede, the defendant’s conviction of arson in the fourth degree under Penal Law § 150.05 must be vacated, and that count of the indictment dismissed.”
People v. Wroblewski, 109 A.D.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). · cites it 2× “It follows, then, defendant argues, that the jury could not consistently have found that defendant caused the deaths during the commission of the crime of arson, fourth degree (Penal Law § 150.05 [l]), 3 because an intentional starting of the fire is a necessary element of…”
People v. Fancher, 116 A.D.3d 1084 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). “50 [2]; Penal Law § 150.05 [1]). Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for arson in the fourth degree; instead, in effect, he asks this Court to reverse this conviction on the ground that the evidence supporting the charge upon…”
People v. Anderson, 38 A.D.3d 1061 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). “In essence, defendant argues that a review of the entire record reveals that the arson in the third degree plea is baseless because his act of starting the fire was reckless (see Penal Law § 150.05 [1]) and not intentional (see Penal Law § 150.”
Williams v. State, 600 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “"' N.Y.Penal Law § 150.05 (McKinney 1992). The appellate division, in People v.”
People v. McGowan, 149 A.D.3d 1161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). “” The evidence of the ensuing events permitted the jury to reasonably and logically find that defendant then placed the burning piece of underwear on the pile of lingerie in the bathtub, making his intent to start the fire that caused the damage clearly inferable (see Penal Law…”
Fudger v. State, 131 A.D.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). “In his pleadings, claimant appears to rely on Court of Claims Act § 8-b (3) (b) (ii) (D) as a predicate for his claim, but this provision does not apply, for nowhere is it asserted that Penal Law §§ 150.05 and 150.10, the provisions under which claimant was indicted and…”
United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998). “See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 150.05 , 150.10 (McKinney 1988); United States v.”
Preferred Mut. Ins. v. Pine, 44 A.D.3d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). “As a result of the fire, Barrish pleaded guilty to arson in the fourth degree, a class E felony (see Penal Law § 150.05 [1]). The instant action was brought by the plaintiff insurance carrier, as subrogee of the owners of the property, to recover the amount paid on the owners’…”
People v. Vyacheslav Kheyfets, 174 Misc. 2d 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). “(Penal Law § 150.05 [2].) It is also necessary, although not sufficient, to make out an affirmative defense to a charge of arson in the third degree that no person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest in the damaged building or motor vehicle, or if…”
People v. Brown, 185 Misc. 2d 326 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2000). “The relevant sections of the arson statute provide that it is an affirmative defense to arson that the building is wholly owned by the defendant (Penal Law §§ 150.05, 150.10) (unless the defendant knows there are people inside the building, see, Penal Law §§ 150.”
— N.Y. Penal Law § 150.05(1) — 2 cases
Williams v. State, 600 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). “"' N.Y.Penal Law § 150.05 (McKinney 1992). The appellate division, in People v.”
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