New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 (2026)
Criminal liability for conduct of another
✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 20.00 Criminal liability for conduct of another. When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 955
cases (89 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003).
People v. Hafeez, 792 N.E.2d 1060 (N.Y. 2003). “However, defendant's guilt is premised upon a theory of accomplice liability and under such a theory, defendant can be guilty of depraved indifference murder only if he intentionally aided codefendant in commission of the crime and shared the codefendant's culpable mental state…”
People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053 (N.Y. 2004). “" [8] In turn, Penal Law § 20.00, the accessorial liability provision, provides that "[w]hen one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission…”
Hoffler v. Bezio, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013). “Although a jury found Hoffler guilty of first-degree witness-elimination murder in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 20.00 and 125.27(l)(a)(v), the New York Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the conviction on direct appeal and remanded the case for a new trial because…”
People v. Santi, 818 N.E.2d 1146 (N.Y. 2004). “Similarly, it criminalizes the conduct of anyone who aids and abets an unauthorized individual in the unlawful practice of any such profession (see Education Law § 6512 [1]; see also Penal Law § 20.00). Specifically, Education Law § 6512 (1) provides that: “Anyone not authorized…”
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011). “"); N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00 (McKinney 2009) ("When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the [requisite] mental culpability .”
People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561 (N.Y. 2003). “[2] Normally, a nonslaying defendant faces accessorial liability when, acting with the requisite mental state necessary to commit an offense, "he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids" another person to commit the offense (Penal Law § 20.00); however,…”
People v. Keschner, 37 N.E.3d 690 (N.Y. 2015). “, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants intentionally aided in the commission of the charged crimes with the mental culpability required for their commission (Penal Law § 20.00) — the jury was variously and erroneously instructed that it could convict appellants as…”
People v. Kaplan, 556 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1990). “Penal Law §20.00 provides that a person may be held criminally liable as an accomplice when he performs certain acts and does so "with the mental culpability required for the commission” of the substantive crime.”
People v. Carnevale, 101 A.D.3d 1375 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). “It was undisputed that defendant did not reenter Button’s home or discharge a gun, that Carnevale reentered alone and shot the victims, and that defendant’s culpability is premised upon accessorial liability under Penal Law § 20.00. This required the People to prove that…”
The People v. William Flanagan, 71 N.E.3d 541 (N.Y. 2017). “Similarly, because defendant was charged as both a principal and an accomplice, he is criminally liable for the conduct of any other person if he acted with the mental culpability required for committing the underlying offense and solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or…”
People v. Guerrero, 2017 NY Slip Op 3772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). “*884 Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt his guilt of assault in the first degree and gang assault in the first degree, based on an acting-in-concert theory (see Penal Law §§ 20.00, 120.07, 120.10…”
People v. Collier, 146 A.D.3d 1146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). “t the male victim’s possessions and while defendant was pointing a sawed-off shotgun at the male victim and striking him with it, we are satisfied that a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences existed from which a rational jury could have concluded that, with intent…”
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