New York Consolidated Laws

N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 (2026)

Aggravated harassment in the second degree

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section NY-LEGnysenate.gov Justiaon Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
§ 240.30 Aggravated harassment in the second degree.
  A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when:
  1. With intent to harass another person, the actor either:
  (a) communicates, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, by computer
or any other electronic means, or by mail, or by transmitting or
delivering any other form of communication, a threat to cause physical
harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of, such person, or a member
of such person's same family or household as defined in subdivision one
of section 530.11 of the criminal procedure law, and the actor knows or
reasonably should know that such communication will cause such person to
reasonably fear harm to such person's physical safety or property, or to
the physical safety or property of a member of such person's same family
or household; or
  (b) causes a communication to be initiated anonymously or otherwise,
by telephone, by computer or any other electronic means, or by mail, or
by transmitting or delivering any other form of communication, a threat
to cause physical harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of, such
person, a member of such person's same family or household as defined in
subdivision one of section 530.11 of the criminal procedure law, and the
actor knows or reasonably should know that such communication will cause
such person to reasonably fear harm to such person's physical safety or
property, or to the physical safety or property of a member of such
person's same family or household; or
  2. With intent to harass or threaten another person, he or she makes a
telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of
legitimate communication; or
  3. With the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person,
he or she strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person
to physical contact, including removing a religious clothing article or
headdress from such person, or attempts or threatens to do the same
because of a belief or perception regarding such person's race, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or expression,
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation,
regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct; or
  3-a. With the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another
person, such person strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects
another person to physical contact, which includes spitting on such
other person, and such other person is a train operator, ticket
inspector, conductor, signalperson, bus operator, station agent, station
cleaner, terminal cleaner, station customer assistant, traffic checker;
person whose official duties include the sale or collection of tickets,
passes, vouchers, or other revenue payment media for use on a train,
bus, or ferry or the collection or handling of revenues therefrom; a
person whose official duties include the maintenance, repair,
inspection, troubleshooting, testing or cleaning of buses or ferries, a
transit signal system, elevated or underground subway tracks, transit
station structure, including fare equipment, escalators, elevators and
other equipment necessary to passenger service, commuter rail tracks or
stations, train yard, revenue train in passenger service, a ferry
station, or a train or bus station or terminal; or a supervisor of such
personnel, employed by any transit agency, authority or company, public
or private, whose operation is authorized by New York state or any of
its political subdivisions while such individual is performing an
assigned duty; or
  4. With the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person,
he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects another person to
physical contact thereby causing physical injury to such person or to a
family or household member of such person as defined in section 530.11
of the criminal procedure law; or
  5. He or she commits the crime of harassment in the first degree and
has previously been convicted of the crime of harassment in the first
degree as defined by section 240.25 of this article within the preceding
ten years.
  Aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 351 cases (63 in the last 5 years), 1982–2026 · leading case: People v. Shack, 658 N.E.2d 706 (NY 1995).
People v. Shack, 658 N.E.2d 706 (NY 1995). · cites it 19× “The statute provides: "A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he * * * [m]akes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication.”
People v. Thompson, 28 Misc. 3d 483 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2010). · cites it 48× “Upon the submitted papers, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the underlying matter as facially insufficient is granted to the extent as follows: Procedural History In the instant action, the defendant is accused of violating Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a) — aggravated harassment in…”
People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805 (NY 2014). · cites it 5× “Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a) provides that “[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she .”
Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123 (2d Cir. 2023). · cites it 2× “3d at 126–27; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.30 , 70.15. The additional charge based on fabricated evidence thus carried a much smaller penalty than the charge not based on fabricated evidence.”
Boyler v. City of Lackawanna, 287 F. Supp. 3d 308 (W.D.N.Y. 2018). · cites it 3× “N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 (1)(a). The criminal complaint in this action was premised upon this subdivision.”
People v. Hernandez, 7 Misc. 3d 857 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2005). · cites it 11× “The defendant, Sue Hernandez, is charged with two counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree, the first count alleging a violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1), and the second a violation of Penal Law § 240.”
People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28 (NY 2003). · cites it 2× “There, the defendant challenged Penal Law § 240.30 (2), which provides that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he * * * [m]akes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation…”
People v. Shropshire, 181 Misc. 2d 77 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999). · cites it 14× “in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1) and four counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.”
People v. Goldstein, 196 Misc. 2d 741 (N.Y. App. Term. 2003). · cites it 6× “Defendant was charged with aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30 [1], [2]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.”
People v. Limage, 19 Misc. 3d 395 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2008). · cites it 8× “*396 The defendant is charged with two counts of aggravated harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.30 [1] [a], M). The defendant moves to dismiss the charges against him, contending that they are facially insufficient, and that the statute is unconstitutional as…”
Paruchuri v. Akil, 2017 NY Slip Op 8675 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). “Although the text messages were vulgar and insulting, they did not contain any true threats of physical harm to the mother or the child, or of unlawful harm to the mother’s property (see Penal Law § 240.30; People v Orr, 47 Misc 3d 1213[A] , 2015 NY Slip Op 50568[U] , *3-4 [Crim…”
People v. Cooper, 4 Misc. 3d 788 (2004). · cites it 9× “*789 The defendant is charged with aggravated harassment in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law § 240.30 (1), a class A misdemeanor criminal offense.”
— N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1) — 3 cases
Vives v. City of New York, 305 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Schlagler v. Phillips, 985 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Smith v. Town of Lewiston (W.D.N.Y. 2022).
— N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1)(a) — 10 cases
People v. Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 08011 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
Matter of Giovanni De M. v. Nick W., 2021 NY Slip Op 06947 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
Matter of Giovanni De M. v. Nick W., 2021 NY Slip Op 06947 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
— N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(1)(b) — 3 cases
Matter of T.M.S. v. K.R.G., 2025 NY Slip Op 06040 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
— N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(2) — 3 cases
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
Matter of T.M.S. v. K.R.G., 2025 NY Slip Op 06040 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025).
People v. Abisdid, 2024 NY Slip Op 24102 (Kings Criminal Ct. 2024).
— N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30(3) — 2 cases
Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 70 F. Supp. 2d 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Walker v. Shepard, 107 F. Supp. 2d 183 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.