NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-69 (2026)

Cartways, tramways, etc., laid out; procedure

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) If any person, firm, association, or corporation shall be engaged in the cultivation of any land or the cutting and removing of any standing timber, or the working of any quarries, mines, or minerals, or the operating of any industrial or manufacturing plants, or public or private cemetery, or taking action preparatory to the operation of any such enterprises, to which there is leading no public road or other adequate means of transportation, other than a navigable waterway, affording necessary and proper means of ingress thereto and egress therefrom, such person, firm, association, or corporation may institute a special proceeding as set out in the preceding section (G.S. 136-68), and if it shall be made to appear to the court necessary, reasonable and just that such person shall have a private way to a public road or watercourse or railroad over the lands of other persons, the court shall appoint a jury of view of three disinterested freeholders to view the premises and lay off a cartway, tramway, or railway of not less than 18 feet in width and not more than 30 feet in width, or cableways, chutes, and flumes, and assess the damages the owner or owners of the land crossed may sustain thereby, and make report of their findings in writing to the clerk of the superior court. Exceptions to said report may be filed by any interested party and such exceptions shall be heard and determined by the clerk of the superior court. The clerk of the superior court may affirm or modify said report, or set the same aside and order a new jury of view. All damages assessed by a judgment of the clerk, together with the cost of the proceeding, shall be paid into the clerk's office before the petitioners shall acquire any rights under said proceeding.

(b) (See editor's note) Compensation to the landowner for the establishment of a cartway over the property of another shall be as provided in Chapter 40A Article 4 of the North Carolina General Statutes.

(c) Where a tract of land lies partly in one county and partly in an adjoining county, or where a tract of land lies wholly within one county and the public road nearest or from which the most practical roadway to said land would run, lies in an adjoining county and the practical way for a cartway to said land would lead over lands in an adjoining county, then and in that event the proceeding for the laying out and establishing of a cartway may be commenced in either the county in which the land is located or the adjoining county through which said cartway would extend to the public road, and upon the filing of such petition in either county the clerk of the court shall have jurisdiction to proceed for the appointment of a jury from the county in which the petition is filed and proceed for the laying out and establishing of a cartway as if the tract of land to be reached by the cartway and the entire length of the cartway are all located within the bounds of said county in which the petition may be filed. (1798, c. 508, s. 1, P.R.; 1822, c. 1139, s. 1, P.R.; R.C., c. 101, s. 37; 1879, c. 258; Code, s. 2056; 1887, c. 46; 1903, c. 102; Rev., s. 2686; 1909, c. 364, s. 1; 1917, c. 187, s. 1; c. 282, s. 1; C.S., s. 3836; 1921, c. 135; Ex. Sess., 1921, c. 73; 1929, c. 197, s. 1; 1931, c. 448; 1951, c. 1125, s. 1; 1961, c. 71; 1965, c. 414, s. 1; 1981, c. 826, s. 1; 1995, c. 513, ss. 2, 3a; 2019-215, s. 1.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 23 cases, 1948–2010 · leading case: Turlington v. McLeod, 374 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1988).
Turlington v. McLeod, 374 S.E.2d 394 (N.C. 1988). · cites it 20× “The question presented by this case is whether the cartway statute, N.C.G.S. § 136-69 * , employs the general meaning of “tim *592 ber” and thereby provides for cartways for purposes of cutting and removing firewood from property to which there is no other access from public…”
State High. Comm'n v. Thornton, 156 S.E.2d 248 (N.C. 1967). · cites it 6× “(This was not a railroad established under G.S. § 136-69, then § 2023 of the N.C.Code of 1883.”
Candler v. Sluder, 130 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1963). · cites it 8× “” The pertinent portion of G.S. 136-69 provides: “If any person . . .”
Davis v. Forsyth Cnty., 453 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 6× “2d 779 (1958); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-69 (1986). Section 136-69 states: If any person, firm, association, or corporation, shall be engaged in the cultivation of any land or the cutting and removing of any standing timber .”
Harris v. S. Ry. Co., 396 S.E.2d 623 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 4× “For the following reasons, we hold that it is. Defendant argues that plaintiff, as contended in the complaint, is not entitled to the new crossing under the cattle guard statute, N.”
Taylor v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 137 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 1964). · cites it 5× “G.S. 136-69. Respondent’s evidence that ten years ago logs were transported over the sixty-foot easement to Mill Tail Creek and rafted down it to Alligator River is sufficient to sustain his Plonor’s finding of fact that Mill Tail Creek is a navigable stream.”
Pritchard v. Scott, 118 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. 1961). · cites it 3× “136-68 and G.S. 136-69. Candor compels the admission that petitioner finds support for her contention in the cited case.”
Garris v. . Byrd, 49 S.E.2d 625 (N.C. 1948). · cites it 3× “One of the primary questions the defendant seeks to present on this appeal is this: Is an adequate permissive "way of ingress to and egress from property which is not served by a public road “other adequate means of transportation affording necessary and proper means of ingress…”
Turlington v. McLeod, 339 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 3× “G.S. 136-69 provides, in pertinent part: If any person .”
Yount v. Lowe, 215 S.E.2d 563 (N.C. 1975). “The provisions of G.S. 136-69, limiting the purposes for which a cartway may be laid out, and cases construing and applying cartway statutes, relied on by plaintiffs, are inapposite in the factual setting revealed by the record in this case.”
Jones v. Robbins, 660 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). “2d 1, 5 (1963) (citing G.S. 136-69; Triplett v. Lail, 227 N.C. 274 , 41 S.”
Clinard v. Lambeth, 67 S.E.2d 452 (N.C. 1951). “136-68, G.S. 136-69 and G.S. 136-70 with respect to the alteration, extension, or discontinuance thereof, and authorizes any interested party to institute such proceeding.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-69(a) — 1 case
Richards v. Jolley, 703 S.E.2d 467 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
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