NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-173 (2026)

Pedestrians' right-of-way at crosswalks

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(a) Where traffic-control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any unmarked crosswalk at or near an intersection, except as otherwise provided in Part 11 of this Article.

(b) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle.

(c) The driver of a vehicle emerging from or entering an alley, building entrance, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian, or person riding a bicycle, approaching on any sidewalk or walkway extending across such alley, building entrance, road, or driveway. (1937, c. 407, s. 134; 1973, c. 1330, s. 32.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1952–2021 · leading case: Anderson v. Carter, 158 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1968).
Anderson v. Carter, 158 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1968). · cites it 3× “G.S. 20-173 (a) and G.S. 20-174(a) do not prohibit pedestrians from crossing streets on highways at places other than marked crosswalks or unmarked crosswalks at intersections.”
Griffin v. Pancoast, 125 S.E.2d 310 (N.C. 1962). · cites it 2× “The point of collision was therefore important in fixing the rights and duties of the parties. Part 11, c. 20, of our General Statutes fixes the relative rights of pedestrians and motorists.”
Spencer v. McDowell Motor Co., 72 S.E.2d 598 (N.C. 1952). · cites it 2× “134, now G.S. § 20-173, pedestrians' right of way at crosswalks, it is further declared in Sec.”
Blake v. Mallard, 136 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1964). “Had she crossed in the vicinity of the Nightingale where the unnamed dirt street joined the highway she would have had the right of way over a motorist approaching that intersection, G.”
Wagoner v. Butcher, 170 S.E.2d 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969). · cites it 2× “This Court does not adopt the defendants’ contention that G.S. 20-173 (a) must be construed as indicating a legislative intent to establish two mutually exclusive sets of rules to be applied according to the mere presence or absence of a traffic light.”
McCoy v. Dowdy, 192 S.E.2d 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). · cites it 2× “This evi *246 dence taken as true places the plaintiff within the area which is an unmarked pedestrian crossing, thus giving her the right of way under G.S. 20-173 (a) and Anderson v. Carter, 272 N.”
Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Campbell, 141 S.E.2d 296 (N.C. 1965). “Could Campbell ignore the provisions of G.S. 20-173 (a) and 20-38(1)? Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.”
Keaton v. Blue Bird Taxi Co. of Asheville, 86 S.E.2d 93 (N.C. 1955). “*593 Here the plaintiff is entitled to call to her aid these provisions of G.S. 20-173 (a) : “Where traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian…”
Carter v. Murray, 171 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970). · cites it 2× “From these facts, a reasonable inference could legitimately be drawn that plaintiff was struck by defendants’ car while he was crossing Fourth Street within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection and that defendant-driver had failed to yield the right-of-way to him as required…”
Barrow v. Sargent, 862 S.E.2d 688 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4× “¶ 12 These provisions, which Plaintiff cites in support of his first proposed special instruction, are by their terms limited to “pedestrians.”
Barrow v. Sargent, 862 S.E.2d 688 (N.C. Ct. App. 2021). · cites it 4× “¶ 12 These provisions, which Plaintiff cites in support of his first proposed special instruction, are by their terms limited to “pedestrians.”
Downs v. Watson, 173 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970). · cites it 2× “G.S. 20-173(a) provides: *16 “Where traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any…”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-173(a): 6 cases
Anderson v. Carter, 158 S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1968). “G.S. 20-173 (a) and G.S. 20-174(a) do not prohibit pedestrians from crossing streets on highways at places other than marked crosswalks or unmarked crosswalks at intersections.”
Blake v. Mallard, 136 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. 1964). “Had she crossed in the vicinity of the Nightingale where the unnamed dirt street joined the highway she would have had the right of way over a motorist approaching that intersection, G.”
Carter v. Murray, 171 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970). “From these facts, a reasonable inference could legitimately be drawn that plaintiff was struck by defendants’ car while he was crossing Fourth Street within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection and that defendant-driver had failed to yield the right-of-way to him as required…”
Downs v. Watson, 173 S.E.2d 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970). “G.S. 20-173(a) provides: *16 “Where traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk or within any…”
Bowen v. Gardner ex rel. Gardner, 168 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. 1969).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.