N.C. Gen. Stat. » Chapter 39
NC General Statutes

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (2026)

Transfer or obligation voidable as to present or future creditor

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:

(1) With intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or

(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:

a. Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or

b. Intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.

(b) In determining intent under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:

(1) The transfer or obligation was to an insider;

(2) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;

(3) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;

(4) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;

(5) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;

(6) The debtor absconded;

(7) The debtor removed or concealed assets;

(8) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;

(9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;

(10) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;

(11) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor that transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor;

(12) The debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due; and

(13) The debtor transferred the assets in the course of legitimate estate or tax planning.

(c) A creditor making a claim for relief under subsection (a) of this section has the burden of proving the elements of the claim for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. (1997-291, s. 2; 2015-23, s. 1.)

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 72 cases (28 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case: Burns v. Dennis (In Re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
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Burns v. Dennis (In Re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). · cites it 38× “The Trustee asserts the following nine claims *345 against Betty and Tony: (1) fraudulent conveyances to the Farm Affiliates pursuant to Section 544(b) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 39-23.4; (2) fraudulent conveyances to the Farm Affiliates pursuant to Section 548; (3) preferences to the…”
Fischer Inv. Capital, Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 27× “According to Plaintiff, such a result would be particularly appropriate given that Defendant Mark Lewis and Defendant Catawba had transferred the Gravestone Property to Defendant Ridgeline in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(l) and N.C.”
Est. of Hurst ex rel. Cherry v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 36× “Where plaintiffs in prior litigation asserted that business entities were one and the same, they are judicially estopped from asserting any inconsistent factual allegations in this case and cannot show that Moorehead’s transfer to defendant Jones was fraudulent under N.C. Gen.…”
KB Aircraft Acquisition, LLC v. Berry, 790 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 14× “Applying the Statute Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges fraudulent transfer in violation of two separate subsections of the UVTA: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) (2015), which creates a cause of action for transfers or obligations voidable as to present or future…”
Hoch v. Hoch (In re Hoch), 577 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). · cites it 28× “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (c). The UVTA also has a limitations provision for actions arising thereunder, which is at the center of Jane’s Motion for summary judgment.”
Starnes v. Comm'r, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). · cites it 10× “The third and last NCUFTA subsection the Commissioner relies upon is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1). That subsection provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer "[w]ith intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any…”
Starnes v. Comm'r, 2011 T.C. Memo. 63 (Tax Ct. 2011). · cites it 9× “Additionally, transfers are fraudulent to present creditors according to the NCUFTA where: (a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the…”
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 21× “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
Rountree v. Nunnery (In Re Rountree), 448 B.R. 389 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011). · cites it 4× “N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 39-23.4 to -23.5 (2011); see also UFTA §§ 4-5 (providing the same statutory language as N.”
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). · cites it 15× “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
Ivey v. Swofford (In Re Whitley), 463 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). · cites it 9× “§ 548 (a)(1)(a) with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 39-23.4 (allowing a transfer to be avoided when the debtor acted with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” an entity or creditor).”
Norman Owen Trucking, Inc. v. Morkoski, 506 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 3× “at 164 (emphasis in original); see also N.C.G.S. § 39-23.4 (Conveyances with intent to defraud creditors void), and § 39-23.”
Show all 72 citing cases →
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(12) — 1 case
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(4) — 1 case
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a) — 23 cases
Schofield-Johnson, LLC v. United States (In Re Schofield-Johnson), 462 B.R. 539 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011).
Rountree v. Nunnery (In Re Rountree), 448 B.R. 389 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011). “N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 39-23.4 to -23.5 (2011); see also UFTA §§ 4-5 (providing the same statutory language as N.”
Ivey v. Swofford (In Re Whitley), 463 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). “§ 548 (a)(1)(a) with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 39-23.4 (allowing a transfer to be avoided when the debtor acted with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” an entity or creditor).”
Maloney v. All. Dev. Grp., L.L.C., 2006 NCBC 11 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2006).
Mckee v. James, 2013 NCBC 38 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2013).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a)(1) — 23 cases
KB Aircraft Acquisition, LLC v. Berry, 790 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Applying the Statute Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges fraudulent transfer in violation of two separate subsections of the UVTA: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) (2015), which creates a cause of action for transfers or obligations voidable as to present or future…”
Starnes v. Comm'r, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). “The third and last NCUFTA subsection the Commissioner relies upon is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1). That subsection provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer "[w]ith intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any…”
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
Hoch v. Hoch (In re Hoch), 577 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (c). The UVTA also has a limitations provision for actions arising thereunder, which is at the center of Jane’s Motion for summary judgment.”
Poulos v. Poulos, 2016 NCBC 71 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2016).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a)(2) — 18 cases
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
Starnes v. Comm'r, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). “The third and last NCUFTA subsection the Commissioner relies upon is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1). That subsection provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer "[w]ith intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any…”
KB Aircraft Acquisition, LLC v. Berry, 790 S.E.2d 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Applying the Statute Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges fraudulent transfer in violation of two separate subsections of the UVTA: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) (2015), which creates a cause of action for transfers or obligations voidable as to present or future…”
Hoch v. Hoch (In re Hoch), 577 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (c). The UVTA also has a limitations provision for actions arising thereunder, which is at the center of Jane’s Motion for summary judgment.”
Ivey v. Swofford (In Re Whitley), 463 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). “§ 548 (a)(1)(a) with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 39-23.4 (allowing a transfer to be avoided when the debtor acted with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” an entity or creditor).”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a)(2)(a) — 1 case
Dillon v. Stafford, 2020 NCBC 97 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2020).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(a)(l) — 5 cases
Hoch v. Hoch (In re Hoch), 577 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (c). The UVTA also has a limitations provision for actions arising thereunder, which is at the center of Jane’s Motion for summary judgment.”
Fischer Inv. Capital, Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). “According to Plaintiff, such a result would be particularly appropriate given that Defendant Mark Lewis and Defendant Catawba had transferred the Gravestone Property to Defendant Ridgeline in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(l) and N.C.”
Ivey v. Swofford (In Re Whitley), 463 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). “§ 548 (a)(1)(a) with N.C. Gen.Stat. § 39-23.4 (allowing a transfer to be avoided when the debtor acted with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” an entity or creditor).”
Est. of Hurst ex rel. Cherry v. Jones, 750 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). “Where plaintiffs in prior litigation asserted that business entities were one and the same, they are judicially estopped from asserting any inconsistent factual allegations in this case and cannot show that Moorehead’s transfer to defendant Jones was fraudulent under N.C. Gen.…”
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b) — 11 cases
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
Starnes v. Comm'r, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). “The third and last NCUFTA subsection the Commissioner relies upon is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1). That subsection provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer "[w]ith intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any…”
Hoch v. Hoch (In re Hoch), 577 B.R. 202 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2017). “” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (c). The UVTA also has a limitations provision for actions arising thereunder, which is at the center of Jane’s Motion for summary judgment.”
Fischer Inv. Capital, Inc. v. Catawba Dev. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 143 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). “According to Plaintiff, such a result would be particularly appropriate given that Defendant Mark Lewis and Defendant Catawba had transferred the Gravestone Property to Defendant Ridgeline in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(l) and N.C.”
Schofield-Johnson, LLC v. United States (In Re Schofield-Johnson), 462 B.R. 539 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(1) — 5 cases
Starnes v. Comm'r, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2012). “The third and last NCUFTA subsection the Commissioner relies upon is N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1). That subsection provides that a transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer "[w]ith intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any…”
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(11) — 2 cases
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(13) — 2 cases
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
Cherry Cmty. Org. v. Sellars (N.C. 2022).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(3) — 2 cases
Crowell v. Crowell, 809 S.E.2d 325 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). “Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4 (a)(1) establishes as fraudulent any transfer of property that is made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.”
Anhui Omi Vinyl Co., Ltd. v. USA Opel Flooring (N.C. Ct. App. 2024).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(4) — 1 case
Anhui Omi Vinyl Co., Ltd. v. USA Opel Flooring (N.C. Ct. App. 2024).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(5) — 1 case
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(8) — 1 case
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(b)(9) — 2 cases
Andrew v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 3d 739 (M.D.N.C. 2015). “§ 39-23.4 cmt. 5; see also Starnes, T.C.M.”
Anhui Omi Vinyl Co., Ltd. v. USA Opel Flooring (N.C. Ct. App. 2024).
— N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-23.4(c) — 4 cases
Ballantyne Brands, LLC v. Millard (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2023).
Ballantyne Brands, LLC v. Wiesehan (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2023).
Smith v. DiSeveria (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2024).
Ballantyne Brands, LLC v. Wiesehan, Jr. (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2023).
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