NC General Statutes
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-1 (2026)
Fee tail converted into fee simple
✓ current as of July 2026
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Every person seized of an estate in tail shall be deemed to be seized of the same in fee simple. (1784, c. 204, s. 5; R.C., c. 43, s. 1; Code, s. 1325; Rev., s. 1578; C.S., s. 1734; 1995, c. 190, s. 1; c. 525, s. 1.)
§ 41-2: Repealed by Session Laws 2020-50, s. 2(d), effective June 30, 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases, 1944–2016 · leading case: Brisson v. Kathy A. Santoriello, M.D., P.A., 528 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 2000).
Brisson v. Kathy A. Santoriello, M.D., P.A., 528 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. 2000). “Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 41-1, at 32 (2d ed.1995). Many *573 plaintiffs have used "this rule to cure an unforeseen defect in a claim that did not become apparent until trial.”
Augur v. Augur, 573 S.E.2d 125 (N.C. 2002). “Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 41-1, at 33 (1995) (same). Therefore, the trial court’s resolution eliminated any present or future legal effect the DVA might have on defendant as a result of plaintiff’s complaint.”
Allied Spectrum, LLC v. German Auto Ctr., Inc., 793 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). “Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 41-1, at 41-3 (3d ed. 2007). If a plaintiff has rested its case, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice may only be entered by stipulation of the parties or by court order.”
Bass v. Durham Cnty. Hosp. Corp., 580 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). “Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 41-1, at 32 (2d ed. 1995) ... The purpose of our long-standing rule allowing a plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal and refile the claim within one year even though the statute of limitations has run subsequent to a plaintiff's…”
City of Raleigh v. Coll. Campus Apts., Inc., 380 S.E.2d 163 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). “See 9 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 147 (1971), (hereinafter cited as Wright and Miller ) and W.”
In Re Wilson's Will, 133 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. 1963). “Wilson used the word "children" in the sense of "heirs of the body" it follows that each nephew and the great-nephew took an estate tail by virtue of the rule in Shelley's case, which by the statute of 1784 (G.S. § 41-1) is converted into an estate in fee simple.”
Ray v. Ray, 155 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1967). “By such a devise, the rule in Shelley’s case, and the doctrine of merger, give A an estate tail which G.S. 41-1 converts into a fee simple. In re Will of Wilson, 260 N.”
Bb&t Boli Plan Tr. v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2016 NCBC 34 (N.C. Bus. Ct. 2016). “The rule also offers a safety net to plaintiff or his counsel who are either unprepared or unwilling to proceed with trial the first time the case is called.”
Lackey v. Hamlet City Bd. of Educ., 128 S.E.2d 806 (N.C. 1963). “, 1734 (now G.S. 41-1) ), and if she should die not having such heirs or issue living at the time of her death, then to the heirs of the grantor.”
Davis v. Brown, 84 S.E.2d 334 (N.C. 1954). “G.S. 41-1; Cole v. Thornton, 180 N.C. 90 , 104 S.”
Wright v. Vaden, 146 S.E.2d 31 (N.C. 1966). “Plaintiffs contend that the devise “to the children or other lineal descendants of said Elsie May Johnson” is the equivalent of a devise to the heirs of her body and that the words are, therefore, words of limitation which create in her a fee tail, converted by G.”
Hollowell v. Hollowell, 420 S.E.2d 827 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). “§ 41-1 (1990) is instructive on the first of these issues and provides in part: Every contingent limitation in any deed or will, made to depend upon the dying of any person without heir or heirs of the body, or without issue or issues of the body, or without children, or…”
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