1. Any individual who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have given consent to submit to an onsite screening test or tests of the individual's breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration in the individual's breath upon the request of a law enforcement officer who has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or a violation under section 39-08-01 or an equivalent offense, or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer's observations, formulated an opinion that the individual's body contains alcohol.
2. An individual may not be required to submit to a screening test or tests of breath while at a hospital as a patient if the medical practitioner in immediate charge of the individual's case is not first notified of the proposal to make the requirement, or objects to the test or tests on the ground that such would be prejudicial to the proper care or treatment of the patient.
3. The screening test or tests must be performed by an enforcement officer certified as a chemical test operator by the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee and according to methods and with devices approved by the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee. The results of such screening test must be used only for determining whether or not a further test shall be given under the provisions of section 39-20-01. The officer shall inform the individual that North Dakota law requires the individual to take the screening test to determine whether the individual is under the influence of alcohol and that refusal of the individual to submit to a screening test may result in a revocation for at least one hundred eighty days and up to three years of that individual's driving privileges. If such individual refuses to submit to such screening test or tests, none may be given, but such refusal is admissible in a court proceeding if the individual was arrested in violation of section 39-08-01 and did not take any additional chemical tests requested by the law enforcement officer. Such refusal is sufficient cause to revoke such individual's license or permit to drive in the same manner as provided in section 39-20-04, and a hearing as provided in section 39-20-05 and a judicial review as provided in section 39-20-06 must be available.
4. The director must not revoke an individual's driving privileges for refusing to submit to a screening test requested under this section if the individual provides a sufficient breath, blood, or urine sample for a chemical test requested under section 39-20-01 for the same incident.
5. No provisions of this section may supersede any provisions of chapter 39-20, nor may any provision of chapter 39-20 be construed to supersede this section except as provided herein.
6. For the purposes of this section, "chemical test operator" means an individual certified by the director of the state crime laboratory or the director's designee as qualified to perform analysis for alcohol in an individual's blood, breath, or urine.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
51
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1980–2023 · leading case:
Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, 894 N.W.2d 888.
Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, 894 N.W.2d 888.
· cites it 44× “[¶24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was driving while impaired.” On the basis of a different…”
Schulke v. NDDOT, 2020 ND 53.
· cites it 30× “The district court reversed the administrative hearing officer’s decision after finding the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that Schulke had refused an “onsite” screening test was erroneous as a matter of law because the test occurred at a location other than the…”
City of Fargo v. Erickson, 1999 ND 145, 598 N.W.2d 787.
· cites it 22× “test was inadmissible under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14. The City asserts only the result of an A.”
State v. Webster, 2017 ND 75, 891 N.W.2d 769.
· cites it 20× “[¶ 15] The charges against Webster involved an incident in 2014, and under the operative statute, a person who operated a motor vehicle on a highway of this state who refused to submit to an onsite screening test upon the request of an officer under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 was…”
State v. O'Connor, 2016 ND 72, 877 N.W.2d 312.
· cites it 8× “The district court agreed with O’Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test, concluding: “[A] plain language reading of the statutes does not allow the implied consent advisory for screening tests under § 39-20-14 to be a substitute for the implied consent advisory…”
Yellowbird v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2013 ND 131, 833 N.W.2d 536.
· cites it 18× “Because we conclude the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 does not require the officer requesting the on-site screening test to be certified to administer the test, we affirm the district court judgment affirming the Department’s revocation of YellowBird’s driving privileges.”
Fossum v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2014 ND 47, 843 N.W.2d 282.
· cites it 16× “[¶16] This Court has explained the role of the N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 on-site screening test: Similar in purpose to the various field sobriety tests, the purpose of an on-site chemical screening test is to insure that sufficient probable cause exists to warrant an arrest .”
State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335 (N.D. 1987).
· cites it 12× “screening test evidence is precluded by § 39-20-14, N.D.C.C., when “probable cause” for arresting the defendant is not an issue at trial.”
Jesser v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2019 ND 287, 936 N.W.2d 102.
· cites it 23× “III [¶7] The Department argues the district court erred by reversing the administrative hearing officer’s decision because the Department had authority to revoke Jesser’s license under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 for refusal to take the onsite screening test.”
State v. Taylor, 2018 ND 132, 911 N.W.2d 905.
· cites it 16× “" Taylor broached the issue about his earlier requested jury instruction under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, and the court again denied his request: COURT: .”
State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, 849 N.W.2d 239.
· cites it 8× “Under North Dakota’s implied consent law, N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1), a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of the individual’s breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration if there is reason to believe: (1) a traffic violation has…”
State v. Guttormson, 2015 ND 235, 869 N.W.2d 737.
· cites it 24× “But, I am not convinced that by the mere reference to N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 (which discusses the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may request an on-site screening test), within the actual charge for refusal under N.”
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-14(1): 11 cases
Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, 894 N.W.2d 888.
“[¶24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was driving while impaired.” On the basis of a different…”
State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, 849 N.W.2d 239.
“Under North Dakota’s implied consent law, N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1), a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of the individual’s breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration if there is reason to believe: (1) a traffic violation has…”
State v. Webster, 2017 ND 75, 891 N.W.2d 769.
“[¶ 15] The charges against Webster involved an incident in 2014, and under the operative statute, a person who operated a motor vehicle on a highway of this state who refused to submit to an onsite screening test upon the request of an officer under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 was…”
Schulke v. NDDOT, 2020 ND 53.
“The district court reversed the administrative hearing officer’s decision after finding the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that Schulke had refused an “onsite” screening test was erroneous as a matter of law because the test occurred at a location other than the…”
State v. Taylor, 2018 ND 132, 911 N.W.2d 905.
“" Taylor broached the issue about his earlier requested jury instruction under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, and the court again denied his request: COURT: .”
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-14(3): 15 cases
State v. O'Connor, 2016 ND 72, 877 N.W.2d 312.
“The district court agreed with O’Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test, concluding: “[A] plain language reading of the statutes does not allow the implied consent advisory for screening tests under § 39-20-14 to be a substitute for the implied consent advisory…”
Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, 894 N.W.2d 888.
“[¶24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was driving while impaired.” On the basis of a different…”
Fossum v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2014 ND 47, 843 N.W.2d 282.
“[¶16] This Court has explained the role of the N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 on-site screening test: Similar in purpose to the various field sobriety tests, the purpose of an on-site chemical screening test is to insure that sufficient probable cause exists to warrant an arrest .”
N.D. Cent. Code § 39-20-14(4): 2 cases
Jesser v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2019 ND 287, 936 N.W.2d 102.
“III [¶7] The Department argues the district court erred by reversing the administrative hearing officer’s decision because the Department had authority to revoke Jesser’s license under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 for refusal to take the onsite screening test.”
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