(A)(1) The attorney general or the court of claims shall not make or order an award of reparations to a claimant if the criminally injurious conduct upon which the claimant bases a claim never was reported to a law enforcement officer or agency.
(2)(a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b), (c), or (d) of this section, the attorney general or court of claims shall not make or order an award of reparations to a claimant if the claim is based on criminally injurious conduct that occurred more than three years before the claim was filed or if the claim was denied under the law as it existed prior to the effective date of this amendment.
(b) If the claimant was under twenty-one years of age at the time of the criminally injurious conduct, the claim is not barred under division (A)(2)(a) of this section until after the claimant's twenty-fourth birthday.
(c) If the claim is based on criminally injurious conduct that occurred prior to the effective date of this section and was denied under the law as it existed prior to the effective date of this amendment, the claim is not barred under division (A)(2)(a) of this section and the claimant is eligible to reapply for relief under this section until more than three years have passed since the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to the claim.
(d) Notwithstanding divisions (A)(2)(a), (b), and (c) of this section, the attorney general is permitted to make an award of reparations at any time for good cause shown.
(B)(1) The attorney general or the court of claims shall not make or order an award of reparations to a claimant if any of the following apply:
(a) The claimant is the offender or an accomplice of the offender who committed the criminally injurious conduct, or the award would unjustly benefit the offender or accomplice.
(b) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, both of the following apply:
(i) The victim was a passenger in a motor vehicle and knew or reasonably should have known that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both.
(ii) The claimant is seeking compensation for injuries proximately caused by the driver described in division (B)(1)(b)(i) of this section being under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both.
(c) Both of the following apply:
(i) The victim was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both and was a passenger in a motor vehicle and, if sober, should have reasonably known that the driver was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both.
(ii) The claimant is seeking compensation for injuries proximately caused by the driver described in division (B)(1)(b)(i) of this section being under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or both.
(2) Division (B)(1)(b) of this section does not apply if on the date of the occurrence of the criminally injurious conduct, the victim was under sixteen years of age or was at least sixteen years of age but less than eighteen years of age and was riding with a parent, guardian, or care-provider.
(C) The attorney general or the court of claims, upon a finding that the claimant or victim has not fully cooperated with appropriate law enforcement agencies, may deny a claim or reconsider and reduce an award of reparations.
(D) The attorney general or the court of claims shall reduce an award of reparations or deny a claim for an award of reparations that is otherwise payable to a claimant to the extent that the economic loss upon which the claim is based is recouped from other persons, including collateral sources. If an award is reduced or a claim is denied because of the expected recoupment of all or part of the economic loss of the claimant from a collateral source, the amount of the award or the denial of the claim shall be conditioned upon the claimant's economic loss being recouped by the collateral source. If the award or denial is conditioned upon the recoupment of the claimant's economic loss from a collateral source and it is determined that the claimant did not unreasonably fail to present a timely claim to the collateral source and will not receive all or part of the expected recoupment, the claim may be reopened and an award may be made in an amount equal to the amount of expected recoupment that it is determined the claimant will not receive from the collateral source.
If the claimant recoups all or part of the economic loss upon which the claim is based from any other person or entity, including a collateral source, the attorney general may recover pursuant to section 2743.72 of the Revised Code the part of the award that represents the economic loss for which the claimant received the recoupment from the other person or entity.
(E)(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (E)(2) of this section, in determining whether to make an award of reparations pursuant to this section, the attorney general or the court of claims shall consider whether there was contributory misconduct by the victim or the claimant. The attorney general or the court of claims shall reduce an award of reparations or deny a claim for an award of reparations to the extent it is determined to be reasonable because of the contributory misconduct of the claimant or the victim.
(2) Notwithstanding division (E)(1) of this section, in determining whether to make an award of reparations pursuant to this section, if the criminally injurious conduct upon which the claim is based resulted in a victim's death, the attorney general and the court of claims shall not consider whether there was contributory misconduct by the deceased victim. The attorney general or the court of claims shall not reduce an award of reparations or deny a claim for an award of reparations based on contributory misconduct of a deceased victim.
(F) The attorney general or the court of claims shall not make an award of reparations to a claimant if the criminally injurious conduct that caused the injury or death that is the subject of the claim occurred to a victim who was an adult and while the victim, after being convicted of or pleading guilty to an offense, was serving a sentence of imprisonment in any detention facility, as defined in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.
(G) If a claimant unreasonably fails to present a claim timely to a source of benefits or advantages that would have been a collateral source and that would have reimbursed the claimant for all or a portion of a particular expense, the attorney general or the court of claims may reduce an award of reparations or deny a claim for an award of reparations to the extent that it is reasonable to do so.
(H) Reparations payable to a victim described in division (L)(1) of section 2743.51 of the Revised Code and to all other claimants sustaining economic loss because of injury to or the death of that victim shall not exceed fifty thousand dollars in the aggregate. Reparations payable to a victim described in division (L)(2) of section 2743.51 of the Revised Code shall not exceed five thousand dollars. Reparations payable to a victim described in division (L)(3) of section 2743.51 of the Revised Code shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars. If the attorney general or the court of claims reduces an award under division (E) of this section, the maximum aggregate amount of reparations payable under this division shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction under division (E) of this section.
(I) Reparations otherwise payable to a victim under this section shall not be payable to the victim during any period that the victim is incarcerated.
(J) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit an award to a claimant whose claim is based on the claimant's being a victim of a violation of section 2905.32 of the Revised Code if the claimant was less than eighteen years of age when the criminally injurious conduct occurred.
Last updated June 15, 2022 at 2:42 PM
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 124
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1978–2024 · leading case: State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988).
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988). · cites it 12דRelator argues that R.C. 2743.60 (E) is a bill of attainder prohibited by Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution, a denial of equal protection of the laws under both Constitutions, and…”
State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2003). · cites it 9ד{¶ 2} Following an investigation, appellee Ohio Attorney General recommended that Ferguson’s application be denied under R.C. 2743.60(E) because he had engaged in felonious conduct within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to his claim.”
State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio 1998). · cites it 2דThe statute at issue in Matz was R.C. 2743.60(E), which prohibits those who had been convicted of a felony within ten years from collecting a Victims of Crime Compensation award.”
In re McKinnon, 476 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1984). · cites it 22דThat issue is whether R.C. 2743.60(E), which became effective on March 18, 1983, is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the criminally injurious conduct occurred prior to that date.”
State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404 (1998). · cites it 2דThe statute at issue in Matz was R.C. 2743.60(E), which prohibits those who had been convicted of a felony within ten years from collecting a Victims of Crime Compensation award.”
In re Schroepfer, 448 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1983). · cites it 7ד51(B) as inpari materia, the phrase “is recouped from other persons, including collateral sources” (R.C. 2743.60[D]) includes those benefits which are “readily available” (R.”
In re DeCerbo, 449 N.E.2d 526 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1982). · cites it 6דThe discussion of the appellant with reference to the denial is surplusage and we can properly only consider the first assignment of error in appellant’s brief, which is: “The panel of commissioners erred in determining that an award was not precluded by Ohio Revised Code…”
State v. Jarvis, 2020-Ohio-1127, 152 N.E.3d 1225. “The Court of Claims of Ohio denied recovery to the relator based upon the 1983 Muskingum County, Case No.”
In re Cowan, 499 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1986). · cites it 26ד61, the court finds the decisions of the commissioners are unreasonable and unlawful. Hence, the order of the panel of commissioners is reversed and payment of the claim is denied.”
In re Robinson, 684 N.E.2d 754 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1996). · cites it 5דThe panel’s determination reversed the decision of the single commissioner, which denied the applicant’s claim for an award of reparations pursuant to R.C. 2743.60(E). The commissioner .had found that the applicant, Michael Robinson, was previously arrested for rape and…”
In re Vaughn, 698 N.E.2d 148 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997). · cites it 11דVaughn-Johnson’s claim for an award of reparations pursu *174 ant to R.C. 2743.60(E), because decedent Tyrone R.”
In re Carver, 698 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997). · cites it 4דThe Attorney General argued that the decision of the single commissioner should be affirmed, since R.C. 2743.60(E) provides for denial of a claim on the basis of felonious conduct, as well as a felony conviction.”
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988). “Relator argues that R.C. 2743.60 (E) is a bill of attainder prohibited by Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution, a denial of equal protection of the laws under both Constitutions, and…”
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988). “Relator argues that R.C. 2743.60 (E) is a bill of attainder prohibited by Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution, a denial of equal protection of the laws under both Constitutions, and…”
In re DeCerbo, 449 N.E.2d 526 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1982). “The discussion of the appellant with reference to the denial is surplusage and we can properly only consider the first assignment of error in appellant’s brief, which is: “The panel of commissioners erred in determining that an award was not precluded by Ohio Revised Code…”
In re Cowan, 499 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1986). “61, the court finds the decisions of the commissioners are unreasonable and unlawful. Hence, the order of the panel of commissioners is reversed and payment of the claim is denied.”
In re Schroepfer, 448 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1983). “51(B) as inpari materia, the phrase “is recouped from other persons, including collateral sources” (R.C. 2743.60[D]) includes those benefits which are “readily available” (R.”
In re DeCerbo, 449 N.E.2d 526 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1982). “The discussion of the appellant with reference to the denial is surplusage and we can properly only consider the first assignment of error in appellant’s brief, which is: “The panel of commissioners erred in determining that an award was not precluded by Ohio Revised Code…”
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988). “Relator argues that R.C. 2743.60 (E) is a bill of attainder prohibited by Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution, a denial of equal protection of the laws under both Constitutions, and…”
State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio 1998). “The statute at issue in Matz was R.C. 2743.60(E), which prohibits those who had been convicted of a felony within ten years from collecting a Victims of Crime Compensation award.”
State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2003). “{¶ 2} Following an investigation, appellee Ohio Attorney General recommended that Ferguson’s application be denied under R.C. 2743.60(E) because he had engaged in felonious conduct within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to his claim.”
In re McKinnon, 476 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1984). “That issue is whether R.C. 2743.60(E), which became effective on March 18, 1983, is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the criminally injurious conduct occurred prior to that date.”
State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404 (1998). “The statute at issue in Matz was R.C. 2743.60(E), which prohibits those who had been convicted of a felony within ten years from collecting a Victims of Crime Compensation award.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.60(E)(1): 2 cases
State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2003). “{¶ 2} Following an investigation, appellee Ohio Attorney General recommended that Ferguson’s application be denied under R.C. 2743.60(E) because he had engaged in felonious conduct within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to his claim.”
State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 2003). “{¶ 2} Following an investigation, appellee Ohio Attorney General recommended that Ferguson’s application be denied under R.C. 2743.60(E) because he had engaged in felonious conduct within ten years prior to the criminally injurious conduct that gave rise to his claim.”
In re Carver, 698 N.E.2d 151 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1997). “The Attorney General argued that the decision of the single commissioner should be affirmed, since R.C. 2743.60(E) provides for denial of a claim on the basis of felonious conduct, as well as a felony conviction.”
In re Cowan, 499 N.E.2d 937 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1986). “61, the court finds the decisions of the commissioners are unreasonable and unlawful. Hence, the order of the panel of commissioners is reversed and payment of the claim is denied.”
State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 525 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio 1988). “Relator argues that R.C. 2743.60 (E) is a bill of attainder prohibited by Section 10, Article I, United States Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Section 9, Article I, Ohio Constitution, a denial of equal protection of the laws under both Constitutions, and…”
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