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Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.71 (2026)

Reimbursement of investigative costs of arson

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2026 179citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 179 opinions since 1983, 10 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (A) (45 cases).

(A) As used in this section:

(1) "Agency" means any law enforcement agency, other public agency, or public official involved in the investigation or prosecution of the offender or in the investigation of the fire or explosion in an aggravated arson, arson, or criminal damaging or endangering case. An "agency" includes, but is not limited to, a sheriff's office, a municipal corporation, township, or township or joint police district police department, the office of a prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village solicitor, or similar chief legal officer of a municipal corporation, the fire marshal's office, a municipal corporation, township, or township fire district fire department, the office of a fire prevention officer, and any state, county, or municipal corporation crime laboratory.

(2) "Assets" includes all forms of real or personal property.

(3) "Itemized statement" means the statement of costs described in division (B) of this section.

(4) "Offender" means the person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing, attempting to commit, or complicity in committing a violation of section 2909.02 or 2909.03 of the Revised Code, or, when the means used are fire or explosion, division (A)(2) of section 2909.06 of the Revised Code.

(5) "Costs" means the reasonable value of the time spent by an officer or employee of an agency on the aggravated arson, arson, or criminal damaging or endangering case, any moneys spent by the agency on that case, and the reasonable fair market value of resources used or expended by the agency on that case.

(B) Prior to the sentencing of an offender, the court shall enter an order that directs agencies that wish to be reimbursed by the offender for the costs they incurred in the investigation or prosecution of the offender or in the investigation of the fire or explosion involved in the case, to file with the court within a specified time an itemized statement of those costs. The order also shall require that a copy of the itemized statement be given to the offender or offender's attorney within the specified time. Only itemized statements so filed and given shall be considered at the hearing described in division (C) of this section.

(C) The court shall set a date for a hearing on all the itemized statements filed with it and given to the offender or the offender's attorney in accordance with division (B) of this section. The hearing shall be held prior to the sentencing of the offender, but may be held on the same day as the sentencing. Notice of the hearing date shall be given to the offender or the offender's attorney and to the agencies whose itemized statements are involved. At the hearing, each agency has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the costs set forth in its itemized statement were incurred in the investigation or prosecution of the offender or in the investigation of the fire or explosion involved in the case, and of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the offender has assets available for the reimbursement of all or a portion of the costs.

The offender may cross-examine all witnesses and examine all documentation presented by the agencies at the hearing, and the offender may present at the hearing witnesses and documentation the offender has obtained without a subpoena or a subpoena duces tecum or, in the case of documentation, that belongs to the offender. The offender also may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum for, and present and examine at the hearing, witnesses and documentation, subject to the following applying to the witnesses or documentation subpoenaed:

(1) The testimony of witnesses subpoenaed or documentation subpoenaed is material to the preparation or presentation by the offender of the offender's defense to the claims of the agencies for a reimbursement of costs;

(2) If witnesses to be subpoenaed are personnel of an agency or documentation to be subpoenaed belongs to an agency, the personnel or documentation may be subpoenaed only if the agency involved has indicated, pursuant to this division, that it intends to present the personnel as witnesses or use the documentation at the hearing. The offender shall submit, in writing, a request to an agency as described in this division to ascertain whether the agency intends to present various personnel as witnesses or to use particular documentation. The request shall indicate that the offender is considering issuing subpoenas to personnel of the agency who are specifically named or identified by title or position, or for documentation of the agency that is specifically described or generally identified, and shall request the agency to indicate, in writing, whether it intends to present such personnel as witnesses or to use such documentation at the hearing. The agency shall promptly reply to the request of the offender. An agency is prohibited from presenting personnel as witnesses or from using documentation at the hearing if it indicates to the offender it does not intend to do so in response to a request of the offender under this division, or if it fails to reply or promptly reply to such a request.

(D) Following the hearing, the court shall determine which of the agencies established by a preponderance of the evidence that costs set forth in their itemized statements were incurred as described in division (C) of this section and that the offender has assets available for reimbursement purposes. The court also shall determine whether the offender has assets available to reimburse all such agencies, in whole or in part, for their established costs, and if it determines that the assets are available, it shall order the offender, as part of the offender's sentence, to reimburse the agencies from the offender's assets for all or a specified portion of their established costs.

The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.71 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Gaines, 545 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 1989).
cites § 2929.71 18×subsections: (A) 3×cited by 126 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The trial court thereafter imposed an additional term of three years’ actual incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.71. This section provides in pertinent part: “(A) The court shall impose a term of actual incarceration of three years in addition to imposing a life sentence…”
The case’s holding
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was operable or could readily have been rendered operable to impose a mandatory firearm specification sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“prior to imposition of an additional term of three years' actual incarceration for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was operable or could readily have been rendered operable at the time of the offense.” · 11 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Moore, 476 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio 1985).
cites § 2929.71 21×subsections: (B) 14× (A)(2)cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“01(A)(1), is subject to the enhancement provision of R.C. 2929.71 as it existed prior to the amendment of R.”
The case’s holding
An unarmed accomplice to aggravated robbery is subject to a mandatory three-year term of actual incarceration on a firearm specification.
3
GREENState v. Powell, 571 N.E.2d 125 (Ohio 1991).
cites § 2929.71 12×subsections: (A) (A)(2)cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The primary issue presented is whether a defendant may be given an additional three-year term of actual incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.71, the so-called gun specification statute, for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony where the firearm is acquired by…”
The case’s holding
Aggravated burglary continues as long as the defendant remains in the structure and a firearm specification applies if the defendant possesses a firearm at any point during the crime.
Later courts cite it for
“the crime of aggravated burglary continues so long as the defendant remains in the structure being burglarized because the trespass of the defendant has not been completed.” · 16 citing courts
4
REDState v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380 (1997).
cites § 2929.71 3×subsections: (A)cited by 3,345 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Superseded by statute.
Where it cites § 2929.71
“” {¶ 17} Furthermore, if we were to accept the findings of the court of appeals’ majority in this case, an individual who commits a holdup with a real gun could possibly avoid a firearm specification conviction simply by not saying anything and by not discharging the firearm at…”
The case’s holding
A firearm specification may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and an appellate court requires only a majority vote to reverse a conviction based on sufficiency of evidence.
5
GREENState v. Loines, 484 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1984).
cites § 2929.71 18×subsections: (C) 2× (A)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“This second determination is necessary for purposes of invoking R.C. 2929.71, Ohio’s recent felony-firearm statute.”
6
GREENMorgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 626 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 1994).
cites § 2929.71 8×subsections: (A)(2)cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The public policy behind this enactment is apparent: a criminal with a gun is both more dangerous and harder to apprehend than one without a gun.”
The case’s holding
Courts must give effect to the plain and unambiguous language of a statute and cannot ignore it under the guise of liberal construction in favor of the accused.
Later courts cite it for
“ignore the plain and unambiguous language of a statute under the guise of either statutory interpretation or liberal construction; the courts must give effect to the words utilized.” · 10 citing courts
7
GREENIn re Good, 692 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 1997).
cites § 2929.71 8×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“01 (aggravated robbery) and R.C. 2929.71 (possession of a firearm while committing a felony).”
The case’s holding
The trier of fact is in the best position to determine the facts of a case by observing and hearing the testimony of witnesses.
Later courts cite it for
“the trier of fact has the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify and is in the best position to determine the facts of the case.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Chapman, 487 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio 1986).
cites § 2929.71 7×subsections: (A)cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“01, may be sentenced to a mandatory three-year term under the enhancement provision of R.C. 2929.71. This court previously held that unarmed accomplices were subject to R.”
The case’s holding
A mandatory prison term for a firearm specification applies to an offender regardless of whether they were the principal or an unarmed accomplice.
Later courts cite it for
“regardless of whether he was the principal offender or an unarmed accomplice.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Houseman, 591 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990).
cites § 2929.71 10×subsections: (B)cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“” The trial court merged the firearm specifications in Counts 2, 3, and 9 for one three-year term of actual incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.71. The trial court also merged the firearm specifications in Counts 4 and 8 for one three-year term of actual incarceration and the…”
The case’s holding
Aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and grand theft arising from distinct conduct with different purposes are not allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.
Later courts cite it for
“appellant committed aggravated robbery when he committed the theft of mrs. swank's car keys and antique gun while in possession of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance" and "grand theft was committed when appellant took mrs. swank's automobile” · 1 citing court
10
GREENState v. McCall, 2012-Ohio-5604.
cites § 2929.71 16×subsections: (B) 15×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“{¶20} Likewise, the Fifth District has held that a claim of improper sentencing on a firearm specification under R.C 2929.71 is subject to res judicata and cannot be raised in a post-appeal motion.”
11
GREENState v. Combs, 581 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio 1991).
cites § 2929.71 4×cited by 236 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“Combs argues he has a “right to serve the six years” for the gun specifications before execution. However, Combs’ argument lacks merit.”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor may legitimately refer to the nature and circumstances of an offense to refute mitigating suggestions and explain why aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors.
Later courts cite it for
“probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Jones, 2017-Ohio-413.
cites § 2929.71 5×subsections: (D)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant when it improperly ordered Appellant to reimburse and/or pay restitution to the Toledo Fire Department and failed to comply with R.C. 2929.71. 5. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant at sentencing by imposing new…”
Later courts cite it for
“when a misdemeanor sentence is imposed within the statutory limits, a reviewing court will presume the trial judge followed the statutes, unless there is evidence to the contrary.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Price, 493 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1985).
cites § 2929.71 12×subsections: (A) 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“Thus, there is no offense prescribed by R.C. 2929.71 (A) that stands on its own. In addition to the fact that the statute does not create a separate offense, it does not create a separate penalty such that a defendant is required to endure multiple sentences for the same offense.”
14
GREENState v. Tyson, 482 N.E.2d 1327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1984).
cites § 2929.71 13×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The specification to the primary charge pursuant to R.C. 2929.71 and 2941.141, which provides for three years’ actual incarceration for the use of a firearm in the perpetration of an offense, alleged that appellant did have a firearm while committing the offense of attempted…”
15
GREENState v. Wills, 635 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1994).
cites § 2929.71 5×subsections: (B) 4×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“When it enacted R.C. 2929.71, the General Assembly intended to separately punish each criminal transaction committed with the assistance of firearms.”
The case’s holding
A transaction under the firearm specification statute is a series of continuous acts bound together by time, space, and purpose, directed toward a single objective.
Later courts cite it for
“a series of continuous acts bound together by time, space and purpose, and directed toward a single objective.” · 24 citing courts
16
GREENState v. White, 594 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1991).
cites § 2929.71 11×subsections: (B) 7× (A)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“R.C. 2929.71 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(B) If an offender is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, two or more felonies and two or more specifications charging him with having a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the felonies, each…”
17
GREENState v. Xie, 584 N.E.2d 715 (Ohio 1992).
cites § 2929.71 2×cited by 1,659 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“R.C. 2929.71. Xie’s counsel apparently added the two sentence terms together to conclude that Xie would be eligible for parole in twenty-three years.”
The case’s holding
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” · 259 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80.
cites § 2929.71 2×subsections: (B) 2×cited by 228 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“2d 370 (1994), we defined the word “transaction” as it was used in a previous firearm-enhancement statute, R.C. 2929.71(B), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1307, 1143.”
The case’s holding
Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice to the defense.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the jury instructions correctly state the law is a question that is reviewed de novo.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Murphy, 551 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio 1990).
cites § 2929.71 10×subsections: (A) 2×cited by 131 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“The issue before this court is whether the firearm specification in R.C. 2929.71 can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt without actually presenting scientific or direct evidence as to the *208 operability of the firearm.”
The case’s holding
The state establishes firearm operability beyond a reasonable doubt through lay witness testimony regarding the instrument and the circumstances of the crime without needing to produce the physical weapon.
Later courts cite it for
“the state must present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was operable, or could readily have been rendered operable, at the time of the offense.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Hanning, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (Ohio 2000).
cites § 2929.71 3×subsections: (A)(2)cited by 123 cases
Where it cites § 2929.71
“This court had previously considered the same question with regard to former R.C. 2929.71 before it was amended on June 30, 1983.”
The case’s holding
Mandatory juvenile bindover provisions require the child to personally possess and display a firearm rather than attributing the actions of an accomplice to the juvenile.
Later courts cite it for
“discretionary transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety.” · 8 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 17 cases in 1990. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ohio Ct. App.131Ohio43N.D. Ohio36th Cir.1S.D. Ohio1
By subsection
(A)45 cases
State v. Gaines, 545 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 1989).“The trial court thereafter imposed an additional term of three years’ actual incarceration pursuant to R.C. 2929.71. This section provides in pertinent part: “(A) The court shall impose a term of actual incarceration of three years in addition to imposing a life sentence…”
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380 (1997).“” {¶ 17} Furthermore, if we were to accept the findings of the court of appeals’ majority in this case, an individual who commits a holdup with a real gun could possibly avoid a firearm specification conviction simply by not saying anything and by not discharging the firearm at…”
State v. Price, 493 N.E.2d 1372 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1985).“Thus, there is no offense prescribed by R.C. 2929.71 (A) that stands on its own. In addition to the fact that the statute does not create a separate offense, it does not create a separate penalty such that a defendant is required to endure multiple sentences for the same offense.”
State v. Dapice, 566 N.E.2d 1261 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1989).
State v. Manley, 643 N.E.2d 1107 (Ohio 1994).
Showing the top 5 of 45. More in the list view →
(A)(1)1 case
State v. Rodriguez, 615 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1992).
(A)(2)13 cases
State v. Thomas, 2016-Ohio-5567, 70 N.E.3d 496.
State v. Hanning, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (Ohio 2000).“This court had previously considered the same question with regard to former R.C. 2929.71 before it was amended on June 30, 1983.”
Morgan v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 626 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio 1994).“The public policy behind this enactment is apparent: a criminal with a gun is both more dangerous and harder to apprehend than one without a gun.”
State v. Brown, 668 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1995).
State v. Feliciano, 685 N.E.2d 1307 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 1996).
Showing the top 5 of 13. More in the list view →
(B)29 cases
State v. Moore, 476 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio 1985).“01(A)(1), is subject to the enhancement provision of R.C. 2929.71 as it existed prior to the amendment of R.”
State v. McCall, 2012-Ohio-5604.“{¶20} Likewise, the Fifth District has held that a claim of improper sentencing on a firearm specification under R.C 2929.71 is subject to res judicata and cannot be raised in a post-appeal motion.”
State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, 54 N.E.3d 80.“2d 370 (1994), we defined the word “transaction” as it was used in a previous firearm-enhancement statute, R.C. 2929.71(B), Am.Sub.S.B. No. 258, 143 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1307, 1143.”
State v. Wills, 635 N.E.2d 370 (Ohio 1994).“When it enacted R.C. 2929.71, the General Assembly intended to separately punish each criminal transaction committed with the assistance of firearms.”
State v. White, 594 N.E.2d 1087 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1991).“R.C. 2929.71 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “(B) If an offender is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, two or more felonies and two or more specifications charging him with having a firearm on or about his person or under his control while committing the felonies, each…”
Showing the top 5 of 29. More in the list view →
(C)3 cases
State v. Loines, 484 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1984).“This second determination is necessary for purposes of invoking R.C. 2929.71, Ohio’s recent felony-firearm statute.”
State v. Lytle, 551 N.E.2d 950 (Ohio 1990).
State v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-3759.
(D)3 cases
State v. Jones, 2017-Ohio-413.“The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant when it improperly ordered Appellant to reimburse and/or pay restitution to the Toledo Fire Department and failed to comply with R.C. 2929.71. 5. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant at sentencing by imposing new…”
State v. Perz, 877 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 2007).
State v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-3759.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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