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Ohio Revised Code

Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03 (2026)

Presumption of paternity

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Effective:
June 15, 2006
Latest Legislation:
House Bill 102 - 126th General Assembly
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(A) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the following circumstances:

(1) The man and the child's mother are or have been married to each other, and the child is born during the marriage or is born within three hundred days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, divorce, or dissolution or after the man and the child's mother separate pursuant to a separation agreement.

(2) The man and the child's mother attempted, before the child's birth, to marry each other by a marriage that was solemnized in apparent compliance with the law of the state in which the marriage took place, the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and either of the following applies:

(a) The marriage can only be declared invalid by a court and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred days after the termination of the marriage by death, annulment, divorce, or dissolution;

(b) The attempted marriage is invalid without a court order and the child is born within three hundred days after the termination of cohabitation.

(3) An acknowledgment of paternity has been filed pursuant to section 3111.23 or former section 5101.314 of the Revised Code and has not become final under former section 3111.211 or 5101.314 or section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised Code.

(B) A presumption that arises under this section can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that includes the results of genetic testing, except that a presumption that is conclusive as provided in division (A) of section 3111.95 or division (B) of section 3111.97 of the Revised Code cannot be rebutted. An acknowledgment of paternity that becomes final under section 2151.232, 3111.25, or 3111.821 of the Revised Code is not a presumption and shall be considered a final and enforceable determination of paternity unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under section 3111.28 or 3119.962 of the Revised Code. If two or more conflicting presumptions arise under this section, the court shall determine, based upon logic and policy considerations, which presumption controls.

(C)(1) Except as provided in division (C)(2) of this section, a presumption of paternity that arose pursuant to this section prior to March 22, 2001, shall remain valid on and after that date unless rebutted pursuant to division (B) of this section. This division does not apply to a determination described in division (B)(3) of this section as division (B)(3) of this section existed prior to March 22, 2001.

(2) A presumption of paternity that arose prior to March 22, 2001, based on an acknowledgment of paternity that became final under former section 3111.211 or 5101.314 or section 2151.232 of the Revised Code is not a presumption and shall be considered a final and enforceable determination of paternity unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under section 3111.28 or 3119.962 of the Revised Code.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 80 cases (12 in the last 5 years), 1959–2026 · leading case: Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio 1989).
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Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio 1989). · cites it 11× “02 which seeks to rebut the presumption created by R.C. 3111.03 is one encompassed within the terms of the preceding reference.”
Gilbraith v. Hixson, 512 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1987). · cites it 5× “Determining first that the essentially nonadversarial nature of dissolution and legitimation proceedings under Ohio law is a significant consideration that weighs against the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the majority went on to say that “clear mandates” appearing…”
Nwabara v. Willacy, 733 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1999). · cites it 9× “This belief is premised on an application of R.C. 3111.03, which provides that where a child is born to a woman within three hundred days of the date of the divorce, her husband is presumed to have been the father of that child.”
Myers v. Myers, 792 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2003). · cites it 4× “(¶ 71} “(2) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child under any of the circumstances listed in divisions (A)(1) to (3) of section 3111.03 of the Revised Code. *254 {¶ 72} “(8) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself…”
Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio 2014). · cites it 4× “95 (providing that if “a married woman” uses “non-spousal artificial insemination” to which her spouse consented, the spouse “shall be treated in law and regarded as” the parent of the child, and the sperm donor shall have no parental rights); see also Ohio Rev.Code § 3111.03…”
Kreitzer v. Anderson, 811 N.E.2d 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004). · cites it 5× “The Revised Code requires “each man presumed to be the father under section 3111.03 of the Revised Code” be made a party to the paternity action.”
Jackson v. Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000). · cites it 4× “In this regard, R.C. 3111.03 states: ' “(A) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the following circumstances: “(1) The man and the child’s mother are or have been married to each other, and the child is born during the marriage * * *.”
Heather Martin Gartner v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013). · cites it 2× “”); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.03 (A)(1) (LexisNexis 2012) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child [if] .”
In re A.D., 2023-Ohio-2442, 221 N.E.3d 259. · cites it 2× “Because the trial court’s record does not contain a divorce decree or information related to whether the establishment of paternity was rebutted by Mason under R.C. 3111.03 prior to the trial court’s order for genetic testing, we cannot glean from the record whether Austin…”
Evicks v. Evicks, 607 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1992). · cites it 4× “” Under R.C. 3111.03(A)(1) and (2), it appears that two conflicting presumptions arguably arise as to the paternity of the parties’ second child.”
In re A.B., 2019-Ohio-90, 128 N.E.3d 694. · cites it 2× “” Also relevant to this determination is R.C. 3111.03, which governs presumptions as to father and child relationships, and which provides as follows: (A) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child under any of the following circumstances: (1) The man and the child's…”
In re Adoption of Reams, 557 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1989). · cites it 2× “A presumption that arises under division (A)(1) or (2) of section 3111.03 of the Revised Code is conclusive with respect to this father and child relationship, and no action under sections 3111.”
Show all 80 citing cases →
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(3): 1 case
State v. Wills, 2013-Ohio-4507.
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(4): 1 case
State v. Wills, 2013-Ohio-4507.
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A): 6 cases
Nwabara v. Willacy, 733 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1999). “This belief is premised on an application of R.C. 3111.03, which provides that where a child is born to a woman within three hundred days of the date of the divorce, her husband is presumed to have been the father of that child.”
Wiczynski v. Hutton, 2024-Ohio-2660.
McClelland v. Catholic Charities Diocese of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-3514.
In re Martin, 1994 Ohio 506 (Ohio 1994).
In re J.D., 2017-Ohio-1081.
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(1): 30 cases
Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio 1989). “02 which seeks to rebut the presumption created by R.C. 3111.03 is one encompassed within the terms of the preceding reference.”
Nwabara v. Willacy, 733 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1999). “This belief is premised on an application of R.C. 3111.03, which provides that where a child is born to a woman within three hundred days of the date of the divorce, her husband is presumed to have been the father of that child.”
Myers v. Myers, 792 N.E.2d 770 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. 2003). “(¶ 71} “(2) The person or male minor was presumed to be the natural father of the child under any of the circumstances listed in divisions (A)(1) to (3) of section 3111.03 of the Revised Code. *254 {¶ 72} “(8) The person or male minor otherwise admitted or acknowledged himself…”
Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio 2014). “95 (providing that if “a married woman” uses “non-spousal artificial insemination” to which her spouse consented, the spouse “shall be treated in law and regarded as” the parent of the child, and the sperm donor shall have no parental rights); see also Ohio Rev.Code § 3111.03…”
In re C.C., 932 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 2010).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(2): 1 case
Evicks v. Evicks, 607 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1992). “” Under R.C. 3111.03(A)(1) and (2), it appears that two conflicting presumptions arguably arise as to the paternity of the parties’ second child.”
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(3): 4 cases
McClelland v. Catholic Charities Diocese of Toledo, 2018-Ohio-3514.
Garrison v. Smith, 561 N.E.2d 1041 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1988).
In re Adoption of A.S., 2017-Ohio-2814.
In re L.E.S., 2026-Ohio-1449.
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(3)(a): 2 cases
Gilbraith v. Hixson, 512 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1987). “Determining first that the essentially nonadversarial nature of dissolution and legitimation proceedings under Ohio law is a significant consideration that weighs against the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the majority went on to say that “clear mandates” appearing…”
McMullen v. Muir, 517 N.E.2d 1381 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1986).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(3)(c): 1 case
Gilbraith v. Hixson, 512 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio 1987). “Determining first that the essentially nonadversarial nature of dissolution and legitimation proceedings under Ohio law is a significant consideration that weighs against the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the majority went on to say that “clear mandates” appearing…”
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(4): 2 cases
In re Smith, 474 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984).
Little v. Stoops, 585 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 1989).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(5): 2 cases
Filkins v. Cales, 619 N.E.2d 1156 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1993).
State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Truss, 729 N.E.2d 459 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1999).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(A)(6): 1 case
Broxterman v. Broxterman, 656 N.E.2d 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(AX1): 1 case
Hamilton v. Burke, 1 Ohio App. Unrep. 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
Ohio Rev. Code § 3111.03(B): 19 cases
Hulett v. Hulett, 544 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio 1989). “02 which seeks to rebut the presumption created by R.C. 3111.03 is one encompassed within the terms of the preceding reference.”
In re T.D., 2018-Ohio-204, 104 N.E.3d 177.
Kreitzer v. Anderson, 811 N.E.2d 607 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2004). “The Revised Code requires “each man presumed to be the father under section 3111.03 of the Revised Code” be made a party to the paternity action.”
Morris v. Mottern, 2015-Ohio-4523, 48 N.E.3d 92.
Evicks v. Evicks, 607 N.E.2d 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1992). “” Under R.C. 3111.03(A)(1) and (2), it appears that two conflicting presumptions arguably arise as to the paternity of the parties’ second child.”
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