No public utility shall charge, demand, exact, receive, or collect a different rate, rental, toll, or charge for any service rendered, or to be rendered, than that applicable to such service as specified in its schedule filed with the public utilities commission which is in effect at the time.
No public utility shall refund or remit directly or indirectly, any rate, rental, toll, or charge so specified, or any part thereof, or extend to any person, firm, or corporation, any rule, regulation, privilege, or facility except such as are specified in such schedule and regularly and uniformly extended to all persons, firms, and corporations under like circumstances for like, or substantially similar, service.
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 4905.32 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
“1 : Whether the commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking {¶ 15} FirstEnergy argues under its first proposition of law that the commission engaged in unlawful retroactive ratemaking when it ordered FirstEnergy to refund more than $43 million in REC costs.…”
Later courts cite it for
“whether information constitutes a trade secret is a question of fact.” · 3 citing courts
“23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 63} R.C. 4905.32, the statute on which the Keco decision is based, does not state that there is “no right of action for restitution of the increase in charges collected during the pendency of the appeal.”
The case’s holding
An electric utility is not required to prove that carrying costs are necessary to recover them under the applicable statute.
Later courts cite it for
“the court must give effect to the words used, making neither additions nor deletions from words chosen by the general assembly. certainly, had the general assembly intended to require that electric-distribution utilities prove that carrying costs were 'necessary' before they could be recovered, it would have chosen words to that effect” · 2 citing courts
Reversed by Anthony Williams v. Duke Energy International, Inc (2012): the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 4905.32
“It is true, as Plaintiffs contend, that O.R.C. § 4905.32, a specific statute prohibiting the collection of other than the filed rate, no longer applies to market-based electric utilities.”
“4 {¶ 57} In the fourth proposition of law, OCC contends that the commission’s order and first entry on rehearing approving CG & E’s rate-stabilization plan permit discriminatory treatment of customers in violation of R.C. 4905.32 through *314 4905.35. OCC argues that the…”
Later courts cite it for
“the commission's reasoning and the factual basis supporting the modifications on rehearing must be discernible from its orders” · 1 citing court
“” And R.C. 4905.32 states: “No public utility shall charge, demand, exact, receive, or collect a different rate * * * or charge for any service rendered, or to be rendered, than that applicable to such service as specified in its schedule filed with the public utilities…”
The case’s holding
A commission-approved utility tariff, a general law, controls over a conflicting municipal ordinance exercising police power on who bears the cost of relocating utility lines.
Later courts cite it for
“in accordance with common law, utilities have been required to relocate power lines from the right of way at their own expense whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities” · 1 citing court
“Nor has Ohio Power demonstrated that the commission’s decision to apply proceeds from the 2008 settlement agreement against 2009 fuel costs was unreasonable.”
The case’s holding
Courts defer to a state utility commission's expertise in interpreting highly specialized utility law, and the commission may credit pre-audit-period settlement proceeds against later fuel costs where the agreement affected those costs.
Later courts cite it for
“the court has customarily relied on the expertise of a state agency in interpreting a law where ' "highly specialized issues" ' are involved and ' "where agency expertise would, therefore, be of assistance in discerning the presumed intent of our general assembly” · 1 citing court
“See R.C. 4905.32; Keco Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Tel.”
The case’s holding
A party that forgoes the statutory rehearing and appeal from a Public Utilities Commission order may not use Civ.R. 60(B) as a substitute for appeal to obtain relief from that final order.
Later courts cite it for
“exercise only those powers that the general assembly confers” · 1 citing court
“” But it asserts that the commission should have ordered electric-distribution utilities to include the necessary refund language in the Rider SGF tariffs to effectuate the refund provision contained in R.”
Later courts cite it for
“the expression of one item in an associated group or series excludes unmentioned items” · 3 citing courts
“R.C. 4905.32 provides in pertinent part that: "No public utility shall charge, demand, exact, receive, or collect a different rate, rental, toll, or charge for any service rendered, or to be rendered, than that applicable to such service as specified in a schedule filed with the…”
“{¶ 23} OCC and the governmental aggregators claim that these differing credits violate R.C. 4905.32, 4905.33, and 4905.35, and that they discriminate against customers who are not capable of being served by governmental aggregators.”
“Were it not for the regulation of tariffs by the commission, utilities could unfairly use their monopoly power to force higher *407 rates on some customers in order to subsidize lower rates given to other, more favored customers.”
“99(C), which establishes penalties which may be pursued by the State when a utility violates R.C. 4905.32. Appellants argue that the existence of the separate statute imposing penalties which may be sought by the State is evidence that the first statute, which enable private…”
“32 states: No public utility shall refund or remit directly or indirectly, any rate, rental, toll, or charge so specified or, any part thereof, or extend to any person, firm, or corporation, any rule, regulation, privilege, or facility except such as are specified in such…”
“It appears that these allegations do set forth reasonable grounds for complaints that the services received, the rates for those services, and Ohio Bell’s practices affecting or relating to those services are unreasonable, unjust, discriminatory and unjustly preferential in…”
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
195619892022
One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 4 cases in 2014–2015. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
By court
Ohio20Ohio Ct. App.3N.D. Ohio1S.D. Ohio1
By subsection
Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 4905.32 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.
Sections this text refers to
Enactment and amendments
Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.
Versions
Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.