The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance or an amendment to the ordinance, may be continued, although such use does not conform with the provisions of such ordinance or amendment, but if any such nonconforming use is voluntarily discontinued for two years or more, or for a period of not less than six months but not more than two years that a municipal corporation otherwise provides by ordinance, any future use of such land shall be in conformity with sections 713.01 to 713.15 of the Revised Code. The legislative authority of a municipal corporation shall provide in any zoning ordinance for the completion, restoration, reconstruction, extension, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon such reasonable terms as are set forth in the zoning ordinance.
The 20 cases that cite Ohio Rev. Code § 713.15 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment.RelevanceNewestTreatment
“{¶ 33} Until now, the term “nonconforming use” has referred to “a use of property which was lawful prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance” and which “may be continued after the effective date of the ordinance even though it does not comply with the applicable use…”
The case’s holding
A lot purchased as buildable before a minimum-size zoning amendment may be grandfathered and cannot be barred from construction by the amendment where similar lots were permitted to be built.
Later courts cite it for
“the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision only on questions of law to determine whether the lower court abused its discretion in finding that the administrative order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” · 2 citing courts
“Plaintiff argues in his Motion for Summary Judgment 3 that, pursuant to Ohio Rev.Code § 713.15, his use of his property for an adult book establishment should be grandfathered into the current Village zoning plan because he “was never afforded an opportunity to continue to…”
Later courts cite it for
“self-serving affidavits, alone, are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.” · 6 citing courts
“The question presented by this appeal is whether constitutional due process or the prohibition of R.C. 713.15 against retroactive zoning ordinances prohibits the retroactive enforcement of a sign ordinance which requires the alteration or removal of previously lawful signs.”
Later courts cite it for
“the constitutional right of the individual to use private property has always been subservient to the public welfare ... and such use is subject to the legitimate exercise of local police power ....” · 5 citing courts
“” O.R.C. § 713.15. Further, Article XVIII, § 3 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits municipalities from adopting regulations that conflict with the state’s general laws.”
Later courts cite it for
“virtually limitless, and failed to curb the discretion of inspectors 'in time, place, and scope.” · 2 citing courts
“” R.C. 713.15. The Village’s ordinances do not restrict the restoration of a nonconforming use of land as long as the restoration does not extend, change, or enlarge the use.”
“intiffs of the economically viable use of their property and thus is an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Mnend-ments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 16, of the Ohio Constitution; (8) Defendant’s attempts to restrict the continuing use of…”
The case’s holding
A city sign ordinance imposing content-based restrictions on noncommercial speech fails strict scrutiny unless the city shows the restrictions are necessary and narrowly drawn by the least restrictive means.
Later courts cite it for
“the city has not shown that the content-based distinctions are necessary to serve their interests of safety and aesthetics, and because the ordinance is not narrowly drawn by the least restrictive means to achieve those interests.” · 1 citing court
“” In 1957, the Ohio Legislature enacted R.C. 713.15, which read (see 127 Ohio Laws 18, 19): “The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto, may be…”
The case’s holding
Municipalities may require a substantially damaged nonconforming structure to be rebuilt in conformity with current zoning or removed because nonconforming uses are disfavored.
Later courts cite it for
“the rights of a nonconforming user are limited, and the clear intent and purpose is to eliminate such nonconforming uses as rapidly as possible.” · 4 citing courts
“Because the mobile-home parks in this case existed prior to the passage of the ordinance creating the R-2 Districts, the mobile-home parks are legal nonconforming uses under R.C. 713.15. {¶ 3} In 1987, appellant, the village of Lodi, passed an ordinance enacting Lodi Zoning Code…”
The case’s holding
A zoning ordinance cannot impute a tenant's six-month abandonment of a mobile home to the park owner and thereby end the owner's nonconforming use; an unconstitutional sentence may be severed.
Later courts cite it for
“zoning ordinances contemplate the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses within a zoned area, and, where an ordinance accomplishes such a result without depriving a property owner of a vested property right, it is generally held to be constitutional.” · 2 citing courts
“34628, unreported, reversed the decision of the board of zoning appeals and ruled that R.C. 713.15, not R.R.C.O. (Rocky River Code of Ordinances) 1165.”
“See, also, R.C. 713.15. The zoning ordinance was passed on August 19, 2002, and took effect on September 19, 2002.”
Later courts cite it for
“a nonconforming use of land is a use that was lawful before the enactment of a zoning amendment, but one which, although no longer valid under the current zoning rules, may be lawfully continued.” · 2 citing courts
“{¶ 24} Under R.C. 713.15: The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance or an amendment to the ordinance, may be continued, although such use does not conform with the…”
“The pertinent part of R.C. 713.15 provides that “[t]he lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or premises, as existing and lawful at the time of enacting a zoning ordinance or amendment thereto, may be continued, although such use does not conform…”
The case’s holding
A use of property must be lawful when established to qualify as a nonconforming use entitled to continuation; a use that violated the zoning ordinance then in effect does not qualify.
Later courts cite it for
“a use of property must be lawful at the time the use was established in order to qualify as a nonconforming use.” · 2 citing courts
“According to appellants, the pertinent provision of the zoning ordinance does not comply with R.C. 713.15 and therefore is unconstitutional.”
Later courts cite it for
“persons dealing with municipal corporations are not entitled to rely on actions of municipal corporations or their agents when pertinent statutory requirements are not met,” · 2 citing courts
“Retroactive zoning XXL claims that the sign ordinance violates Ohio’s prohibition against retroactive zoning ordinances at Ohio Rev.Code § 713.15 and moves for summary judgment on this claim.”
“Further, with respect to land use regulations enacted as part of a municipal zoning code, Ohio has codified in R.C. 713.15 the protection conferred upon such nonconforming uses: “The lawful use of any dwelling, building, or structure and of any land or premises, as existing and…”
Later courts cite it for
“stated another way, the use in question must have been in full accordance with all applicable land use regulations in effect when the activity was begun.” · 3 citing courts
“" R.C. 713.15. Thus, in order to determine whether appellant's operation of the junk yard was a nonconforming use permissible after the 2008 Zoning Regulations Revision, we must find that the junk yard was a lawful use at the time the use was established in 2005.”
“In their third assignment of error, appellants contend that the motel did not lose its “grandfather” status to exist as a nonconforming but legal use as a motel pursuant to R.C. 713.15. That statute provides that a nonconforming use must be voluntarily discontinued for at least…”
The case’s holding
A stipulation is binding upon the parties and constitutes a fact deemed adjudicated once it is entered, filed, and accepted by the court.
Later courts cite it for
“the thirty-day time limit for filing the notice of appeal does not begin to run until the later of (1) entry of the judgment or order appealed if the notice mandated by civ.r. 58(b) is served within three days of the entry of the judgment; or (2) service of the notice of judgment and its date of entry if service is not made on the party within the three-day period in civ.r. 58(b).” · 9 citing courts
“The trial court should have ruled that the ordinance was illegal regulation of a pre-existing nonconforming use under Ohio Revised Code Section 713.15, and therefore unenforceable.”
“{¶ 9} Stumpff argues that the Board and the trial court erred by finding that he did not prove that his use of Parcels 16, 18, and 19 was a continuing, nonconforming use under R.C. 713.15. Appellant’s Brief 15-17. Specifically, Stumpff argues that the Board and the trial court…”
“R.C. 713.15; State v. Pierce (1956), 164 Ohio St.”
The case’s holding
A nonconforming use is a lawful pre-ordinance use that may continue despite noncompliance with zoning restrictions, but such uses remain subject to valid police-power regulations protecting public health, safety, and welfare.
Later courts cite it for
“employed to designate a use of property which was lawful prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance and which use may be continued after the effective date of the ordinance even though it does not comply with the applicable use restrictions.” · 9 citing courts
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.
Citing cases by year
195619902025
One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 6 cases in 2012–2013. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.
By court
Ohio Ct. App.32Ohio7N.D. Ohio4S.D. Ohio3
By subsection
Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.
Sections that the same cases cite. The first number is counted among the 100 cases that cite § 713.15 most heavily: how many of them are also among the other section’s own 20 leading cases.
Sections this text refers to
Enactment and amendments
Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.
Versions
Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.