Oklahoma Statutes

Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727 (2026)

Interest on judgments rendered on or after January 1,

✓ current as of July 2026
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2000, but before January 1, 2005. POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST A. 1. Except as otherwise provided by this section, all judgments of courts of record, including costs and attorney fees authorized by statute or otherwise and allowed by the court, shall bear interest at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section.

2. Costs and attorney fees allowed by the court shall bear interest from the earlier of the date the judgment or order is pronounced, if expressly stated in the written judgment or order awarding the costs and attorney fees, or the date the judgment or order is filed with the court clerk. B. Judgments, including costs and attorney fees authorized by statute or otherwise and allowed by the court, against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, shall bear interest during the term of judgment at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section, but not to exceed ten percent (10%), from the date of rendition. No judgment against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, inclusive of postjudgment interest, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to The Governmental Tort Claims Act. C. The postjudgment interest authorized by subsection A or subsection B of this section shall accrue from the earlier of the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk, and shall initially accrue at the rate in effect for the calendar year during which the judgment is rendered until the end of the calendar year in which the judgment was rendered, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs. Beginning on the first day of January of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. For each succeeding calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which a judgment remains unpaid, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. A separate computation using the interest rate in effect for judgments as provided by subsection I of this section shall be made for each calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which the judgment remains unpaid in order to determine the total amount of interest for which the judgment debtor is liable. The postjudgment interest rate for each calendar year or part of a calendar year a judgment remains unpaid shall be multiplied by the original amount of the judgment, including any prejudgment interest, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued. Interest shall accrue on a judgment in the manner

prescribed by this subsection until the judgment is satisfied or released. D. If a rate of interest is specified in a contract, the rate specified shall apply and be stated in the journal entry of judgment. The rate of interest shall not exceed the lawful rate for that obligation. Postjudgment interest shall be calculated and accrued in the same manner as prescribed in subsection C of this section. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST E. Except as provided by subsection F of this section, if a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries or injury to personal rights including, but not limited to, injury resulting from bodily restraint, personal insult, defamation, invasion of privacy, injury to personal relations, or detriment due to an act or omission of another is accepted by the trial court, the court in rendering judgment shall add interest on the verdict at a rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section from the date the suit resulting in the judgment was commenced to the earlier of the date the verdict is accepted by the trial court as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. The interest rate for computation of prejudgment interest shall begin with the rate prescribed by subsection I of this section which is in effect for the calendar year in which the suit resulting in the judgment is commenced. This rate shall be in effect until the end of the calendar year in which the suit resulting in judgment was filed or until the date judgment is filed, whichever first occurs. Beginning on the first day of January of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the date the judgment is filed, whichever first occurs, and for each succeeding calendar year thereafter, the prejudgment interest rate shall be the rate in effect for judgments rendered during each calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. After the computation of all prejudgment interest has been completed, the total amount of prejudgment interest shall be added to the amount of the judgment rendered pursuant to the trial of the action, and the total amount of the resulting judgment shall become the amount upon which postjudgment interest is computed pursuant to subsection A of this section. F. If a verdict of the type described by subsection E of this section is rendered against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, the judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section, but not to exceed ten percent (10%) from the date the suit was commenced to the earlier of the date the verdict is accepted by the trial court as

expressly stated in the judgment or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. The interest rate for computation of prejudgment interest shall begin with the rate prescribed by subsection I of this section which is in effect for the calendar year in which the suit resulting in the judgment is commenced. This rate shall be in effect until the end of the calendar year in which the suit resulting in judgment was filed or until the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, whichever first occurs. Beginning on the first day of January of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the date judgment is rendered, whichever first occurs, and for each succeeding calendar year thereafter, the prejudgment interest rate shall be the rate in effect for judgments rendered during each calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. After the computation of prejudgment interest has been completed, the amount shall be added to the amount of the judgment rendered pursuant to the trial of the action, and the total amount of the resulting judgment shall become the amount upon which postjudgment interest is computed pursuant to subsection B of this section. No award of prejudgment interest against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, including the amount of the judgment awarded pursuant to trial of the action, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to The Governmental Tort Claims Act. G. If exemplary or punitive damages are awarded in an action for personal injury or injury to personal rights including, but not limited to, injury resulting from bodily restraint, personal insult, defamation, invasion of privacy, injury to personal relations, or detriment due to an act or omission of another, the interest on that award shall begin to accrue from the earlier of the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. H. If a judgment is rendered establishing the existence of a lien against property and no rate of interest exists, the court shall allow prejudgment interest at a rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section from the date the lien is filed to the date of verdict. I. For purposes of computing either postjudgment interest or prejudgment interest as authorized by this section, interest shall be determined using a rate equal to the average United States Treasury Bill rate of the preceding calendar year as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day in January of each year, plus four percentage points.

J. For purposes of computing postjudgment interest, the provisions of this section, including the amendments prescribed by Chapter 320, O.S.L. 1997, shall be applicable to all judgments of the district courts rendered on or after January 1, 2000 but before January 1, 2005. Until January 1, 2005, the method for computing postjudgment interest prescribed by this section shall be applicable to all judgments remaining unpaid rendered prior to January 1, 2000. K. For purposes of computing prejudgment interest, the provisions of this section, including the amendments prescribed by Chapter 320, O.S.L. 1997, shall be applicable to all actions which are filed in the district courts on or after January 1, 2000, but before January 1, 2005, for which an award of prejudgment interest is authorized by the provisions of this section. R.L.1910, § 1008. Amended by Laws 1968, c. 71, § 1, emerg. eff. March 25, 1968; Laws 1971, c. 252, § 1. Renumbered from § 274 of Title 15 by Laws 1971, c. 252, § 2. Amended by Laws 1979, c. 60, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1979; Laws 1982, c. 78, § 1, emerg. eff. April 1, 1982; Laws 1984, c. 83, § 1, emerg. eff. April 4, 1984; Laws 1985, c. 257, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1985; Laws 1986, c. 315, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1986; Laws 1997, c. 320, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 293, § 7, eff. Nov. 1, 1999; Laws 2004, c. 368, § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 2004.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 85 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1972–2024 · leading case: Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48 (Okla. 2005).
Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48 (Okla. 2005). · cites it 8× “Accordingly, the matter appears to be placed squarely within the following pronouncement from Timmons II, "[i]f damages `by reason of personal injuries' are shown to have been intermixed with other elements of damage in one general verdict, the provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 727…”
Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1987). · cites it 18× “The first being that 12 O.S.Supp. 1979 § 727 is unconstitutional and no prejudgment interest or post-judgment interest should be allowed.”
Brashier v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 925 P.2d 20 (Okla. 1996). · cites it 14× “[2] insofar as counsel-fee recovery constitutes an element of damages in a bad-faith tort claim? [2] Are the proceeds of UM indemnity to be treated in law as a *23 personal injury recovery, which qualifies them for 12 O.S.1991 § 727 [3] prejudgment interest? and [3] Are costs…”
City of Tulsa v. Smittle, 702 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1985). · cites it 8× “2 Petitioner also asserts that the proper rate of interest on appeal of a workers’ compensation award is ten percent (10%) pursuant to 12 O.S.Supp.1984 § 727, which states in pertinent part: “All judgments of courts of record shall bear interest at the rate of fifteen percent…”
In the Matter of the Assessments for Tax Year 2012 of Certain Props., 2021 OK 7 (Okla. 2021). · cites it 5× “274, Renumbered as 12 O.S. § 727 by Laws 1971, HB 1298, c. 252, § 2 Discussed at Length 15 O.”
Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589 (Okla. 1985). · cites it 4× “The terms of 12 O.S.1971 § 727 provided in pertinent part: "All judgments of courts of record shall bear interest, at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, from the date of rendition_" 17 .”
Stroud v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 2001 OK 76 (Okla. 2001). · cites it 4× “V STROUD/SCI ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 12 O.S.Supp.1997 § 727 (E) ¶ 35 Plaintiffs' claim that Andersen's negligent conduct injured their "personal rights" thereby entitling them to receive prejudgment interest under the terms of 12 O.”
Cox v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 1999 OK 57 (Okla. 1999). · cites it 10× “99% then the post-judgment interest is added to 12 O.S. § 727 at 9.22% .with reduction for payment made on April 14, 1998.”
Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 743 P.2d 1067 (Okla. 1987). · cites it 7× “[2] The amendment in effect at the date of the disputed ruling was 12 O.S.Supp. 1984 § 727 providing for an interest rate of 15 percent.”
Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1999 OK 44 (Okla. 1999). · cites it 3× “The award of prejudgment interest in Brashier rests on 12 O.S.1991 § 727, 31 which governs solely personal-injury elements of recovery.”
Mellenberger v. Sweeney, 800 P.2d 747 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990). · cites it 10× “As elsewhere noted, "[P]ost-judgment interest [provided under 12 O.S. § 727] is to be applied to the judgment entered by the court in a personal injury action, and that the judgment thus entered consists of the sum of the verdict award, plus pre-judgment *750 interest calculated…”
Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 1973). · cites it 6× “A separate order of January 7, 1972, reflected that plaintiff had orally requested the above referenced 10% interest, and also had orally requested 6% interest on the judgment from July 2, 1970, the date plaintiff’s petition was filed, until September 10, 1971, the date verdict…”
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(2) — 4 cases
Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589 (Okla. 1985). “The terms of 12 O.S.1971 § 727 provided in pertinent part: "All judgments of courts of record shall bear interest, at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, from the date of rendition_" 17 .”
Messler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 (Okla. 1984).
Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1987). “The first being that 12 O.S.Supp. 1979 § 727 is unconstitutional and no prejudgment interest or post-judgment interest should be allowed.”
Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 896 P.2d 1195 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(A) — 3 cases
Shadoan v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 1140 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
Mellenberger v. Sweeney, 800 P.2d 747 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990). “As elsewhere noted, "[P]ost-judgment interest [provided under 12 O.S. § 727] is to be applied to the judgment entered by the court in a personal injury action, and that the judgment thus entered consists of the sum of the verdict award, plus pre-judgment *750 interest calculated…”
Mare Oil Co. v. Deep Blue Royalties, L.L.C., 65 P.3d 294 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(A)(1) — 2 cases
Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1987). “The first being that 12 O.S.Supp. 1979 § 727 is unconstitutional and no prejudgment interest or post-judgment interest should be allowed.”
Am. Superior Feeds, Inc. v. Mason Warehouse, Inc., 943 P.2d 171 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(A)(2) — 15 cases
Brashier v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 925 P.2d 20 (Okla. 1996). “[2] insofar as counsel-fee recovery constitutes an element of damages in a bad-faith tort claim? [2] Are the proceeds of UM indemnity to be treated in law as a *23 personal injury recovery, which qualifies them for 12 O.S.1991 § 727 [3] prejudgment interest? and [3] Are costs…”
Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48 (Okla. 2005). “Accordingly, the matter appears to be placed squarely within the following pronouncement from Timmons II, "[i]f damages `by reason of personal injuries' are shown to have been intermixed with other elements of damage in one general verdict, the provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 727…”
Huff v. State, 764 P.2d 183 (Okla. 1988).
Taylor v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1999 OK 44 (Okla. 1999). “The award of prejudgment interest in Brashier rests on 12 O.S.1991 § 727, 31 which governs solely personal-injury elements of recovery.”
Majors v. Good, 832 P.2d 420 (Okla. 1992).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(B) — 5 cases
Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087 (Okla. 1987). “The first being that 12 O.S.Supp. 1979 § 727 is unconstitutional and no prejudgment interest or post-judgment interest should be allowed.”
Mellenberger v. Sweeney, 800 P.2d 747 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990). “As elsewhere noted, "[P]ost-judgment interest [provided under 12 O.S. § 727] is to be applied to the judgment entered by the court in a personal injury action, and that the judgment thus entered consists of the sum of the verdict award, plus pre-judgment *750 interest calculated…”
Traczyk v. Traczyk, 891 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1995).
Burwell v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 896 P.2d 1195 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
In re Wheatley, 251 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Okla 2000).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(D) — 1 case
Equip. World, Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 2004 OK CIV APP 47 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(E) — 4 cases
Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48 (Okla. 2005). “Accordingly, the matter appears to be placed squarely within the following pronouncement from Timmons II, "[i]f damages `by reason of personal injuries' are shown to have been intermixed with other elements of damage in one general verdict, the provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 727…”
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Dyer, 2002 OK CIV APP 126 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002).
Woodie v. Arney, 90 P.3d 598 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
— Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 727(K) — 1 case
Andrew v. Depani-sparkes, 2021 OK CIV APP 41 (Okla. Civ. App. 2021).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.