Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or interest therein, can only be brought within the periods hereinafter prescribed, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and at no other time thereafter: (1) An action for the recovery of real property sold on execution, or for the recovery of real estate partitioned by judgment in kind, or sold, or conveyed pursuant to partition proceedings, or other judicial sale, or an action for the recovery of real estate distributed under decree of district court in administration or probate proceedings, when brought by or on behalf of the execution debtor or former owner, or his or their heirs, or any person claiming under him or them by title acquired after the date of the judgment or by any person claiming to be an heir or devisee of the decedent in whose estate such decree was rendered, or claiming under, as successor in interest, any such heir or devisee, within five (5) years after the date of the recording of the deed made in pursuance of the sale or proceeding, or within five (5) years after the date of the entry of the final judgment of partition in kind where no sale is had in the partition proceedings; or within five (5) years after the recording of the decree of distribution rendered by the district court in an administration or probate proceeding; provided, however, that where any such action pertains to real estate distributed under decree of district court in administration or probate proceedings and would at the passage of this act be barred by the terms hereof, such action may be brought within one (1) year after the passage of this act; this proviso shall not be construed to revive any action barred by paragraph 4 of this section. (2) An action for the recovery of real property sold by executors, administrators, or guardians, upon an order or judgment of a court directing such sale, brought by the heirs or devisees of the deceased person, or the ward of his guardian, or any person claiming under any or either of them, by the title acquired after the date of judgment or order, within five (5) years after the date of recording of the deed made in pursuance of the sale. (3) An action for the recovery of real property sold for taxes, within five (5) years after the date of the recording of the tax deed, except where lands exempt from taxation by reason of any Act of the Congress of the United States of America have been sold for taxes, in which case there shall be no limitation; provided, nothing herein shall be construed as reviving any cause of action for recovery of real property heretofore barred nor as divesting any interest acquired by adverse possession prior to the effective date hereof.
(4) An action for the recovery of real property not hereinbefore provided for, within fifteen (15) years. (5) An action for the forcible entry and detention or forcible detention only of real property, within two (2) years. (6) Numbered paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 shall be fully operative regardless of whether the deed or judgment or the precedent action or proceeding upon which such deed or judgment is based is void or voidable in whole or in part, for any reason, jurisdictional or otherwise; provided that this paragraph shall not be applied so as to bar causes of action which have heretofore accrued, until the expiration of one (1) year from and after its effective date. R.L. 1910, § 4655. Amended by Laws 1945, p. 37, § 1; Laws 1949, p. 95, § 1; Laws 1961, p. 59, § 1, emerg. eff. July 26, 1961.
Notes of Decisions
MacY v. Oklahoma City Sch. Dist. No. 89, 1998 OK 58, 961 P.2d 804.
· cites it 8× “1991 § 333, the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 93 [18] not only extinguish the true owner's remedy but also confer upon the adverse occupant title to the premises by prescription.”
Krosmico v. Pettit, 1998 OK 90, 968 P.2d 345.
· cites it 4× “12 O.S.1991 § 93 provides in part that: Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or interest therein, can only be brought within the periods hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued, and at no other time…”
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93 (4). Specifically, the court found, among other things, Sherrill Farm *1261 had been subject to Bobby Brantley’s grazing license until 1992 and that OSU and Weyerhaeuser had also conducted activities on Sherrill Farm incompatible with Brantley’s…”
Williams v. Bailey, 268 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1954).
· cites it 5× “A statute of identical terms as § 93, supra, except for paragraph 6 and some variances of the time periods prescribed, has existed since early Statehood.”
Atl. Richfield Co. v. State Ex Rel. Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 659 P.2d 930 (Okla. 1983).
· cites it 3× “It is suggested in concurring opinion that there is here no need to address the validity of the partition sale in contest because the attack sought to be made on it was barred by an after-enacted five-year limitation period provided in 12 O.”
Mobbs v. City of Lehigh, 655 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1982).
· cites it 2× “In 12 O.S.1981 § 93 the legislature provided for a shorter limitation period in favor of persons in possession under a void tax deed.”
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Neustadt, 917 P.2d 1005 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
· cites it 5× “Alternatively, Bank urges the applicability of 12 O.S.1991 § 93(4), which provides a fifteen year limitations period for actions for the recovery of real property.”
Base v. Devon Energy Prod., 2024 OK 3, 563 P.3d 934.
· cites it 36× “The Trial Court Properly Applied the 15-Year Statute of Limitation Found in 12 O.S.2011, § 93 (4). ¶ 47 Having determined that a "S[tatute ]O[f ]L[imitations] is applicable to [this] quiet title suit," Trustees second question raised on certiorari is, "if so, whether the 15-year…”
Sarkeys v. Scott, 269 P.2d 779 (Okla. 1954).
· cites it 6× “37, 12 O.S.Supp.1947, § 93, the recovery of real property sold for taxes can only be brought within two (2) years after the recording of the tax deed.”
Matter of Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1976).
· cites it 2× “2d 296 , wherein suit was instituted to cancel deed due to grantor’s incapacity we stated in second paragraph of syllabus: “In an action to cancel a void conveyance of land, the plaintiff is not barred by any lapse of time short of that sufficient to establish title by…”
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93(1): 5 cases
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93(3): 13 cases
Krosmico v. Pettit, 1998 OK 90, 968 P.2d 345.
“12 O.S.1991 § 93 provides in part that: Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or interest therein, can only be brought within the periods hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued, and at no other time…”
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93(4): 23 cases
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Neustadt, 917 P.2d 1005 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996).
“Alternatively, Bank urges the applicability of 12 O.S.1991 § 93(4), which provides a fifteen year limitations period for actions for the recovery of real property.”
Base v. Devon Energy Prod., 2024 OK 3, 563 P.3d 934.
“The Trial Court Properly Applied the 15-Year Statute of Limitation Found in 12 O.S.2011, § 93 (4). ¶ 47 Having determined that a "S[tatute ]O[f ]L[imitations] is applicable to [this] quiet title suit," Trustees second question raised on certiorari is, "if so, whether the 15-year…”
Krosmico v. Pettit, 1998 OK 90, 968 P.2d 345.
“12 O.S.1991 § 93 provides in part that: Actions for the recovery of real property, or for the determination of any adverse right or interest therein, can only be brought within the periods hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued, and at no other time…”
Atl. Richfield Co. v. State Ex Rel. Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 659 P.2d 930 (Okla. 1983).
“It is suggested in concurring opinion that there is here no need to address the validity of the partition sale in contest because the attack sought to be made on it was barred by an after-enacted five-year limitation period provided in 12 O.”
Matter of Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207 (Okla. 1976).
“2d 296 , wherein suit was instituted to cancel deed due to grantor’s incapacity we stated in second paragraph of syllabus: “In an action to cancel a void conveyance of land, the plaintiff is not barred by any lapse of time short of that sufficient to establish title by…”
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 93(6): 4 cases
MacY v. Oklahoma City Sch. Dist. No. 89, 1998 OK 58, 961 P.2d 804.
“1991 § 333, the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 93 [18] not only extinguish the true owner's remedy but also confer upon the adverse occupant title to the premises by prescription.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.