109.119 Rights
of person who establishes emotional ties creating child-parent relationship or
ongoing personal relationship; presumption regarding legal parent; motion for
intervention. (1)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (9) of this section, any person,
including but not limited to a related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent,
grandparent or relative by blood or marriage, who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal relationship
with a child may petition or file a motion for intervention with the court
having jurisdiction over the custody, placement or guardianship of that child,
or if no such proceedings are pending, may petition the court for the county in
which the child resides, for an order providing for relief under subsection (3)
of this section.
(2)(a) In any
proceeding under this section, there is a presumption that the legal parent
acts in the best interest of the child.
(b) In an order
granting relief under this section, the court shall include findings of fact
supporting the rebuttal of the presumption described in paragraph (a) of this
subsection.
(c) The
presumption described in paragraph (a) of this subsection does not apply in a
proceeding to modify an order granting relief under this section.
(3)(a) If the
court determines that a child-parent relationship exists and if the court
determines that the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) of this section
has been rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant
custody, guardianship, right of visitation or other right to the person having
the child-parent relationship, if to do so is in the best interest of the
child. The court may determine temporary custody of the child or temporary
visitation rights under this paragraph pending a final order.
(b) If the court
determines that an ongoing personal relationship exists and if the court
determines that the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) of this section
has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall grant
visitation or contact rights to the person having the ongoing personal
relationship, if to do so is in the best interest of the child. The court may
order temporary visitation or contact rights under this paragraph pending a
final order.
(4)(a) In
deciding whether the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) of this section
has been rebutted and whether to award visitation or contact rights over the
objection of the legal parent, the court may consider factors including, but
not limited to, the following, which may be shown by the evidence:
(A) The
petitioner or intervenor is or recently has been the child’s primary caretaker;
(B) Circumstances
detrimental to the child exist if relief is denied;
(C) The legal
parent has fostered, encouraged or consented to the relationship between the
child and the petitioner or intervenor;
(D) Granting
relief would not substantially interfere with the custodial relationship; or
(E) The legal
parent has unreasonably denied or limited contact between the child and the
petitioner or intervenor.
(b) In deciding
whether the presumption described in subsection (2)(a) of this section has been
rebutted and whether to award custody, guardianship or other rights over the
objection of the legal parent, the court may consider factors including, but
not limited to, the following, which may be shown by the evidence:
(A) The legal
parent is unwilling or unable to care adequately for the child;
(B) The
petitioner or intervenor is or recently has been the child’s primary caretaker;
(C) Circumstances
detrimental to the child exist if relief is denied;
(D) The legal
parent has fostered, encouraged or consented to the relationship between the
child and the petitioner or intervenor; or
(E) The legal
parent has unreasonably denied or limited contact between the child and the
petitioner or intervenor.
(5) In addition
to the other rights granted under this section, a stepparent with a
child-parent relationship who is a party in a dissolution proceeding may
petition the court having jurisdiction for custody or visitation under this
section or may petition the court for the county in which the child resides for
adoption of the child. The stepparent may also file for post-judgment
modification of a judgment relating to child custody.
(6)(a) A motion
for intervention filed under this section shall comply with ORCP 33 and state
the grounds for relief under this section.
(b) Costs for the
representation of an intervenor under this section may not be charged against
funds appropriated for public defense services.
(7) In a
proceeding under this section, the court may:
(a) Cause an
investigation, examination or evaluation to be made under ORS 107.425 or may
appoint an individual or a panel or may designate a program to assist the court
in creating parenting plans or resolving disputes regarding parenting time and
to assist the parties in creating and implementing parenting plans under ORS
107.425 (3).
(b) Assess
against a party reasonable attorney fees and costs for the benefit of another
party.
(8) When a
petition or motion to intervene is filed under this section seeking
guardianship or custody of a child who is a foreign national, the petitioner or
intervenor shall serve a copy of the petition or motion on the consulate for
the child’s country.
(9) This section
does not apply to proceedings under ORS chapter 419B.
(10) As used in
this section:
(a) “Child-parent
relationship” means a relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in
part, within the six months preceding the filing of an action under this
section, and in which relationship a person having physical custody of a child
or residing in the same household as the child supplied, or otherwise made
available to the child, food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries and
provided the child with necessary care, education and discipline, and which
relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the child’s
psychological needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical needs.
However, a relationship between a child and a person who is the nonrelated
foster parent of the child is not a child-parent relationship under this
section unless the relationship continued over a period exceeding 12 months.
(b) “Circumstances
detrimental to the child” includes but is not limited to circumstances that may
cause psychological, emotional or physical harm to a child.
(c) “Grandparent”
means the legal parent of the child’s legal parent.
(d) “Legal parent”
means a parent as defined in ORS 419A.004 whose rights have not been terminated
under ORS 419B.500 to 419B.524.
(e) “Ongoing
personal relationship” means a relationship with substantial continuity for at
least one year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality. [1985
c.516 §2; 1987 c.810 §1; 1993 c.372 §1; 1997 c.92 §1; 1997 c.479 §1; 1997 c.873
§20; 1999 c.569 §6; 2001 c.873 §§1,1a,1e; 2003 c.143 §§1,2; 2003 c.231 §§4,5;
2003 c.576 §§138,139]
109.120 [Repealed by 1969 c.619 §15]
109.121 [1979 c.776 §2; 1983 c.369 §2;
1987 c.810 §2; 1993 c.33 §291; 1999 c.477 §1; 1999 c.569 §7; repealed by 2001
c.873 §2]
109.123 [1979 c.776 §3; repealed by 2001
c.873 §2]
(Adjudications of
Parentage)
Notes of Decisions
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
· cites it 79× “However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 182× “(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 74× “All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
In the Matter of Marriage of Hruby & Hruby, 748 P.2d 57 (Or. 1987).
· cites it 31× “ORS 109.119 allows “[a]ny person * * * who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child” to intervene in, or to initiate, proceedings to determine child custody and related matters.”
State v. Wooden, 57 P.3d 583 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 24× “2d 1126 (1999) * * *, in ORS 109.119 cases, the `best interest of the child' standard applies in resolving custody disputes between a biological parent and non-biological parents.”
Burk v. Hall, 62 P.3d 394 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 30× “2 That statute provides, in part: “(1) Any person, including but not limited to a related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent, grandparent or relative by blood or marriage, who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing personal…”
In Re Marriage of Wilson, 55 P.3d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 22× “Nonetheless, because husband is a stepfather, his claim to custody of C is governed by ORS 109.119, which involves the rights of a parent vis-á-vis a stepparent who has established a “child-parent relationship.”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 27× “The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999).
· cites it 19× “In the alternative, husband argued that, given the child-parent relationship that he has with both children, ORS 109.119 confers on him substantive custodial rights as a stepparent and requires use of the “best interests of the child” standard, ORS 107.”
Husk v. Adelman, 383 P.3d 961 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 23× “The court determined that Husk had established an “ongoing personal relationship” with G and ordered visitation as allowed by ORS 109.119. 1 We write to address Adelman’s first two assignments of error, challenging the visitation plan, and reject Adelman’s third assignment of…”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 38× “We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
Pulley v. Herndon, 527 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 27× “Specifically, mother contends that some of the trial court’s findings in support of the court’s best-interest conclusion are either erroneous or did not take into account relevant evidence. Mother asks for de novo review under ORAP 5.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(1) — 42 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re Marriage of Wilson, 55 P.3d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“Nonetheless, because husband is a stepfather, his claim to custody of C is governed by ORS 109.119, which involves the rights of a parent vis-á-vis a stepparent who has established a “child-parent relationship.”
Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999).
“In the alternative, husband argued that, given the child-parent relationship that he has with both children, ORS 109.119 confers on him substantive custodial rights as a stepparent and requires use of the “best interests of the child” standard, ORS 107.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(1)(a) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(1)(e) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10)(a) — 15 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
Husk v. Adelman, 383 P.3d 961 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“The court determined that Husk had established an “ongoing personal relationship” with G and ordered visitation as allowed by ORS 109.119. 1 We write to address Adelman’s first two assignments of error, challenging the visitation plan, and reject Adelman’s third assignment of…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10)(b) — 8 cases
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10)(d) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10)(e) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10Xa) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(10Xc) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(2) — 12 cases
Pulley v. Herndon, 527 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“Specifically, mother contends that some of the trial court’s findings in support of the court’s best-interest conclusion are either erroneous or did not take into account relevant evidence. Mother asks for de novo review under ORAP 5.”
In Re Marriage of Wilson, 55 P.3d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“Nonetheless, because husband is a stepfather, his claim to custody of C is governed by ORS 109.119, which involves the rights of a parent vis-á-vis a stepparent who has established a “child-parent relationship.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(2)(a) — 34 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(2)(b) — 7 cases
In Re Marriage of Wilson, 55 P.3d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“Nonetheless, because husband is a stepfather, his claim to custody of C is governed by ORS 109.119, which involves the rights of a parent vis-á-vis a stepparent who has established a “child-parent relationship.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(2)(c) — 7 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(2001) — 1 case
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(3) — 15 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In the Matter of Marriage of Hruby & Hruby, 748 P.2d 57 (Or. 1987).
“ORS 109.119 allows “[a]ny person * * * who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child” to intervene in, or to initiate, proceedings to determine child custody and related matters.”
Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999).
“In the alternative, husband argued that, given the child-parent relationship that he has with both children, ORS 109.119 confers on him substantive custodial rights as a stepparent and requires use of the “best interests of the child” standard, ORS 107.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(3)(a) — 28 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(3)(b) — 15 cases
Husk v. Adelman, 383 P.3d 961 (Or. Ct. App. 2016).
“The court determined that Husk had established an “ongoing personal relationship” with G and ordered visitation as allowed by ORS 109.119. 1 We write to address Adelman’s first two assignments of error, challenging the visitation plan, and reject Adelman’s third assignment of…”
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4) — 7 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(A) — 1 case
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a) — 8 cases
Pulley v. Herndon, 527 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“Specifically, mother contends that some of the trial court’s findings in support of the court’s best-interest conclusion are either erroneous or did not take into account relevant evidence. Mother asks for de novo review under ORAP 5.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a)(A) — 4 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a)(B) — 4 cases
Pulley v. Herndon, 527 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2023).
“Specifically, mother contends that some of the trial court’s findings in support of the court’s best-interest conclusion are either erroneous or did not take into account relevant evidence. Mother asks for de novo review under ORAP 5.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a)(C) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a)(D) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(a)(E) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b) — 23 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b)(A) — 11 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b)(B) — 12 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b)(C) — 16 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b)(D) — 11 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Kleinsasser, 333 P.3d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“The parties, however, do not provide us with guidance on our applicable standard of review should we decline to review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether the presumption in ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(4)(b)(E) — 10 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(5) — 9 cases
In the Matter of Marriage of Hruby & Hruby, 748 P.2d 57 (Or. 1987).
“ORS 109.119 allows “[a]ny person * * * who has established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child” to intervene in, or to initiate, proceedings to determine child custody and related matters.”
Matter of Marriage of Sleeper, 982 P.2d 1126 (Or. 1999).
“In the alternative, husband argued that, given the child-parent relationship that he has with both children, ORS 109.119 confers on him substantive custodial rights as a stepparent and requires use of the “best interests of the child” standard, ORS 107.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(5)(a) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(5)(d) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(6)(a) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(6)(d) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(7) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(7)(b) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(8)(a) — 4 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(8)(b) — 6 cases
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(8)(c) — 3 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
Wurtele v. Blevins, 84 P.3d 225 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“We review the facts de novo under the standards prescribed in ORS 109.119 and our case law construing and applying that statute.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(8)(d) — 3 cases
In Re the Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“(2) Grandparents have rebutted the statutory presumption that mother acts in the best interests of the children by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that mother is unable to care adequately for the children and that circumstances detrimental to the children exist…”
In Re the Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 67 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“All members of the court agree that we should allow the petition and modify our former opinion to state that the 2001 amendments to ORS 109.119 are fully retroactive. Five members believe that we should remand for further proceedings in the trial court; five members believe that…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(8)(e) — 1 case
In Re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or. 2004).
“However, the court also identified several negative factors regarding grandparents, including grandparents’ tendency to dote on the children, their efforts to “control” father and the children, and their desire to prevent father from having the children.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.119(Y)(b) — 1 case
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