109.381 Effect
of judgment of adoption.
(1) A judgment of a court of this state granting an adoption, and the
proceedings in such adoption matter, shall in all respects be entitled to the
same presumptions and be as conclusive as if rendered by a court of record
acting in all respects as a court of general jurisdiction and not by a court of
special or inferior jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over the persons and the
cause shall be presumed to exist.
(2) Except for
such right of appeal as may be provided by law, judgments of adoption shall be
binding and conclusive upon all parties to the proceeding. No party nor anyone
claiming by, through or under a party to an adoption proceeding, may for any
reason, either by collateral or direct proceedings, question the validity of a
judgment of adoption entered by a court of competent jurisdiction of this or
any other state.
(3) After the
expiration of one year from the entry of a judgment of adoption in this state
the validity of the adoption shall be binding on all persons, and it shall be
conclusively presumed that the child’s natural parents and all other persons
who might claim to have any right to, or over the child, have abandoned the
child and consented to the entry of such judgment of adoption, and that the
child became the lawful child of the adoptive parents or parent at the time
when the judgment of adoption was rendered, all irrespective of jurisdictional
or other defects in the adoption proceeding. After the expiration of the
one-year period no one may question the validity of the adoption for any
reason, either through collateral or direct proceedings, and all persons shall
be bound thereby. However, the provisions of this subsection shall not affect
the right of appeal from a judgment of adoption as may be provided by law. [Subsections
(1), (2) and (3) enacted as 1959 c.609 §§2,3,4; subsection (4) derived from
1959 c.609 §6; 2003 c.576 §155; 2005 c.22 §89]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
25
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1963–2022 · leading case:
Wimber v. Timpe, 818 P.2d 954 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
Wimber v. Timpe, 818 P.2d 954 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 10× “Appellant asserts that, because neither ORS 109.381 2 nor *143 ORCP 71B(1) 3 authorizes vacation of the decree under the circumstances, the trial court erred.”
Hogue v. Olympic Bank, 708 P.2d 605 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 19× “The legislature enacted ORS 109.381 in 1959. The statute provides: “(1) A decree of a court of this state granting an adoption, and the proceedings in such adoption matter, shall in all respects be entitled to the same presumptions and be as conclusive as if rendered by a court…”
McCulley v. Bone, 979 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 10× “The trial court determined that ORS 109.381(2) did not preclude mother from raising the issue of the revocation of her consent and rejected mother's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”
In Re the Est. of Wagner, 748 P.2d 639 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 10× “The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the adoption decree's reinstatement based upon its determination that under Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.381 , the adoption decree, in spite of any jurisdictional defects, was conclusively presumed to be valid and binding…”
Phariss v. Welshans, 946 P.2d 1160 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 11× “Father also argued 5 that, to the extent that ORS 109.381 bars his motion, the statute is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine in Article III, section 1, and Article VII (Amended), section 1, 6 of the Oregon Constitution and under the due process and equal…”
State Ex Rel. Costello v. Cottrell, 867 P.2d 498 (Or. 1994).
· cites it 8× “Plaintiff-relator contends that ORS 109.381 precludes grandmother’s collateral attack against the Grant County adoption decree.”
Hughes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 383 P.2d 55 (Or. 1963).
· cites it 5× “We come finally to Aetna’s contention in support of the order of the court below based upon ORS 109.381 (Oregon Laws 1959, ch 609, §§ 2-6, inclusive) which reads: “(1) A decree of a court of this state granting an adoption, and the proceedings in such adoption matter, shall in…”
Zockert v. Fanning, 800 P.2d 773 (Or. 1990).
· cites it 2× “6 In an adoption proceeding, an Oregon court must first determine that a parent consents or that there is a statutory substitute for consent before it may turn to the second question of whether the requested adoption should, in the best interests of the child, be granted.”
Dep't of Human Servs. v. B. A. S., 221 P.3d 806 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “, ORS 109.381(2) (restricting the ability of a party to an adoption to, “either by collateral or direct proceedings, question the validity of a judgment of adoption”); ORS 109.”
Campbell v. Kindred, 554 P.2d 599 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
· cites it 3× “Subsection (3) of ORS 109.381 provides: "After the expiration of one year from the entry of a decree of adoption in this state the validity of the adoption shall be binding on all persons, and it shall be conclusively presumed that the child’s natural parents and all other…”
Rogers v. Dep't of Revenue, 587 P.2d 91 (Or. 1978).
· cites it 2× “child of the adoptive parents or parent at the time when the decree of adoption was rendered, all irrespective of jurisdictional or other defects in the adoption proceeding; after the expiration of such one-year period no one may question the validity of the adoption for any…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.381(1) — 3 cases
State Ex Rel. Costello v. Cottrell, 867 P.2d 498 (Or. 1994).
“Plaintiff-relator contends that ORS 109.381 precludes grandmother’s collateral attack against the Grant County adoption decree.”
Hogue v. Olympic Bank, 708 P.2d 605 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
“The legislature enacted ORS 109.381 in 1959. The statute provides: “(1) A decree of a court of this state granting an adoption, and the proceedings in such adoption matter, shall in all respects be entitled to the same presumptions and be as conclusive as if rendered by a court…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.381(2) — 6 cases
McCulley v. Bone, 979 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
“The trial court determined that ORS 109.381(2) did not preclude mother from raising the issue of the revocation of her consent and rejected mother's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”
State Ex Rel. Costello v. Cottrell, 867 P.2d 498 (Or. 1994).
“Plaintiff-relator contends that ORS 109.381 precludes grandmother’s collateral attack against the Grant County adoption decree.”
Dep't of Human Servs. v. B. A. S., 221 P.3d 806 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).
“, ORS 109.381(2) (restricting the ability of a party to an adoption to, “either by collateral or direct proceedings, question the validity of a judgment of adoption”); ORS 109.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.381(3) — 18 cases
Phariss v. Welshans, 946 P.2d 1160 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
“Father also argued 5 that, to the extent that ORS 109.381 bars his motion, the statute is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine in Article III, section 1, and Article VII (Amended), section 1, 6 of the Oregon Constitution and under the due process and equal…”
McCulley v. Bone, 979 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
“The trial court determined that ORS 109.381(2) did not preclude mother from raising the issue of the revocation of her consent and rejected mother's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.”
State Ex Rel. Costello v. Cottrell, 867 P.2d 498 (Or. 1994).
“Plaintiff-relator contends that ORS 109.381 precludes grandmother’s collateral attack against the Grant County adoption decree.”
Wimber v. Timpe, 818 P.2d 954 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
“Appellant asserts that, because neither ORS 109.381 2 nor *143 ORCP 71B(1) 3 authorizes vacation of the decree under the circumstances, the trial court erred.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.