Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005 (2026)

General definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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      131.005 General definitions. As used in sections 1 to 311, chapter 836, Oregon Laws 1973, except as otherwise specifically provided or unless the context requires otherwise:

      (1) “Accusatory instrument” means a grand jury indictment, an information or a complaint.

      (2) “Bench warrant” means a process of a court in which a criminal action is pending, directing a peace officer to take into custody a defendant in the action who has previously appeared before the court upon the accusatory instrument by which the action was commenced, and to bring the defendant before the court. The function of a bench warrant is to achieve the court appearance of a defendant in a criminal action for some purpose other than the initial arraignment of the defendant in the action.

      (3) “Complaint” means a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person and bearing an indorsement of acceptance by the district attorney having jurisdiction thereof, filed with a magistrate, and charging another person with the commission of an offense, other than an offense punishable as a felony. A complaint serves both to commence an action and as a basis for prosecution thereof.

      (4) “Complainant’s information” means a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person and bearing an indorsement of acceptance by the district attorney having jurisdiction thereof, filed with a magistrate, and charging another person with the commission of an offense punishable as a felony. A complainant’s information serves to commence an action, but not as a basis for prosecution thereof.

      (5) “Correctional facility” means any place used for the confinement of persons charged with or convicted of a crime or otherwise confined under a court order. “Correctional facility” does not include a youth correction facility as defined in ORS 162.135 and applies to a state hospital only as to persons detained therein charged with or convicted of a crime, or detained therein after being found guilty except for insanity under ORS 161.290 to 161.373.

      (6) “Criminal action” means an action at law by means of which a person is accused of the commission of a violation, misdemeanor or felony.

      (7) “Criminal proceeding” means any proceeding which constitutes a part of a criminal action or occurs in court in connection with a prospective, pending or completed criminal action.

      (8) “District attorney,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes a city attorney as prosecuting officer in the case of municipal ordinance offenses, a county counsel as prosecuting officer under a county charter in the case of county ordinance offenses, and the Attorney General in those criminal actions or proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General.

      (9) “District attorney’s information” means a written accusation by a district attorney and:

      (a) If filed with a magistrate to charge a person with the commission of an offense, other than an offense punishable as a felony, serves both to commence an action and as a basis for prosecution thereof; or

      (b) If filed with a magistrate to charge a person with the commission of an offense punishable as a felony, serves to commence an action, but not as a basis for prosecution thereof; or

      (c) If, as is otherwise authorized by law, filed in circuit court to charge a person with the commission of an offense, serves as a basis for prosecution thereof.

      (10) “Information” means a district attorney’s information or a complainant’s information.

      (11) “Probable cause” means that there is a substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has committed it.

      (12) “Trial court” means a court which by law has jurisdiction over an offense charged in an accusatory instrument and has authority to accept a plea thereto, or try, hear or otherwise dispose of a criminal action based on the accusatory instrument.

      (13) “Ultimate trial jurisdiction” means the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal action or proceeding at the highest trial level.

      (14) “Warrant of arrest” means a process of a court, directing a peace officer to arrest a defendant and to bring the defendant before the court for the purpose of arraignment upon an accusatory instrument filed therewith by which a criminal action against the defendant has been commenced. [1973 c.836 §1; 1983 c.760 §1; 1995 c.738 §3; 1997 c.249 §42; 1997 c.801 §101; 1999 c.1051 §122; 2017 c.634 §1]

 

      Note: Legislative Counsel has substituted “chapter 836, Oregon Laws 1973,” for the words “this Act” in sections 1 and 2, chapter 836, Oregon Laws 1973, compiled as 131.005 and 131.015. Specific ORS references have not been substituted, pursuant to 173.160. These sections may be determined by referring to the 1973 Comparative Section Table located in Volume 22 of ORS.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 180 cases (20 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: State v. Murga, 422 P.3d 417 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Murga, 422 P.3d 417 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 5× “On appeal, defendant contends that because the punitive contempt proceeding originated from a motion and order to show cause, as opposed to an accusatory instrument as provided for in ORS 131.005(1), the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”
State Ex Rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 708 P.2d 1137 (Or. 1985). · cites it 8× “, ORS 131.005 (challenge to jury panels), refer to “criminal action.”
State v. Straughan, 327 P.3d 1172 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 7× “Appellate cases considering the definitions in ORS 131.005 have recognized that a criminal proceeding is broader than a criminal action, though they have not held that an appeal from a judgment of conviction (much less an appeal from the imposition of a contempt sanction) falls…”
State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308 (Or. 1992). · cites it 4× “" The statutory definition of a "[c]omplainant's information" as "a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person," ORS 131.005(4), in contrast to a "[d]istrict attorney's information," which is "a written accusation by a district attorney," ORS 131.”
State v. Moylett, 836 P.2d 1329 (Or. 1992). · cites it 4× “[3] Probable cause to arrest is statutorily defined by ORS 131.005(11): "`Probable cause' means that there is a substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has committed it.”
State v. Vasquez, 34 P.3d 1188 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 7× “” An “information” that charges a felony must be one of two types: “a district attorney’s information or a complainant’s information.” ORS 131.”
Eslamizar, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 2004). · cites it 3× “See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 131.005 (6), (7) (2003).”
State v. Hedgpeth, 452 P.3d 948 (Or. 2019). “Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009) (probable cause standard set forth in ORS 131.005(11) states standard as “more likely than not”); Joshi v.”
State v. Anfield, 836 P.2d 1337 (Or. 1992). · cites it 4× “Justus, therefore, had probable cause, as defined by ORS 131.005(11), to believe that defendant had violated ORS 166.”
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). · cites it 2× “II, § 1233 (Bellinger and Cotton 1902), and compare ORS 131.005(6): "`Criminal action' means an action at law by means of which a person is accused and tried for the commission of an offense.”
State v. Meyers, 958 P.2d 187 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 5× “ORS 131.005(2), for example, refers to a “bench warrant” as the *558 “process of a court in which a criminal action is pending” that authorizes a peace officer to bring the defendant before the court.”
State v. Curran, 628 P.2d 1198 (Or. 1981). · cites it 3× “” We resort to ORS 131.005(6) for the definition of a “criminal action”: “ ‘Criminal action’ means an action at law by means of which a person is accused and tried for the commission of an offense.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(1) — 17 cases
State v. Murga, 422 P.3d 417 (Or. Ct. App. 2018). “On appeal, defendant contends that because the punitive contempt proceeding originated from a motion and order to show cause, as opposed to an accusatory instrument as provided for in ORS 131.005(1), the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”
State v. Freeland, 667 P.2d 509 (Or. 1983).
State v. Knowles, 618 P.2d 1245 (Or. 1980).
State v. Vasquez, 88 P.3d 271 (Or. 2004).
State v. Baxley, 555 P.2d 782 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(10) — 2 cases
State v. Vasquez, 34 P.3d 1188 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “” An “information” that charges a felony must be one of two types: “a district attorney’s information or a complainant’s information.” ORS 131.”
State v. Piskorowski, 909 P.2d 897 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(11) — 99 cases
State v. Moylett, 836 P.2d 1329 (Or. 1992). “[3] Probable cause to arrest is statutorily defined by ORS 131.005(11): "`Probable cause' means that there is a substantial objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been committed and a person to be arrested has committed it.”
State v. Hedgpeth, 452 P.3d 948 (Or. 2019). “Vasquez-Villagomez, 346 Or 12, 23 , 203 P3d 193 (2009) (probable cause standard set forth in ORS 131.005(11) states standard as “more likely than not”); Joshi v.”
State v. Anfield, 836 P.2d 1337 (Or. 1992). “Justus, therefore, had probable cause, as defined by ORS 131.005(11), to believe that defendant had violated ORS 166.”
State v. Anspach, 682 P.2d 786 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Flores, 685 P.2d 999 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(12) — 2 cases
State v. Lawler, 927 P.2d 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Baxley, 555 P.2d 782 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(14) — 3 cases
State v. Carter, 241 P.3d 1205 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Brown, 772 P.2d 429 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Vaughn, 805 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(2) — 5 cases
State v. Carter, 241 P.3d 1205 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Meyers, 958 P.2d 187 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). “ORS 131.005(2), for example, refers to a “bench warrant” as the *558 “process of a court in which a criminal action is pending” that authorizes a peace officer to bring the defendant before the court.”
State v. McColly, 435 P.3d 715 (Or. 2019).
State v. Brown, 772 P.2d 429 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
State v. Vaughn, 805 P.2d 733 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(3) — 12 cases
Abbott v. Baldwin, 36 P.3d 516 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
City of Corvallis v. Pi Kappa Phi, 428 P.3d 905 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
State v. Riggs, 582 P.2d 457 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
State v. Kuznetsov, 199 P.3d 311 (Or. 2008).
State v. McColly, 435 P.3d 715 (Or. 2019).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(4) — 5 cases
State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308 (Or. 1992). “" The statutory definition of a "[c]omplainant's information" as "a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person," ORS 131.005(4), in contrast to a "[d]istrict attorney's information," which is "a written accusation by a district attorney," ORS 131.”
State v. Vasquez, 88 P.3d 271 (Or. 2004).
State v. Vasquez, 34 P.3d 1188 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “” An “information” that charges a felony must be one of two types: “a district attorney’s information or a complainant’s information.” ORS 131.”
State v. Kuznetsov, 199 P.3d 311 (Or. 2008).
State v. Murr, 295 P.3d 122 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(6) — 29 cases
State Ex Rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 708 P.2d 1137 (Or. 1985). “, ORS 131.005 (challenge to jury panels), refer to “criminal action.”
State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136 (Or. 1988). “II, § 1233 (Bellinger and Cotton 1902), and compare ORS 131.005(6): "`Criminal action' means an action at law by means of which a person is accused and tried for the commission of an offense.”
State v. Sheikh-Nur, 398 P.3d 472 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
Abbott v. Baldwin, 36 P.3d 516 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
State v. Smalley, 225 P.3d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(7) — 20 cases
State v. Straughan, 327 P.3d 1172 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). “Appellate cases considering the definitions in ORS 131.005 have recognized that a criminal proceeding is broader than a criminal action, though they have not held that an appeal from a judgment of conviction (much less an appeal from the imposition of a contempt sanction) falls…”
State v. Curran, 628 P.2d 1198 (Or. 1981). “” We resort to ORS 131.005(6) for the definition of a “criminal action”: “ ‘Criminal action’ means an action at law by means of which a person is accused and tried for the commission of an offense.”
Brown v. Adult & Fam. Servs., 643 P.2d 1266 (Or. 1982).
TVKO v. Howland, 73 P.3d 905 (Or. 2003).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(8) — 2 cases
City of Pendleton v. Martin, 611 P.2d 318 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(9) — 7 cases
State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308 (Or. 1992). “" The statutory definition of a "[c]omplainant's information" as "a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person," ORS 131.005(4), in contrast to a "[d]istrict attorney's information," which is "a written accusation by a district attorney," ORS 131.”
State v. Kuznetsov, 199 P.3d 311 (Or. 2008).
State v. Vasquez, 34 P.3d 1188 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). “” An “information” that charges a felony must be one of two types: “a district attorney’s information or a complainant’s information.” ORS 131.”
State v. Piskorowski, 909 P.2d 897 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
State v. Jones, 569 P.2d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(9)(a) — 5 cases
State v. Gray, 515 P.3d 348 (Or. 2022).
City of Portland v. Aziz, 615 P.2d 1109 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
State v. Kuznetsov, 199 P.3d 311 (Or. 2008).
State v. Gilliland, 752 P.2d 1255 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
State v. Dinsmore, 116 P.3d 226 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(9)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Gray, 515 P.3d 348 (Or. 2022).
State v. Haynes, 655 P.2d 621 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(9)(c) — 4 cases
State v. Haynes, 655 P.2d 621 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
State v. Jones, 569 P.2d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
State v. Evans, 242 P.3d 738 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
State v. Evans, 242 P.3d 738 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.005(H) — 2 cases
State v. Smith, 692 P.2d 120 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
State v. Anfield, 788 P.2d 480 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
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