135.265
Security release.
(1) If the defendant is not released on personal recognizance under ORS
135.255, or granted conditional release under ORS 135.260, or fails to agree to
the provisions of the conditional release, the magistrate shall set a security
amount that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance. The defendant
shall execute the security release in the amount set by the magistrate.
(2) The defendant
shall execute a release agreement and deposit with the clerk of the court
before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money equal to 10 percent of
the security amount, but in no event shall such deposit be less than $25. The
clerk shall issue a receipt for the sum deposited. Upon depositing this sum the
defendant shall be released from custody subject to the condition that the
defendant appear to answer the charge in the court having jurisdiction on a day
certain and thereafter as ordered by the court until discharged or final order
of the court. Once security has been given and a charge is pending or is
thereafter filed in or transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction the
latter court shall continue the original security in that court subject to ORS
135.280 and 135.285. When conditions of the release agreement have been
performed and the defendant has been discharged from all obligations in the
cause, the clerk of the court shall return to the person shown by the receipt
to have made the deposit, unless the court orders otherwise, 85 percent of the
sum which has been deposited and shall retain as security release costs 15
percent, but not less than $5 nor more than $750, of the amount deposited. The
interest that has accrued on the full amount deposited shall also be retained
by the clerk. The amount retained by the clerk of a circuit court shall be paid
over as directed by the State Court Administrator for deposit in the General
Fund. The amount retained by a justice of the peace shall be deposited in the
county treasury. The amount retained by the clerk of a municipal court shall be
deposited in the municipal corporation treasury. At the request of the
defendant the court may order whatever amount is repayable to defendant from such
security amount to be paid to defendant’s attorney of record.
(3) Instead of
the security deposit provided for in subsection (2) of this section the
defendant may deposit with the clerk of the court an amount equal to the
security amount in cash, stocks, bonds, or real or personal property situated
in this state with equity not exempt owned by the defendant or sureties worth
double the amount of security set by the magistrate. The stocks, bonds, real or
personal property shall in all cases be justified by affidavit. The magistrate
may further examine the sufficiency of the security as the magistrate considers
necessary. [1973 c.836 §153; 1979 c.878 §1; 1981 c.837 §1; 1981 s.s. c.3 §112;
1983 c.763 §44; 1987 c.905 §14; 2009 c.659 §§9,11; 2011 c.595 §§158,159]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case:
State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954 (Or. 2020).
State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954 (Or. 2020).
· cites it 21× “This question requires us to construe two statutes together—ORS 135.265 and ORS 161.665. When a criminal defendant is not conditionally released or released on per- sonal recognizance, the judge “shall set a security amount that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance”…”
State v. Laune, 464 P.3d 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 18× “According to defendant, an amendment to ORS 135.265(2), which governs the return of security deposits, eliminated the previously recognized presumption that a third-party security deposit belongs to the defendant for purposes of an ability-to-pay determination.”
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981).
· cites it 9× “260, is distinct from a “security release,” as provided by ORS 135.265. Thus, it is provided by ORS 135.”
Priest v. Pearce, 840 P.2d 65 (Or. 1992).
· cites it 2× “That which traditionally was referred to as "bail" has been replaced in name, but not in basic concept, by what presently is referred to statutorily as a "security amount," ORS 135.265. [2] When we issued our writ in this case, we directed the parties to submit memoranda to us…”
Knutson v. Cupp, 601 P.2d 129 (Or. 1979).
· cites it 5× “We believe, however, that the subsection must be read in conjunction with ORS 135.265. Where a defendant has neither been released upon personal recognizance under ORS 135.”
State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201 (N.M. 2018).
“5/110-7(a) (West 2017) (effectively abolishing the commercial bail bond industry by requiring any money bail to be paid directly to the court rather than through a commercial surety); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135.265 (West 2017) (same) ; Wis.”
State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018 NMSC 5 (N.M. 2018).
“5/110-7(a) (West 2017) (effectively abolishing the commercial bail bond industry by requiring any money bail to be paid directly to the court rather than through a commercial surety); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 135.265 (West 2017) (same); Wis.”
State v. Grant, 606 P.2d 1166 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 3× “Pending trial, he was released from custody under the security release provisions of ORS 135.265. 1 Defendant was subsequently convicted of the assault charge, sentenced to the maximum 10-year imprisonment, and ordered as part of his sentence to make restitution to the victim…”
State v. Brooks, 456 P.3d 665 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
“ll be informed that: “(a) If the name by which the defendant is charged in the accusatory instrument is not the true name of the defendant the defendant must then declare the true name; and “(b) If the defendant does not declare the true name as required by paragraph (a) of this…”
State v. Baker, 998 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 7× “The state argues that, under ORS 135.265 and the terms of the release order *570 and agreement, the trial court possessed the authority to apply the security to amounts that defendant owed in this or any other case.”
Cooper v. Burks, 702 P.2d 1107 (Or. 1985).
· cites it 5× “By legislative mandate, the ascending degrees of onerous conditions begin with release upon personal recognizance, move to conditional release, and, finally, end with a security release.”
Application of Liberman, 650 P.2d 83 (Or. 1982).
· cites it 14× “Following plaintiff's completion of a security release questionnaire, a Lane County custody release assistance officer [1] set the security amount for the plaintiff at $3 million (which would require, under ORS 135.265, a deposit of "10 percent of the security amount," $300,000,…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.265(1) — 7 cases
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981).
“260, is distinct from a “security release,” as provided by ORS 135.265. Thus, it is provided by ORS 135.”
State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954 (Or. 2020).
“This question requires us to construe two statutes together—ORS 135.265 and ORS 161.665. When a criminal defendant is not conditionally released or released on per- sonal recognizance, the judge “shall set a security amount that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance”…”
Application of Liberman, 650 P.2d 83 (Or. 1982).
“Following plaintiff's completion of a security release questionnaire, a Lane County custody release assistance officer [1] set the security amount for the plaintiff at $3 million (which would require, under ORS 135.265, a deposit of "10 percent of the security amount," $300,000,…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.265(2) — 14 cases
State v. Laune, 464 P.3d 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2020).
“According to defendant, an amendment to ORS 135.265(2), which governs the return of security deposits, eliminated the previously recognized presumption that a third-party security deposit belongs to the defendant for purposes of an ability-to-pay determination.”
State v. Morales, 476 P.3d 954 (Or. 2020).
“This question requires us to construe two statutes together—ORS 135.265 and ORS 161.665. When a criminal defendant is not conditionally released or released on per- sonal recognizance, the judge “shall set a security amount that will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance”…”
Sexson v. Merten, 631 P.2d 1367 (Or. 1981).
“260, is distinct from a “security release,” as provided by ORS 135.265. Thus, it is provided by ORS 135.”
State v. Baker, 998 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
“The state argues that, under ORS 135.265 and the terms of the release order *570 and agreement, the trial court possessed the authority to apply the security to amounts that defendant owed in this or any other case.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.265(3) — 2 cases
Knutson v. Cupp, 601 P.2d 129 (Or. 1979).
“We believe, however, that the subsection must be read in conjunction with ORS 135.265. Where a defendant has neither been released upon personal recognizance under ORS 135.”
Cooper v. Burks, 702 P.2d 1107 (Or. 1985).
“By legislative mandate, the ascending degrees of onerous conditions begin with release upon personal recognizance, move to conditional release, and, finally, end with a security release.”
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