137.020 Time
for pronouncing judgment; delay; notice of right to appeal. (1) After a plea or verdict of
guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a plea of former conviction
or acquittal, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court
shall appoint a time for pronouncing judgment.
(2)(a) The time
appointed shall be at least two calendar days after the plea or verdict if the
court intends to remain in session so long. If the court does not intend to
remain in session at least two calendar days, the time appointed may be sooner
than two calendar days, but shall be as remote a time as can reasonably be
allowed. However, in the latter case, the judgment shall not be given less than
six hours after the plea or verdict, except with the consent of the defendant.
(b) Except for
good cause shown or as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a court shall not
delay for more than 31 calendar days after the plea or verdict the sentencing
of a defendant held in custody on account of the pending proceedings. Except
for good cause shown or as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a court shall
not delay for more than 56 calendar days after the plea or verdict the
sentencing of a defendant not held in custody on account of the pending
proceedings. If the defendant is not in custody and the court does not
pronounce judgment within 56 calendar days after the plea or verdict, any
period of probation imposed as a part of a subsequent judgment shall begin to
run from the date of the plea or verdict.
(3) If the
defendant is in custody following the verdict, the court shall pronounce
judgment as soon as practicable, but in any case within seven calendar days
following the verdict if no presentence investigation is ordered, and within
seven calendar days after delivery of the presentence report to the court if a
presentence investigation has been ordered; however, the court may delay
pronouncement of judgment beyond the limits of this subsection for good cause
shown.
(4) If the final
calendar day a defendant must be sentenced is not a judicial day then
sentencing may be delayed until the next judicial day.
(5)(a) At the
time a court pronounces judgment the defendant, if present, shall be advised of
the right to appeal and of the procedure for protecting that right. If the
defendant is not present, the court shall advise the defendant in writing of
the right to appeal and of the procedure for protecting that right.
(b) If the trial
court sentences the defendant subsequent to a plea of guilty or no contest or
upon probation revocation or sentence suspension, or if the trial court
sentences the defendant after judgment of an appellate court or a
post-conviction relief court, the court shall advise the defendant of the
limitations on reviewability imposed by ORS 138.105 in person or, if the
defendant is not present, in writing.
(6) If the
defendant is financially eligible for appointment of counsel at state expense
on appeal under ORS 138.500, trial counsel shall determine whether the
defendant wishes to pursue an appeal. If the defendant wishes to pursue an
appeal, trial counsel shall transmit to the Oregon Public Defense Commission,
on a form prepared by the office, information necessary to perfect the appeal. [Amended
by 1971 c.565 §18a; 1987 c.242 §1; 1991 c.111 §12; 2001 c.644 §4; 2003 c.14 §57;
2017 c.529 §23; 2023 c.281 §27]
Notes of Decisions
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
“5-701(B) (2016); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(3) (2015); Pa. Rule Crim.”
McCaw Commc'ns, Inc. v. Marion Cnty., 773 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 6× “, a facility which is necessary to provide the public service of radio transmission - the word is not superfluous or redundant. It is there to distinguish necessary facilities from unnecessary ones, such as advertising signs or possibly storage yards.”
State v. Tison, 424 P.3d 823 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“Defendant acknowledges that the $255 difference between the fines imposed at sentencing and the monetary penalty reflected in the judgments may reflect the trial court's imposition of the $255 fee that it was required to impose under ORS 813.”
State v. Dawson, 284 P.3d 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 8× “ORS 137.020 provides, in pertinent part: “(1) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a plea of former conviction or acquittal, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court shall appoint a time for pronouncing judgment.”
State v. Brewer, 320 P.3d 620 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“Specifically, ORS 137.020(5)(b) requires the court in sentencing a defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest, as well as in other situations, to “advise the defendant of the limitations on appealability imposed by ORS 138.”
State v. Gibson, 51 P.3d 619 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
“See ORS 137.020. Consequently, we vacate the original judgment in Case One, including the dismissal of the DWS charge, and remand that case for entry of a judgment of conviction and sentencing on the DWS charge to which defendant pleaded guilty.”
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
“5–701(B) (2016); Ore. Rev. Stat. §137.020(3) (2015); Pa. Rule Crim.”
State v. Bonner, 771 P.2d 272 (Or. 1989).
“The parties have supplied helpful memoranda. We conclude that the appeal in each case was premature.”
Billings v. Maass, 738 P.2d 222 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
“2 He argues, however, that, because ORS 137.020(3) requires courts to notify convicted defendants of the right to appeal, the omission from ORS 144.”
DeBolt v. Cupp, 528 P.2d 601 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
· cites it 2× “ORS 137.020 requires the court to "appoint a time for" sentencing.”
Alexander v. Gladden, 288 P.2d 219 (Or. 1955).
“If on the contrary, the District *394 Attorney was fully prepared, we see no reason why he could not waive the formalities imposed for his protection, if the accused should also waive his right to time after the plea and before sentence under ORS 137.”
Waker Assocs., Inc. v. Clackamas Cnty., 826 P.2d 20 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 2× “Marion County, 96 Or App 552, 555 , 773 P2d 779 (1989): “Section 137.020, like its statutory analog, defines non-farm uses which are permitted in farm zones.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(1) — 1 case
State v. Tison, 424 P.3d 823 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“Defendant acknowledges that the $255 difference between the fines imposed at sentencing and the monetary penalty reflected in the judgments may reflect the trial court's imposition of the $255 fee that it was required to impose under ORS 813.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(2) — 1 case
State v. Dawson, 284 P.3d 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
“ORS 137.020 provides, in pertinent part: “(1) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a plea of former conviction or acquittal, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court shall appoint a time for pronouncing judgment.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(2)(a) — 1 case
State v. Dawson, 284 P.3d 1272 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
“ORS 137.020 provides, in pertinent part: “(1) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a plea of former conviction or acquittal, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court shall appoint a time for pronouncing judgment.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(3) — 3 cases
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
“5-701(B) (2016); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(3) (2015); Pa. Rule Crim.”
Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
“5–701(B) (2016); Ore. Rev. Stat. §137.020(3) (2015); Pa. Rule Crim.”
Billings v. Maass, 738 P.2d 222 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
“2 He argues, however, that, because ORS 137.020(3) requires courts to notify convicted defendants of the right to appeal, the omission from ORS 144.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(5)(b) — 1 case
State v. Brewer, 320 P.3d 620 (Or. Ct. App. 2014).
“Specifically, ORS 137.020(5)(b) requires the court in sentencing a defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest, as well as in other situations, to “advise the defendant of the limitations on appealability imposed by ORS 138.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.020(d) — 1 case
McCaw Commc'ns, Inc. v. Marion Cnty., 773 P.2d 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
“, a facility which is necessary to provide the public service of radio transmission - the word is not superfluous or redundant. It is there to distinguish necessary facilities from unnecessary ones, such as advertising signs or possibly storage yards.”
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