144.335 Appeal
from order of board to Court of Appeals; appointment of master; costs. (1) A person over whom the State
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may seek
judicial review of a final order of the board as provided in this section if:
(a) The person is
adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the board; and
(b) The person
has exhausted administrative review as provided by board rule.
(2) A person
requesting administrative review shall provide the person’s current mailing
address in the request. The board shall mail its order disposing of the request
for administrative review to the person at that address, unless the person has
otherwise notified the board in writing of a change of address.
(3) The order of
the board need not be in any special form, and the order is sufficient for
purposes of judicial review if it appears that the board acted within the scope
of the board’s authority. The Court of Appeals may affirm, reverse or remand
the order on the same basis as provided in ORS 183.482 (8). The filing of the
petition shall not stay the board’s order, but the board may do so, or the
court may order a stay upon application on such terms as it deems proper.
(4) If a person
described in subsection (1) of this section seeks judicial review of a final
order of the board, the person shall file a petition for judicial review with
the Court of Appeals within 60 days after the date the board mails the order
disposing of the person’s request for administrative review. The person shall
serve a copy of the petition for judicial review on the board.
(5) Within 30
days after being served with a copy of the petition for judicial review, or
such further time as the court may allow, the board shall:
(a) Submit to the
court the record of the proceeding or, if the petitioner agrees, a shortened
record; and
(b) Deliver a
copy of the record to the petitioner or the petitioner’s attorney, if the
petitioner is represented by an attorney.
(6) At any time
after submission of the petitioner’s brief, the court, on its own motion or on
motion of the board, without submission of the board’s brief and without oral
argument, may summarily affirm the board’s order if the court determines that
the judicial review does not present a substantial question of law.
Notwithstanding ORS 2.570, the Chief Judge, or other judge of the Court of
Appeals designated by the Chief Judge, may, on behalf of the Court of Appeals,
deny or, if the petitioner does not oppose the motion, grant the board’s motion
for summary affirmance. A summary affirmance under this subsection constitutes
a decision on the merits of the petitioner’s issues on judicial review.
(7) During the
pendency of judicial review of an order, if the board withdraws the order for
the purpose of reconsideration and thereafter issues an order on
reconsideration, and the petitioner wishes to proceed with the judicial review,
the petitioner need not seek administrative review of the order on
reconsideration and need not file a new petition for judicial review. The
petitioner shall file, within a time established by the court, a notice of
intent to proceed with judicial review.
(8) In the case
of disputed allegations of irregularities in procedure before the board not
shown in the record that, if proved, would warrant reversal or remand, the
Court of Appeals may refer the allegations to a master appointed by the court
to take evidence and make findings of fact upon them.
(9) If the court
determines that a brief filed by the petitioner, when liberally construed,
fails to state a colorable claim for review, the court may order the petitioner
to pay, in addition to the board’s recoverable costs, attorney fees incurred by
the board not to exceed $100. If the petitioner moves to dismiss the petition
prior to a summary affirmance described in subsection (6) of this section, the
court may not award costs or attorney fees to the board.
(10) Upon request
by the board, the Department of Corrections may draw from or charge to the
petitioner’s trust account and pay to the board the amount of any costs or
attorney fees awarded to the board by the court in any judicial review under
this section.
(11) If the
petitioner prevails on judicial review and is represented by an attorney funded
by the Oregon Public Defense Commission, any recoverable costs shall be paid to
the commission. [1973 c.694 §24; 1983 c.740 §18; 1989 c.790 §41; 1993 c.402 §1;
1995 c.108 §3; 1999 c.141 §3; 1999 c.618 §1; 2001 c.661 §1; 2003 c.352 §1; 2007
c.411 §1; 2023 c.281 §32]
Notes of Decisions
Tuckenberry v. Bd. of Parole, 451 P.3d 227 (Or. 2019).
· cites it 25× “In relevant part, ORS 144.335 provides: “(1) A person over whom the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order of the board as provided in this section if: “(a) The person is adversely affected or…”
Mastriano v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 159 P.3d 1151 (Or. 2007).
· cites it 29× “Summarily, it concluded that, under a proper PGE analysis, a board order denying reconsideration of a prior order “is final within the meaning of ORS 144.335 because the order conclusively disposes of [a] petitioner’s *688 request for reopening.”
Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 143 P.3d 538 (Or. 2006).
· cites it 16× “In this case, we must decide what constitutes a “substantial question of law” when the Court of Appeals determines whether to grant a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review of a parole order under ORS 144.335. Petitioner sought judicial review of a decision of the…”
Shelby v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 915 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 26× “Until 1993, ORS 144.335 read, in part: “(1) When a person over whom the board exercises its jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by the final order of the board related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole or the revoking of post-prison supervision and…”
Harris v. Bd. of Parole, 614 P.2d 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
· cites it 16× “2d 1292 (1979)), the Supreme Court held that "ORS 144.335 [1] was intended to provide for judicial review of final orders of the Board of Parole relating to the granting of parole and that the Court of Appeals was in error in holding to the contrary.”
Ayres v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 97 P.3d 1 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 13× “335(l)(b), a person subject to the board’s jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order of the board if the person is adversely affected or aggrieved by that order and “has exhausted administrative review as provided by board rule.”
Engweiler v. Bd. of Parole, 133 P.3d 910 (Or. 2006).
· cites it 17× “The dispositive issue in this case is whether a 1999 order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the board) relating to that sentence that set both a “prison term” and a “murder review date” for petitioner was subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335 (1999),…”
Quintero v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 986 P.2d 575 (Or. 1999).
· cites it 15× “In fact, petitioner argues, one can infer that the legislature intended the word as a term of limitation in ORS 144.335 from the fact that the statute does not include any wording that would counter such an inference (such as “including, but not limited to”), as the statute…”
Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole, 309 P.3d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 33× “The board explained that the condition served to protect the victim from further injury and that the state’s interest in that protection out-weighed the petitioner’s interest in entering Lane County other than as provided in the condition.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(1) — 77 cases
Mastriano v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 159 P.3d 1151 (Or. 2007).
“Summarily, it concluded that, under a proper PGE analysis, a board order denying reconsideration of a prior order “is final within the meaning of ORS 144.335 because the order conclusively disposes of [a] petitioner’s *688 request for reopening.”
Tuckenberry v. Bd. of Parole, 451 P.3d 227 (Or. 2019).
“In relevant part, ORS 144.335 provides: “(1) A person over whom the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order of the board as provided in this section if: “(a) The person is adversely affected or…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(1)(a) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(1)(b) — 10 cases
Tuckenberry v. Bd. of Parole, 451 P.3d 227 (Or. 2019).
“In relevant part, ORS 144.335 provides: “(1) A person over whom the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision exercises its jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order of the board as provided in this section if: “(a) The person is adversely affected or…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(12) — 3 cases
Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 143 P.3d 538 (Or. 2006).
“In this case, we must decide what constitutes a “substantial question of law” when the Court of Appeals determines whether to grant a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review of a parole order under ORS 144.335. Petitioner sought judicial review of a decision of the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(2) — 12 cases
Shelby v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 915 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
“Until 1993, ORS 144.335 read, in part: “(1) When a person over whom the board exercises its jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by the final order of the board related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole or the revoking of post-prison supervision and…”
Mastriano v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 159 P.3d 1151 (Or. 2007).
“Summarily, it concluded that, under a proper PGE analysis, a board order denying reconsideration of a prior order “is final within the meaning of ORS 144.335 because the order conclusively disposes of [a] petitioner’s *688 request for reopening.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(2)(e)(A) — 3 cases
Shelby v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 915 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
“Until 1993, ORS 144.335 read, in part: “(1) When a person over whom the board exercises its jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by the final order of the board related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole or the revoking of post-prison supervision and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(3) — 77 cases
Quintero v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 986 P.2d 575 (Or. 1999).
“In fact, petitioner argues, one can infer that the legislature intended the word as a term of limitation in ORS 144.335 from the fact that the statute does not include any wording that would counter such an inference (such as “including, but not limited to”), as the statute…”
Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole, 309 P.3d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
“The board explained that the condition served to protect the victim from further injury and that the state’s interest in that protection out-weighed the petitioner’s interest in entering Lane County other than as provided in the condition.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(3)(a) — 5 cases
Engweiler v. Bd. of Parole, 133 P.3d 910 (Or. 2006).
“The dispositive issue in this case is whether a 1999 order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (the board) relating to that sentence that set both a “prison term” and a “murder review date” for petitioner was subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335 (1999),…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(3)(g) — 1 case
Shelby v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 915 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
“Until 1993, ORS 144.335 read, in part: “(1) When a person over whom the board exercises its jurisdiction is adversely affected or aggrieved by the final order of the board related to the granting, revoking or discharging of parole or the revoking of post-prison supervision and…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(4) — 11 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(5) — 8 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(6) — 10 cases
Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 143 P.3d 538 (Or. 2006).
“In this case, we must decide what constitutes a “substantial question of law” when the Court of Appeals determines whether to grant a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review of a parole order under ORS 144.335. Petitioner sought judicial review of a decision of the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(7) — 4 cases
Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 143 P.3d 538 (Or. 2006).
“In this case, we must decide what constitutes a “substantial question of law” when the Court of Appeals determines whether to grant a motion for leave to proceed with judicial review of a parole order under ORS 144.335. Petitioner sought judicial review of a decision of the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(8) — 2 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(9) — 3 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(l)(a) — 5 cases
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.335(l)(b) — 10 cases
Ayres v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 97 P.3d 1 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
“335(l)(b), a person subject to the board’s jurisdiction may seek judicial review of a final order of the board if the person is adversely affected or aggrieved by that order and “has exhausted administrative review as provided by board rule.”
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