166.155 Bias
crime in the second degree.
(1) A person commits a bias crime in the second degree if the person:
(a) Tampers or
interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to
believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial
inconvenience to another person because of the person’s perception of the other
person’s race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability
or national origin;
(b) Intentionally
subjects another person to offensive physical contact because of the person’s
perception of the other person’s race, color, religion, gender identity, sexual
orientation, disability or national origin; or
(c) Intentionally,
because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, gender identity,
sexual orientation, disability or national origin of another person or of a
member of the other person’s family, subjects the other person to alarm by
threatening:
(A) To inflict
serious physical injury upon or to commit a felony affecting the other person,
or a member of the other person’s family; or
(B) To cause
substantial damage to the property of the other person or of a member of the
other person’s family.
(2) A bias crime
in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
(3) As used in
this section and ORS 166.165:
(a) “Gender
identity” means an individual’s gender-related identity, appearance, expression
or behavior, regardless of whether the identity, appearance, expression or
behavior differs from that associated with the gender assigned to the
individual at birth.
(b) “Property”
means any tangible personal property or real property. [1981 c.785 §1; 1983
c.521 §1; 1989 c.1029 §1; 2007 c.100 §18; 2011 c.421 §1; 2019 c.553 §1]
166.160 [Repealed by 1971 c.743 §432]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1983–2024 · leading case:
State v. Smith, 510 P.3d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
State v. Smith, 510 P.3d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 21× “3 That law provides that a person commits second-degree intimidation if the person “intentionally, because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national 3 The legislature amended ORS 166.155 in 2019 to rename the offense of…”
State v. Harrington, 680 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 3× “Former ORS 166.155. 1 The intimidation statute enhances the penalty for criminal mischief, ORS 164.”
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
· cites it 2× “In Beebe , the Court of Appeals of Oregon interpreted an ethnic intimidation statute fashioned after the ADL model, ORS 166.155(1), and recognized that the statute punished motive: The statute does not offer more protection to any class of victims.”
Franklin v. State of Or., 563 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Or. 1983).
· cites it 2× “Or.Rev.Stat. § 166.155 (1981), the same solicitude toward abusive language does not extend to the prison context.”
State v. Phillips, 317 P.3d 236 (Or. 2013).
“at 207-08 ; see ORS 166.155 (defining liability for aiding and abetting another person’s criminal conduct).”
State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 4× “4 The trial court found: *741 “ORS 166.155 is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protection of laws in that it gives greater protection to a victim who is assaulted because of his race, color, religion or national origin than to another person who is assaulted for some…”
Nielson v. Legacy Health Sys., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (D. Or. 2001).
· cites it 2× “ORS 166.155 states that a person commits intimidation in the second degree if he or she: (a) Tampers or interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to…”
Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000).
· cites it 3× “190 provides for a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages to any person injured by a violation of ORS 166.155 or 166.165, regardless of any criminal prosecution or the result thereof.”
State v. Black, 512 P.3d 866 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 8× “155(1)(c)(A) (2017) is facially unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. After the state charged defendant with second-degree intimidation, defendant did not demur to that charge or otherwise argue that the statute was unconsti- tutionally…”
State v. Norris, 72 P.3d 103 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
“160 Assault IV; ORS 166.155 Intimidation II; ORS 163.605 Criminal Defamation; ORS 163.”
State v. Sorrell, 510 P.3d 904 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 11× “Defendant then pleaded no contest to two counts of second-degree intimidation, stipulating that there were 1 The legislature amended ORS 166.155 in 2019 to rename the offense of intimidation to “bias crime” and to add gender identity as a protected class.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155(1) — 3 cases
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
“In Beebe , the Court of Appeals of Oregon interpreted an ethnic intimidation statute fashioned after the ADL model, ORS 166.155(1), and recognized that the statute punished motive: The statute does not offer more protection to any class of victims.”
State v. Beebe, 680 P.2d 11 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
“4 The trial court found: *741 “ORS 166.155 is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protection of laws in that it gives greater protection to a victim who is assaulted because of his race, color, religion or national origin than to another person who is assaulted for some…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155(1)(a) — 1 case
State v. Black, 512 P.3d 866 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“155(1)(c)(A) (2017) is facially unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. After the state charged defendant with second-degree intimidation, defendant did not demur to that charge or otherwise argue that the statute was unconsti- tutionally…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155(1)(a)(C) — 1 case
State v. Smith, 510 P.3d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“3 That law provides that a person commits second-degree intimidation if the person “intentionally, because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national 3 The legislature amended ORS 166.155 in 2019 to rename the offense of…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155(1)(b) — 1 case
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155(1)(c)(A) — 6 cases
State v. Smith, 510 P.3d 217 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“3 That law provides that a person commits second-degree intimidation if the person “intentionally, because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national 3 The legislature amended ORS 166.155 in 2019 to rename the offense of…”
State v. Sorrell, 510 P.3d 904 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“Defendant then pleaded no contest to two counts of second-degree intimidation, stipulating that there were 1 The legislature amended ORS 166.155 in 2019 to rename the offense of intimidation to “bias crime” and to add gender identity as a protected class.”
State v. Black, 512 P.3d 866 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
“155(1)(c)(A) (2017) is facially unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. After the state charged defendant with second-degree intimidation, defendant did not demur to that charge or otherwise argue that the statute was unconsti- tutionally…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.