Oregon Revised Statutes

Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020 (2026)

Legislative intent; general and particular provisions; consideration of legislative history

✓ current as of May 2026
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      174.020 Legislative intent; general and particular provisions; consideration of legislative history. (1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.

      (b) To assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute.

      (2) When a general provision and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent.

      (3) A court may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that the parties provide to the court. A court shall give the weight to the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate. [Amended by 2001 c.438 §1; 2017 c.17 §16]

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 557 cases (114 in the last 5 years), 1883–2026 · leading case: State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009).
State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009). · cites it 15× “Specifically, relying on amendments to ORS 174.020, defendant asserts that the court now must consider legislative history at the outset of the analysis and must give that history the same weight as the court gives to text and context.”
State v. Prophet, 507 P.3d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 5× “” ORS 174.020. However, for the purpose of construing the requisite mental state in criminal statutes, the legislature has also supplied a separate set of default rules which, “[a]s the courts have repeatedly pointed out since 1978, * * * are confusing.”
State v. Parra-Sanchez, 527 P.3d 1008 (Or. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 6× “Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673, 677 & n 11 (1997) (discussing this distinction); see also Richard A.”
State v. Kelly, 211 P.3d 932 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 7× “In Gaines , the issue was the effect, if any, of the legislature’s enactment of amendments to ORS 174.020, so that the statute now provides that “[t]o assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute.”
State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31 (Or. 2010). · cites it 6× “" ORS 174.020(2). Defendant argues that ORS 137.”
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993). · cites it 2× “PGE argues that in the context of this case the phrase “The employee * * * shall be entitled to utilize any accrued vacation leave, sick leave or other compensatory leave * * * during the parental leave” should be construed to mean that the employee could use such accrued leave…”
State v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d 471 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “Resolving the parties' dispute requires an application of familiar principles of statutory construction.”
Olsen v. Deschutes Cnty., 127 P.3d 655 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the 90-day period must apply because it appears in a statute that is later and more specific than the statute in which the one-year limitation appears.”
Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon v. Mowry, 261 P.3d 1 (Or. 2011). · cites it 2× “" ORS 174.020(1)(a). After we have interpreted a statute, the legislature's constitutional role allows it to make any change or adjustment in the statutory scheme that it deems appropriate, given this court's construction of the statute (and, of course, subject to constitutional…”
Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (D. Or. 2017). · cites it 4× “3d at 1050 ; see Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020 (3) (directing courts to "give the weight to the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate” when interpreting a statute).”
State v. Cervantes, 223 P.3d 425 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 4× “2d 1143 (1993), as modified by subsequent amendments to ORS 174.020 and by State v. Gaines, 346 Or.”
Doyle v. City of Medford, 337 P.3d 797 (Or. 2014). · cites it 3× “” 13 ORS 174.020 provides: “(1)(a) In the construction of a statute, a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(1) — 3 cases
State v. Azar, 509 P.3d 668 (Or. Ct. App. 2022).
Fircrest Props., LLC v. Simmons, 347 Or. App. 637 (Or. Ct. App. 2026).
State v. T. L., 350 Or. App. 212 (Or. Ct. App. 2026).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(1)(a) — 52 cases
Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon v. Mowry, 261 P.3d 1 (Or. 2011). “" ORS 174.020(1)(a). After we have interpreted a statute, the legislature's constitutional role allows it to make any change or adjustment in the statutory scheme that it deems appropriate, given this court's construction of the statute (and, of course, subject to constitutional…”
Strunk v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 108 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2005).
State v. Prophet, 507 P.3d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). “” ORS 174.020. However, for the purpose of construing the requisite mental state in criminal statutes, the legislature has also supplied a separate set of default rules which, “[a]s the courts have repeatedly pointed out since 1978, * * * are confusing.”
Arrowood Indem. Co. v. Fasching, 503 P.3d 1233 (Or. 2022).
Kinzua Resources v. DEQ, 468 P.3d 410 (Or. 2020).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(1)(b) — 11 cases
State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009). “Specifically, relying on amendments to ORS 174.020, defendant asserts that the court now must consider legislative history at the outset of the analysis and must give that history the same weight as the court gives to text and context.”
State v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d 471 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). “Resolving the parties' dispute requires an application of familiar principles of statutory construction.”
State v. Rodriguez-Barrera, 159 P.3d 1201 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
State v. Cazares-Mendez/Reyes-Sanchez, 256 P.3d 104 (Or. 2011).
State v. Taylor, 350 P.3d 525 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(2) — 70 cases
State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31 (Or. 2010). “" ORS 174.020(2). Defendant argues that ORS 137.”
Olsen v. Deschutes Cnty., 127 P.3d 655 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). “We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the 90-day period must apply because it appears in a statute that is later and more specific than the statute in which the one-year limitation appears.”
State v. Prophet, 507 P.3d 735 (Or. Ct. App. 2022). “” ORS 174.020. However, for the purpose of construing the requisite mental state in criminal statutes, the legislature has also supplied a separate set of default rules which, “[a]s the courts have repeatedly pointed out since 1978, * * * are confusing.”
State v. Civil, 388 P.3d 1185 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
State v. Ramoz, 483 P.3d 615 (Or. 2021).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(3) — 73 cases
Yeatts v. Polygon Nw. Co., 379 P.3d 445 (Or. 2016).
State v. Hammond, 180 P.3d 137 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
State v. Kelly, 211 P.3d 932 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). “In Gaines , the issue was the effect, if any, of the legislature’s enactment of amendments to ORS 174.020, so that the statute now provides that “[t]o assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute.”
Dept. of Human Servs. v. F. J. M., 370 Or. 434 (Or. 2022).
City of Corvallis v. Pi Kappa Phi, 428 P.3d 905 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(l)(a) — 7 cases
State v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d 471 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). “Resolving the parties' dispute requires an application of familiar principles of statutory construction.”
James v. ReconTrust Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Or. 2012).
Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole, 309 P.3d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
Sato v. Hanlon (In re Hanlon), 557 B.R. 801 (Bankr. D. Or. 2016).
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.020(l)(b) — 9 cases
State v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d 471 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). “Resolving the parties' dispute requires an application of familiar principles of statutory construction.”
State v. Kelly, 211 P.3d 932 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). “In Gaines , the issue was the effect, if any, of the legislature’s enactment of amendments to ORS 174.020, so that the statute now provides that “[t]o assist a court in its construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the statute.”
Robert Camel Contracting, Inc. v. Krautscheid, 134 P.3d 1065 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
SAIF Corp. v. DeLeon, 282 P.3d 800 (Or. 2012).
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