811.105 Speeds
that are evidence of basic rule violation. (1) Any speed in excess of a designated speed posted
by authority granted under ORS 810.180 is prima facie evidence of violation of
the basic speed rule under ORS 811.100.
(2) If no
designated speed is posted by authority granted under ORS 810.180, any speed in
excess of one of the following speeds is prima facie evidence of violation of
the basic speed rule:
(a) Fifteen miles
per hour when driving on an alley or a narrow residential roadway.
(b) Twenty miles
per hour in a business district.
(c) Twenty-five
miles per hour in any public park.
(d) Twenty-five
miles per hour on a highway in a residence district if:
(A) The residence
district is not located within a city; and
(B) The highway
is not an arterial highway.
(e) Fifty-five
miles per hour in locations not otherwise described in this section. [1983
c.338 §564; 1985 c.16 §286; 1987 c.887 §10; 1989 c.592 §5; 1995 c.558 §3; 1997
c.404 §5; 1997 c.438 §3; 2003 c.397 §6; 2003 c.819 §6; 2007 c.367 §3; 2019
c.515 §3]
811.106 [1995 c.558 §2; 1997 c.682 §4;
2003 c.397 §7; 2003 c.819 §§7,7a,7b; renumbered 810.243 in 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 2000–2024 · leading case:
Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 21× ““(2) The following apply to the offense described in this section: «;tj jíj ;!j “(b) Speeds that are prima facie evidence of violation of this section are established by ORS 811.105.” 7 ORS 811.105 (1995), read in its entirety, provides as follows: “Any speed in excess of any of…”
State v. Woodford, 428 P.3d 971 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“3d 1101 (2000), a tort case arising from a vehicle collision in a school zone, in which the defendant argued that the plaintiff was negligent per se because he was speeding through the school zone "when children [were] present" in violation of former ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995),…”
State v. Nistler, 342 P.3d 1035 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
“In countering that defense, the plaintiff sought to present testimony from a police officer that he would not have cited the plaintiff for violation of that statute under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 433-34. The defendant objected, asserting that “such testimony would…”
State v. Weber, 19 P.3d 378 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“100 provides, in part, that: “A person commits the offense of violating the basic speed rule if the person drives a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent * * A speed in excess of any posted speed is “prima facie evidence of a violation of the…”
State v. Wever, 19 P.3d 378 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
“" ORS 811.105. [10] The complaint alleges that defendant was driving 58 miles per hour where the posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.”
Johnson v. Monsanto Co. (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“In Stokes, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony on “the meaning of the phrase ‘children are pres- ent’ ” in ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995). 168 Or App at 441 .”
Johnson v. Monsanto Co. (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“In Stokes, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony on “the meaning of the phrase ‘children are pres- ent’ ” in ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995). 168 Or App at 441 .”
State v. Patrick, 284 P.3d 547 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
“111, or is established as the speed the exceeding of which is prima facie evidence of violation of the basic speed rule under ORS 811.105.” A“designated speed,” then, is a speed limit that may override a default statutory speed listed in ORS 811.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.105(2) — 1 case
Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
““(2) The following apply to the offense described in this section: «;tj jíj ;!j “(b) Speeds that are prima facie evidence of violation of this section are established by ORS 811.105.” 7 ORS 811.105 (1995), read in its entirety, provides as follows: “Any speed in excess of any of…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.105(2)(c)(A) — 5 cases
Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
““(2) The following apply to the offense described in this section: «;tj jíj ;!j “(b) Speeds that are prima facie evidence of violation of this section are established by ORS 811.105.” 7 ORS 811.105 (1995), read in its entirety, provides as follows: “Any speed in excess of any of…”
State v. Woodford, 428 P.3d 971 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).
“3d 1101 (2000), a tort case arising from a vehicle collision in a school zone, in which the defendant argued that the plaintiff was negligent per se because he was speeding through the school zone "when children [were] present" in violation of former ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995),…”
State v. Nistler, 342 P.3d 1035 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
“In countering that defense, the plaintiff sought to present testimony from a police officer that he would not have cited the plaintiff for violation of that statute under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 433-34. The defendant objected, asserting that “such testimony would…”
Johnson v. Monsanto Co. (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“In Stokes, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony on “the meaning of the phrase ‘children are pres- ent’ ” in ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995). 168 Or App at 441 .”
Johnson v. Monsanto Co. (Or. Ct. App. 2024).
“In Stokes, the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony on “the meaning of the phrase ‘children are pres- ent’ ” in ORS 811.105(2)(c)(A) (1995). 168 Or App at 441 .”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.105(l)(c) — 1 case
Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
““(2) The following apply to the offense described in this section: «;tj jíj ;!j “(b) Speeds that are prima facie evidence of violation of this section are established by ORS 811.105.” 7 ORS 811.105 (1995), read in its entirety, provides as follows: “Any speed in excess of any of…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.