815.220
Obstruction of vehicle windows; penalty. (1) A person commits the offense of obstruction of
vehicle windows if the person drives or moves on any highway or owns and causes
or knowingly permits to be driven or moved on any highway any vehicle with
windows obstructed in a manner prohibited under this section.
(2) The windows
of a vehicle are obstructed in a manner prohibited by this section if any
material that prevents or impairs the ability to see into or out of the vehicle
is upon any vehicle window described in this subsection. This subsection
applies to any sign, poster, one-way glass, adhesive film, glaze application or
other material if the material prevents or impairs the ability to see into or
out of the vehicle. This subsection only applies to the following windows of
the vehicle:
(a) The front
windshield.
(b) The
side-wings.
(c) The side
windows on either side forward of or adjacent to the operator’s seat.
(3) Nothing in
this section prohibits safety glazing materials of a type that conforms to
standards established under ORS 815.040.
(4) Nothing in
this section prohibits placement of permits in accordance with the provisions
of ORS 803.650 or with rules adopted by the Department of Transportation under
ORS 803.650.
(5) Nothing in
this section prohibits the application of tinting material to the windows of a
motor vehicle in compliance with ORS 815.221.
(6) The offense
described in this section, obstruction of vehicle windows, is a Class D traffic
violation. [1983 c.338 §490; 1985 c.16 §255; 1987 c.166 §5; 1995 c.263 §4; 1995
c.383 §91; 2003 c.158 §5; 2013 c.199 §1]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases, 1994–2016 · leading case:
State v. Elmore, 250 P.3d 439 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
State v. Elmore, 250 P.3d 439 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 20× “Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, contending that the deputy did not have probable cause to stop him for a traffic violation pursuant to ORS 815.220. As pertinent here, that statute prohibits driving a vehicle when the windshield is…”
J.D.I. v. State, 77 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “” The court stated: “The dispositive issue here is whether, for purposes of ORS 815.220(2), a crack is ‘any material that prohibits or impairs the ability to see into or out of the vehicle.”
State v. Stookey, 297 P.3d 548 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 3× “235 (Class C traffic violation); or has a windshield covered by any material that “prohibits or impairs the ability to see into or out of the vehicle,” ORS 815.220 (Class D traffic violation). Finally, defendant observes that the section of the Oregon Vehicle Code relating to…”
State v. Ordner, 287 P.3d 1256 (Or. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 4× “” 3 In Elmore , the prosecutor and the trial court had relied on an officer’s assertion of probable cause to believe that the defendant had violated ORS 815.220 (driving with view-obstructing materials on a windshield).”
State v. Soldahl, 15 P.3d 564 (Or. 2000).
· cites it 2× “ORS 815.220; 1 *423 ORS 810.410(3)(b) (1995).”
State v. Hovies, 887 P.2d 347 (Or. 1994).
· cites it 3× “The district court found defendant guilty of having “obstructed vehicle windows” in violation of *417 ORS 815.220. Defendant appealed pro se to the Court of Appeals asserting, among other things, that the trial court had erred in refusing to permit him to cross-examine the…”
United States v. Bradley, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Or. 2002).
· cites it 2× “While he awaited the records check, he completed a traffic citation for two violations: obscured windows in violation of Or.Rev.Stat. § 815.220, and driving uninsured in violation of Or.”
State v. Soldahl, 972 P.2d 898 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “ORS 815.220. 2 However, because he was concerned that he would “blow” his surveillance if the stop failed to produce either Harland or Kashuba, Millette radioed the Clackamas County Sheriffs dispatcher and requested that another officer make the stop.”
State v. Sexton, 378 P.3d 83 (Washington Cty. Cir. Ct., O.R. 2016).
“, ORS 815.220(1). As a result, she asserts that “a reasonable owner would not feel free to leave when an officer pulls the car over.”
State v. Carston, 913 P.2d 709 (Or. 1996).
· cites it 2× “, the police initiated a traffic stop of the Suzuki for having tinted windows in violation of ORS 815.220. 1 Defendant Carston was driving the Suzuki, and defendants Arlen Joseph Sage and Cheryl Lynn Sage were passengers.”
State v. Carston, 891 P.2d 1366 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
“, the police initiated a traffic stop, based on a violation of ORS 815.220 for having tinted windows, and because all of the information provided by the informant to that point had been accurate.”
State v. Nguyen, 196 P.3d 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “ORS 815.220. 4 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to allow drivers to place registration plates on the dashboard of their vehicles while also prohibiting obstruction of the windshield, and it is even less likely that the legislature would express such an intent by use…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 815.220(1) — 1 case
State v. Sexton, 378 P.3d 83 (Washington Cty. Cir. Ct., O.R. 2016).
“, ORS 815.220(1). As a result, she asserts that “a reasonable owner would not feel free to leave when an officer pulls the car over.”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 815.220(2) — 3 cases
J.D.I. v. State, 77 So. 3d 610 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
“” The court stated: “The dispositive issue here is whether, for purposes of ORS 815.220(2), a crack is ‘any material that prohibits or impairs the ability to see into or out of the vehicle.”
State v. Elmore, 250 P.3d 439 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
“Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, contending that the deputy did not have probable cause to stop him for a traffic violation pursuant to ORS 815.220. As pertinent here, that statute prohibits driving a vehicle when the windshield is…”
State v. Hovies, 887 P.2d 347 (Or. 1994).
“The district court found defendant guilty of having “obstructed vehicle windows” in violation of *417 ORS 815.220. Defendant appealed pro se to the Court of Appeals asserting, among other things, that the trial court had erred in refusing to permit him to cross-examine the…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 815.220(4) — 1 case
State v. Nguyen, 196 P.3d 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
“ORS 815.220. 4 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to allow drivers to place registration plates on the dashboard of their vehicles while also prohibiting obstruction of the windshield, and it is even less likely that the legislature would express such an intent by use…”
— Or. Rev. Stat. § 815.220(5) — 1 case
State v. Hovies, 887 P.2d 347 (Or. 1994).
“The district court found defendant guilty of having “obstructed vehicle windows” in violation of *417 ORS 815.220. Defendant appealed pro se to the Court of Appeals asserting, among other things, that the trial court had erred in refusing to permit him to cross-examine the…”
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