§ 5709. Application for order.
Each application for an order of authorization to intercept a wire, electronic or
oral communication shall be made in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation
of the Attorney General or a district attorney of the county wherein the suspected
criminal activity has been, is or is about to occur and shall contain all of the following:
(1) A statement of the authority of the applicant to make such application.
(2) A statement of the identity and qualifications of the investigative or law enforcement
officers or agency for whom the authority to intercept a wire, electronic or oral
communication is sought.
(3) A sworn statement by the investigative or law enforcement officer who has knowledge
of relevant information justifying the application, which shall include:
(i) The identity of the particular person, if known, committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted.
(ii) The details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed.
(iii) The particular type of communication to be intercepted.
(iv) A showing that there is probable cause to believe that such communication will be
communicated on the wire communication facility involved or at the particular place
where the oral communication is to be intercepted.
(v) The character and location of the particular wire communication facility involved
or the particular place where the oral communication is to be intercepted.
(vi) A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained,
and, if the character of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception
should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been
first obtained, a particular statement of facts establishing probable cause to believe
that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter.
(vii) A particular statement of facts showing that other normal investigative procedures
with respect to the offense have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or are too dangerous to employ.
(4) Where the application is for the renewal or extension of an order, a particular statement
of facts showing the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable
explanation of the failure to obtain such results.
(5) A complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications, known to the
applicant made to any court for authorization to intercept a wire, electronic or oral
communication involving any of the same facilities or places specified in the application
or involving any person whose communication is to be intercepted, and the action taken
by the court on each such application.
(6) A proposed order of authorization for consideration by the judge.
(7) Such additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application as
the judge may require.
(Oct. 21, 1988, P.L.1000, No.115, eff. imd.; Dec. 9, 2002, P.L.1350, No.162, eff.
60 days)
Cross References. Section 5709 is referred to in sections 5702, 5712.1, 5713.1 of this title.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case:
Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 3× “In Fetter , the defendant argued to the Fetter Court that the wiretap evidence should have been suppressed because "normal investigative procedures should have been used instead of the wire, as required under 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5709(3)(vii) and 5710(A)(3), because this was an in-home…”
Commonwealth v. Doty, 498 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1985).
· cites it 2× “18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants.”
Commonwealth v. Katona, 191 A.3d 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
“" 18 Pa.C.S. § 5709. Orders granted by this Court are subject to the timing provisions set forth at 18 Pa.”
Kopko v. Miller, 892 A.2d 766 (Pa. 2006).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(vii) (emphasis added).”
Commonwealth v. Fetter, 770 A.2d 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
“Appellant believes that normal investigative procedures should have been used instead of the wire, as required under 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5709(3)(vii) and 5710(A)(3), because this was an in-home interception and the wire would otherwise violate Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania…”
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 548 A.2d 260 (Pa. 1988).
· cites it 2× “It must also contain details about particular offenses, the type of communications to be intercepted, and must show that there is probable cause to believe that pertinent communications will be transmitted on the facility under surveillance.”
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 546 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1988).
· cites it 3× “It is argued, therefore, that the absence of appellant’s name from the list of individuals named in the application mandates exclusion of the evidence, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i), which provides that an application “shall” include an affidavit specifying the “identity of the…”
Commonwealth v. Riffert, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1988).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants.”
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 696 A.2d 179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i). As did the defendant in Whitaker , appellant also contends that resort to electronic surveillance was improper in this case, because normal investigative procedures would have sufficed.”
Commonwealth v. Leta, 500 A.2d 85 (Pa. 1985).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i). The Commonwealth’s information at the time the Pricci taps were authorized was that Pricci’s contact was with Baldassari, and that Baldassari, in turn, worked with Leta and not with Pricci.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5709(2) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5709(3) — 4 cases
Commonwealth v. Reeves, 548 A.2d 260 (Pa. 1988).
“It must also contain details about particular offenses, the type of communications to be intercepted, and must show that there is probable cause to believe that pertinent communications will be transmitted on the facility under surveillance.”
Commonwealth v. Doty, 498 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1985).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants.”
Commonwealth v. Riffert, 549 A.2d 566 (Pa. 1988).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5709(3)(i) — 6 cases
Commonwealth v. Doty, 498 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1985).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3). The standard for determining whether probable cause existed is the same as that used to determine cause for search warrants.”
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 546 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1988).
“It is argued, therefore, that the absence of appellant’s name from the list of individuals named in the application mandates exclusion of the evidence, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i), which provides that an application “shall” include an affidavit specifying the “identity of the…”
Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 696 A.2d 179 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i). As did the defendant in Whitaker , appellant also contends that resort to electronic surveillance was improper in this case, because normal investigative procedures would have sufficed.”
Commonwealth v. Leta, 500 A.2d 85 (Pa. 1985).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i). The Commonwealth’s information at the time the Pricci taps were authorized was that Pricci’s contact was with Baldassari, and that Baldassari, in turn, worked with Leta and not with Pricci.”
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5709(3)(iv) — 1 case
— 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5709(3)(vii) — 6 cases
Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 201 A.3d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
“In Fetter , the defendant argued to the Fetter Court that the wiretap evidence should have been suppressed because "normal investigative procedures should have been used instead of the wire, as required under 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5709(3)(vii) and 5710(A)(3), because this was an in-home…”
Kopko v. Miller, 892 A.2d 766 (Pa. 2006).
“18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(vii) (emphasis added).”
Commonwealth v. Fetter, 770 A.2d 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
“Appellant believes that normal investigative procedures should have been used instead of the wire, as required under 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5709(3)(vii) and 5710(A)(3), because this was an in-home interception and the wire would otherwise violate Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania…”
Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 546 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1988).
“It is argued, therefore, that the absence of appellant’s name from the list of individuals named in the application mandates exclusion of the evidence, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5709(3)(i), which provides that an application “shall” include an affidavit specifying the “identity of the…”
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