(a) Definitions. For purposes of this chapter, “position of authority” means and includes,
but is not limited to, any person who is acting in the place of a parent and charged
with any of a parent’s rights, duties, or responsibilities to a person under the age
of eighteen (18) years, or a person who is charged with any duty or responsibility
for the health, welfare, or supervision of a person under the age of eighteen (18)
years, either independently or through another, no matter how brief, at the time of
the act.
(b) A person is guilty of third-degree sexual assault if:
(1) He or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual penetration
with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under the age of consent,
sixteen (16) years of age; or
(2) He or she is over the age of eighteen (18) years and engaged in sexual penetration
or sexual contact with another person over the age of fourteen (14) years and under
the age of eighteen (18) years, under circumstances whereby:
(i) The accused has supervisory or disciplinary power over the victim by virtue of the
accused’s legal, professional, or occupational status; or
(ii) The accused is otherwise acting in a position of authority with respect to the victim.
(iii) It shall not be a violation of subsection (b)(2) of this section if the parties are:
(A) Engaging in sexual penetration or contact consensually;
(B) Between the ages of sixteen (16) and twenty (20) years; and
(C) No more than thirty (30) months apart in age.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
37
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1968–2024 · leading case:
State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1987).
State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1987).
· cites it 14× “At that time, the Legislature made no other changes in the statute and did not amend the third-degree sexual-assault statute.”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 9× “" [5] Unlike firstand second-degree sexual assault, which explicitly contain a mens rea requirement, third-degree sexual assault (§ 11-37-6) does not provide for such an element and thus closely parallels the language in the child-molestation sexual assault statutes.”
State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 5× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-37-6 and § 11-10-1. We affirm the conviction for commission of the abominable and detestable crime against nature but, for reasons given below, must vacate the conviction for indecent assault.”
State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618 (R.I. 2007).
· cites it 4× “The Narragansett Police Department filed a criminal complaint alleging that defendant violated G.L.1956 § 11-37-6 by engaging in “sexual penetration with [Sara], a person over the age of fourteen years and under the age of consent, sixteen years of age.”
United States v. Faustino Gomez, 757 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2014).
· cites it 2× “1(a); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-37-6; S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1 (5); Tenn.”
United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
· cites it 2× “The district court, after taking such evidence, concluded that “Sacko’s sexual penetration of a 14-year-old girl in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 was a ‘violent felony’ under ACCA and that Sacko properly was sentenced as an ‘armed career criminal.”
Fontaine v. State, 602 A.2d 521 (R.I. 1992).
· cites it 2× “1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-6 and commission of the abominable and detestable crime against nature in violation of § 11-10-1.”
State v. DiCarlo, 987 A.2d 867 (R.I. 2010).
“3; and one count of third-degree sexual assault, in violation of § 11-37-6. 3 *869 A jury trial was held in the Providence County Superior Court on July 30 and 31 and August 1 and 2, 2007.”
State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d 526 (R.I. 1978).
“” General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) §11-37-6. The defendant’s contention that §8-10-4 refers to a wide range of assaults misses the mark.”
State v. Ralph Thibedau, 157 A.3d 1063 (R.I. 2017).
· cites it 2× “” Section 11-37-6. 5 . On cross-examination, Stephanie testified that the sexual acts occurred at least one hundred times during the two-year period between July 2009 and June 2011.”
United States v. Arnold Richards, III, 456 F.3d 260 (1st Cir. 2006).
“See R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1989). The panel found itself unable to determine, based on the sparse record, whether a violation of this statute involving a 21-year-old perpetrator and a 14-year-old victim qualified as a violent felony.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.