(a) A permit shall not be issued to any prisoner under the authority of §§ 13-8-9 -13-8-13 unless it shall appear to the parole board:
(1) That the prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution in which
confined, as evidenced by reports submitted to the board by the director of the department
of corrections, or his or her designated representatives, in a form to be prescribed
by the director;
(2) That release would not depreciate the seriousness of the prisoner’s offense or promote
disrespect for the law;
(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, would live
and remain at liberty without violating the law;
(4) That the prisoner can properly assume a role in the city or town in which he or she
is to reside. In assessing the prisoner’s role in the community the board shall consider:
(i) Whether or not the prisoner has employment;
(ii) The location of his or her residence and place of employment; and
(iii) The needs of the prisoner for special services, including but not limited to, specialized
medical care and rehabilitative services; and
(5) That any and all restitution imposed pursuant to § 12-19-32 has been paid in full, or satisfactory arrangements have been made with the court
if the person has the ability to pay. Any agreement shall be in writing and it is
the burden of the person seeking parole to satisfy the parole board that this requirement
has been met. Any person subject to the provisions of this section may request an
ability to pay hearing, by filing the request with the court which imposed the original
sentence.
(b) In the case of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life who is released on parole
and who is subsequently convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 11-47-2, the conviction shall constitute an automatic revocation of parole and the prisoner
shall not be eligible for parole thereafter.
(c) In the case of a prisoner convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 11-47-2 and subsequently released on parole, should the prisoner, while on parole, commit
an offense which results in a sentence of imprisonment for life, the conviction shall
constitute an automatic revocation of parole and the prisoner shall not thereafter
be eligible for parole.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1968–2025 · leading case:
Lerner v. Gill.
Lerner v. Gill (R.I. 1983).
· cites it 8× “Our examination of the state's parole law makes it clear that in the spring of 1979 Lerner had no justifiable expectation of parole in ten years.”
Leonard Jefferson v. State of Rhode Island (R.I. 2018).
· cites it 46× “He contends before this Court that the hearing justice erred in denying his application for postconviction relief because, in petitioner’s view, the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution was violated when his parole was revoked and he was denied the possibility…”
State v. Ouimette (R.I. 1976).
· cites it 5× “With these factors in mind, §13-8-14 has set forth certain conditions an inmate must meet before parole may be granted.”
Estrada v. Walker (R.I. 1999).
· cites it 3× “may make a determination at variance with that standard only upon a finding that such determination is warranted by individualized factors such as the character and criminal record of the applicant, the nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses for which the appli…”
Higham v. State (R.I. 2012).
· cites it 2× “” G.L.1956 § 13-8-14(a)(3). Sound policy considerations reinforce the reason the parole board has been granted such expansive discretion.”
Pine v. Clark (R.I. 1994).
“See §§ 13-8-14, 13-8-14.1. We emphasize that the parole statute mandates that the Attorney General’s department supply the board with “a written report of its recommendation concerning the current application for parole.”
Skawinski v. State (R.I. 1988).
· cites it 2× “n, and may make a determination at variance with that standard only upon a finding that such determination is warranted by individualized factors such as the character and criminal record of the applicant, the nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses for which the…”
Petrarca v. Rhode Island (D.R.I. 1984).
· cites it 13× “In assessing his role in the community the board shall consider, (1) whether or not the prisoner has employment (2) the location of his residence and place of employment (3) the needs of the prisoner for special services, including but not limited to, specialized medical care…”
Lyons v. State (R.I. 2012).
· cites it 2× “The Superior Court rejected this argument holding that the decision was well within and consistent with the parole board’s broad discretion in setting policies and procedures for the purpose of ensuring “a reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, [will] live and…”
State v. Tillinghast (R.I. 1992).
“1 is limited by § 13-8-14 which requires the board to evaluate the applicants prison record and to consider whether release would `depreciate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for the law.”
Grieco v. Langlois (R.I. 1968).
· cites it 2× “10 Section 13-8-14 provides in pertinent part that no permit shall be issued unless it shall appear to the parole board that the prisoner is deserving thereof “* * * by reason of his good conduct while imprisoned.”
State v. Stephen Mattatall (R.I. 2019).
· cites it 3× “1, and accurately mirror the statutory release criteria set forth in § 13-8-14, the first of which is a prisoner’s institutional disciplinary record.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14(a) — 1 case
Estrada v. Walker (R.I. 1999).
“may make a determination at variance with that standard only upon a finding that such determination is warranted by individualized factors such as the character and criminal record of the applicant, the nature and circumstances of the offense or offenses for which the appli…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14(a)(2) — 1 case
State v. Stephen Mattatall (R.I. 2019).
“1, and accurately mirror the statutory release criteria set forth in § 13-8-14, the first of which is a prisoner’s institutional disciplinary record.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14(a)(3) — 2 cases
Higham v. State (R.I. 2012).
“” G.L.1956 § 13-8-14(a)(3). Sound policy considerations reinforce the reason the parole board has been granted such expansive discretion.”
Lyons v. State (R.I. 2012).
“The Superior Court rejected this argument holding that the decision was well within and consistent with the parole board’s broad discretion in setting policies and procedures for the purpose of ensuring “a reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, [will] live and…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 13-8-14(b) — 1 case
Leonard Jefferson v. State of Rhode Island (R.I. 2018).
“He contends before this Court that the hearing justice erred in denying his application for postconviction relief because, in petitioner’s view, the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution was violated when his parole was revoked and he was denied the possibility…”
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