Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-30 (2026)
Grounds for review by supreme court
✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate commission of the workers’ compensation court only upon the following grounds:
(1) That the workers’ compensation court acted without or in excess of its authority;
(2) That the order, decree, or award was procured by fraud; or
(3) That the appellate division erred on questions of law or equity, the petitioner first having had the petitioner’s objections noted to any adverse rulings made during the progress of the hearing at the time the rulings were made, if made in open hearing and not otherwise of record.
(b) Review shall not be granted by the supreme court except as provided in this section, and the supreme court shall disregard any irregularity or error of the appellate division or trial judge unless it affirmatively appears that the petitioner was damaged by the irregularity or error.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 39
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1958–2022 · leading case: Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2000).
Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2000). “See G.L.1956 § 28-35-30. Section 28-35-30 provides, in pertinent part: "Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate [division] of the workers' compensation court only upon the following grounds: * * * (3) That the…”
Mumma v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 965 A.2d 437 (R.I. 2009). “She also argues that the Workers' Compensation Court erroneously applied amendments to § 28-33-18, enacted in 1990, limiting partial incapacity benefits to 312 weeks, to subsections (b) and (d) of § 28-33-18.”
DeNardo v. Fairmount Foundries Cranston, Inc., 399 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1979). “Thus, our ability to review a decree of the commission denying benefits on the ground that the employee's injury did not arise out of the employment rests, at least analytically, on a characterization of that determination as a question of law or fact.”
Impulse Packaging, Inc. v. Sicajan, 869 A.2d 593 (R.I. 2005). “A party may seek review by the Supreme Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-35-30. The statute provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate [division] of the workers’ compensation court…”
In the Matter of Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015). “See G.L. 1956 § 28-35-30; McGloin v. Trammellcrow Services, Inc.”
McGLOIN v. Trammellcrow Servs., Inc., 987 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2010). “McGloin timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, and the writ issued on May 9, 2008. II Standard of Review “Upon a petition for certiorari, we review a decree of the Appellate Division for any error of law or equity pursuant to G.”
McCarthy v. Env't Transp. Servs., Inc., 865 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 2005). “2d at 678 and § 28-35-30(a)(3)). On certiorari, our review of the record “is limited to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.”
Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 889 A.2d 691 (R.I. 2005). “A party may seek review by the Supreme Court of a decision of the Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court pursuant to G.L.1956 § 28-35-30. This section provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or…”
Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367 (R.I. 1994). “1993) (citing § 28-35-30(a)(3)). By way of background we note that workers’ compensation benefits are entirely statutory creations, not based on common-law principles.”
Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085 (R.I. 1997). “Simply because § 28—29—2(3)(i) allows earnings capacity to be based on actual wages if an employee has worked at light duty for at least thirteen weeks does not alter the analysis that actual wages constitute a more accurate means of comparison than earnings capacity.”
K-MART v. Whitney, 710 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1998). “1997) (per curiam) (citing G.L.1956 § 28-35-30(a)(3) and Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co.”
Rison v. Air Filter Sys., Inc., 707 A.2d 675 (R.I. 1998). “Rison petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, to resolve this important workers’ compensation question.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-30(a) — 1 case
Milrad v. Hasbro, Inc., 620 A.2d 1247 (R.I. 1993).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-30(a)(3) — 7 cases
Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679 (R.I. 2000). “See G.L.1956 § 28-35-30. Section 28-35-30 provides, in pertinent part: "Upon petition for certiorari, the supreme court may affirm, set aside, or modify any decree of the appellate [division] of the workers' compensation court only upon the following grounds: * * * (3) That the…”
McCarthy v. Env't Transp. Servs., Inc., 865 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 2005). “2d at 678 and § 28-35-30(a)(3)). On certiorari, our review of the record “is limited to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.”
Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., 637 A.2d 367 (R.I. 1994). “1993) (citing § 28-35-30(a)(3)). By way of background we note that workers’ compensation benefits are entirely statutory creations, not based on common-law principles.”
Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085 (R.I. 1997). “Simply because § 28—29—2(3)(i) allows earnings capacity to be based on actual wages if an employee has worked at light duty for at least thirteen weeks does not alter the analysis that actual wages constitute a more accurate means of comparison than earnings capacity.”
K-MART v. Whitney, 710 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1998). “1997) (per curiam) (citing G.L.1956 § 28-35-30(a)(3) and Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co.”
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