Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-33 (2026)

Finality of decree — Stay of decree

✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section RI-LEGwebserver.rilegislature.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Any decree entered by the workers’ compensation court acting within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud, be final, and shall take effect immediately upon being entered, and enforcement of the decree shall not be stayed pending appeal. If benefits have been ordered to be paid, reduced, discontinued, or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until reversed. If compensation payments have been ordered by the workers’ compensation court, those payments shall be made and continued until reversal, and if payments have not been ordered and the decree is reversed, retroactive payments shall be made from the date provided for in the decision of the supreme court. Provided, that an employee shall not be required to make restitution to the employer for any benefits paid regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases, 1959–1996 · leading case: Merchants Mut. Ins. v. Newport Hosp., 272 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1971).
Merchants Mut. Ins. v. Newport Hosp., 272 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1971). · cites it 14× “Section 28-35-33 provides that an appeal from a decree of the compensation commission shall not stay its effect.”
John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1984). · cites it 3× “This procedure thereby allows a legitimately disabled employee to obtain benefits without a lengthy and perhaps burdensome delay and conversely prevents an undeserving petitioner from unjustly receiving compensation benefits.”
Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147 (R.I. 1982). · cites it 2× “The commission correctly determined that § 28-35-43 must be considered in conjunction with §§ 28-35-28 and 28-35-33.”
Woods v. Safeway Sys., Inc., 232 A.2d 121 (R.I. 1967). · cites it 2× “1956, §28-35-33. 2 As we have already stated, the commission’s decree was subsequently reversed by this court and the cause was remanded to the workmen’s compensation commission for further proceedings.”
Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063 (R.I. 1996). “General Laws 1956 § 28-35-33 provides in pertinent part: *1066 “Any decree entered by the workers’ compensation [court] acting within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be final, and shall take effect immediately upon being entered, and enforcement of the decree shall not…”
Capaldi v. Liberty Tool & Gage Works, Inc., 206 A.2d 639 (R.I. 1965). “Persuasive of the soundness of this view as to the legislative intent being that the prosecution of the petition for compensation must be not only successful but final to entitle 'the employee to the award of a counsel fee is the fact *240 that under §28-35-33 an appeal from a…”
McCoy v. Cataldo, 148 A.2d 267 (R.I. 1959). · cites it 2× “The petitioner's motion to dismiss the appeal in Equity No. 2728 raises the question whether respondents' failure to pay the hospital bills deprives them of their right to prosecute an appeal to this court.”
Silva v. Devine, 155 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1959). “*124 We have held that under proper circumstances §28-35-33, which provides that an appeal from a decree of the workmen’s compensation commission will not stay the effect of the decree, does not prevent this court from staying a decree of the commission pending an appeal.”
Zecchino v. State, 520 A.2d 139 (R.I. 1987). “1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 28-35-33, pending her appeal to the appellate commission.”
Cranston Print Works Co. v. Picano, 177 A.2d 922 (R.I. 1962). “In the case at bar, under §28-35-33 the effect of the decree was stayed by the employee’s appeal to the full commission.”
Koshgarian v. Hawksley, 152 A.2d 214 (R.I. 1959). “1956, §28-35-33. In that section it is provided that an appeal from a decree of the full commission “shall not stay the effect of said decree, and if benefits have been ordered to be paid, reduced, discontinued or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until…”
D'Iorio v. United States Rubber Co., 148 A.2d 678 (R.I. 1959). “1956, §28-35-33. The fact that petitioner was laid off solely on account of lack of work does not mean that she could not prove partial incapacity thereafter.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.