Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7 (2026)

Unlawful employment practices

✓ current as of July 2026
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice:

(1) For any employer:

(i) To refuse to hire any applicant for employment because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(ii) Because of those reasons, to discharge an employee or discriminate against him or her with respect to hire, tenure, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment. However, if an insurer or employer extends insurance-related benefits to persons other than or in addition to the named employee, nothing in this subdivision shall require those benefits to be offered to unmarried partners of named employees;

(iii) In the recruiting of individuals for employment or in hiring them, to utilize any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source that the employer knows, or has reasonable cause to know, discriminates against individuals because of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(iv) To refuse to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer’s program, enterprise, or business;

(v) When an employee has presented to the employer an internal complaint alleging harassment in the workplace on the basis of race or color, religion, sex, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or country of ancestral origin, to refuse to disclose in a timely manner in writing to that employee the disposition of the complaint, including a description of any action taken in resolution of the complaint; provided, however, no other personnel information shall be disclosed to the complainant; or

(vi) To require an employee as a condition of employment, to execute a nondisclosure agreement that requires alleged violations of civil rights remain confidential, or a non-disparagement agreement concerning alleged violations of civil rights or alleged unlawful conduct, or any agreement with a clause that requires alleged violations of civil rights remain confidential. Any contract provision in violation of this subsection shall be void as a violation of public policy;

(2)(i) For any employment agency to fail or refuse to properly classify or refer for employment or otherwise discriminate against any individual because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or

(ii) For any employment agency, placement service, training school or center, labor organization, or any other employee referring source to comply with an employer’s request for the referral of job applicants if the request indicates, either directly or indirectly, that the employer will not afford full and equal employment opportunities to individuals regardless of their race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(3) For any labor organization:

(i) To deny full and equal membership rights to any applicant for membership because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(ii) Because of those reasons, to deny a member full and equal membership rights, expel him or her from membership, or otherwise discriminate in any manner against him or her with respect to his or her hire, tenure, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, or any other matter directly or indirectly related to membership or employment, whether or not authorized or required by the constitution or bylaws of the labor organization or by a collective labor agreement or other contract;

(iii) To fail or refuse to classify properly or refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any member because of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or

(iv) To refuse to reasonably accommodate a member’s or prospective member’s disability unless the labor organization can demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the labor organization’s program, enterprise, or business;

(4) Except where based on a bona fide occupational qualification certified by the commission or where necessary to comply with any federal mandated affirmative action programs, for any employer or employment agency, labor organization, placement service, training school or center, or any other employee referring source, prior to employment or admission to membership of any individual, to:

(i) Elicit, or attempt to elicit, any information directly or indirectly pertaining to his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(ii) Make or keep a record of his or her race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(iii) Use any form of application for employment, or personnel or membership blank containing questions or entries directly or indirectly pertaining to race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin;

(iv) Print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment or membership indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based upon race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin; or

(v) Establish, announce, or follow a policy of denying or limiting, through a quota system or otherwise, employment or membership opportunities of any group because of the race or color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin of that group;

(5) For any employer or employment agency, labor organization, placement service, training school or center, or any other employee referring source to discriminate in any manner against any individual because he or she has opposed any practice forbidden by this chapter, or because he or she has made a charge, testified, or assisted in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter;

(6) For any person, whether or not an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice, or to obstruct or prevent any person from complying with the provisions of this chapter or any order issued pursuant to this chapter, or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any act declared by this section to be an unlawful employment practice;

(7) For any employer to include on any application for employment, except applications for law enforcement agency positions or positions related to law enforcement agencies, a question inquiring or to otherwise inquire either orally or in writing whether the applicant has ever been arrested, charged with or convicted of any crime; provided, that:

(i) If a federal or state law or regulation creates a mandatory or presumptive disqualification from employment based on a person’s conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses, an employer may include a question or otherwise inquire whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those offenses; or

(ii) If a standard fidelity bond or an equivalent bond is required for the position for which the applicant is seeking employment and his or her conviction of one or more specified criminal offenses would disqualify the applicant from obtaining such a bond, an employer may include a question or otherwise inquire whether the applicant has ever been convicted of any of those offenses; and

(iii) Notwithstanding, any employer may ask an applicant for information about his or her criminal convictions at the first interview or thereafter, in accordance with all applicable state and federal laws;

(8)(i) For any person who or that, on June 7, 1988, is providing either by direct payment or by making contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program, benefits in violation with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38, until the expiration of a period of one year from June 7, 1988, or if there is an applicable collective bargaining agreement in effect on June 7, 1988, until the termination of that agreement, in order to come into compliance with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38, to reduce the benefits or the compensation provided any employee on June 7, 1988, either directly or by failing to provide sufficient contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program.

(ii) Where the costs of these benefits on June 7, 1988, are apportioned between employers and employees, the payments or contributions required to comply with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38 may be made by employers and employees in the same proportion.

(iii) Nothing in this section shall prevent the readjustment of benefits or compensation for reasons unrelated to compliance with §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 and 28-5-38.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 72 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984).
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984). · cites it 4× “1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 28-5-7 (1984 Cum.Supp.). We reverse. Gordon, who is black, had been employed by the Shipyard as a certified welder and shipfitter.”
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976). · cites it 7× “These petitions for certiorari seek review of a Superior Court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an order of the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights in a case of alleged employment discrimination of a physically handicapped person in violation of General Laws…”
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 374 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1977). · cites it 9× “When the cumulative effect of these characteristics is considered, it becomes clear that pregnancy is in fact not like other disabilities.”
Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1983). · cites it 10× “G.L. § 28-5-7. 1 - Specifically, Anthony Gonsalves alleged that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of color and race; and that such course of discriminato *1284 ry conduct culminated in his dismissal from employment because he was black.”
Ctr. for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros, 710 A.2d 680 (R.I. 1998). · cites it 4× “Barros (Barros), in violation of G.L.1956 § 28-5-7. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Superior Court judgment and dismiss CBH’s petition.”
Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). · cites it 5× “R.I. Gen.Laws § 28-5-7 states, in pertinent part: Unlawful employment practices.”
Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Centers, Inc., 236 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2001). · cites it 3× “In this case, the complaint explicitly charged, virtually in the words of the statute, that National discriminated against Diane Conetta in violation of Title VII and the relevant state statute “by discharging [her] upon a pretext and otherwise discriminating] against her…”
Ferro v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp. ex rel. Lewis, 2 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.R.I. 2014). · cites it 10× “See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-7 and 28-5-6(14). .”
Carmella Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160 (R.I. 2014). · cites it 5× “See § 28-5-7. As most employees are at-will, the consideration of an employee’s at-will status as a factor weighing against discrimination would render the statute meaningless.”
Stevenson v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6918 (Cal. 1997). · cites it 2× “§ 955 ; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7; S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-80 ; Tenn.”
Wayne Distrib. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 673 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 3× “310, § 1, and that Santos’s employment with Wayne was terminated because of his handicap in violation of § 28-5-7, as amended by P.L.1988, ch. 310, § 2.”
Tang v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Elderly Affairs, 904 F. Supp. 55 (D.R.I. 1995). · cites it 8× “G.L. § 28-5-7) 56. Paragraphs 1 through 47 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1) — 8 cases
Casey v. Town of Portsmouth, 861 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 2004).
Washington v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 3d 309 (D.R.I. 2018).
Ferro v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp. ex rel. Lewis, 2 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.R.I. 2014). “See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-7 and 28-5-6(14). .”
Beverly Ruth D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.R.I. 1998).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(i) — 4 cases
Russell v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. of RI, 160 F. Supp. 2d 239 (D.R.I. 2001).
Carmella Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160 (R.I. 2014). “See § 28-5-7. As most employees are at-will, the consideration of an employee’s at-will status as a factor weighing against discrimination would render the statute meaningless.”
Gupta (D.R.I. 2026).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(i)(ii) — 1 case
Carmella Bucci v. Hurd Buick Pontiac GMC Truck, LLC, 85 A.3d 1160 (R.I. 2014). “See § 28-5-7. As most employees are at-will, the consideration of an employee’s at-will status as a factor weighing against discrimination would render the statute meaningless.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(iv) — 2 cases
Gomes v. Brown Univ. (D.R.I. 2023).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(3) — 1 case
Rainey v. Town of Warren, 80 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.R.I. 2000).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(5) — 9 cases
Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). “R.I. Gen.Laws § 28-5-7 states, in pertinent part: Unlawful employment practices.”
Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292 (R.I. 2007).
Shoucair v. Brown Univ., 917 A.2d 418 (R.I. 2007).
Tang v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Elderly Affairs, 904 F. Supp. 55 (D.R.I. 1995). “G.L. § 28-5-7) 56. Paragraphs 1 through 47 are hereby incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(6) — 8 cases
Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Centers, Inc., 236 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2001). “In this case, the complaint explicitly charged, virtually in the words of the statute, that National discriminated against Diane Conetta in violation of Title VII and the relevant state statute “by discharging [her] upon a pretext and otherwise discriminating] against her…”
Ferro v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp. ex rel. Lewis, 2 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.R.I. 2014). “See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-7 and 28-5-6(14). .”
Wyss v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.R.I. 1998).
Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562 (D.R.I. 1996). “R.I. Gen.Laws § 28-5-7 states, in pertinent part: Unlawful employment practices.”
Mancini v. City of Providence, 282 F. Supp. 3d 459 (D.R.I. 2017).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(7) — 2 cases
City of Pawtucket, Police Div. v. Ricci, 692 A.2d 678 (R.I. 1997).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(A) — 3 cases
Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 359 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1976). “These petitions for certiorari seek review of a Superior Court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an order of the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights in a case of alleged employment discrimination of a physically handicapped person in violation of General Laws…”
Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 374 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 1977). “When the cumulative effect of these characteristics is considered, it becomes clear that pregnancy is in fact not like other disabilities.”
Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 905 F. Supp. 1139 (D.R.I. 1995).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(E) — 1 case
Vierra v. Rhode Island Mun. Police Academy, 539 A.2d 971 (R.I. 1988).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(a) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(l)(B) — 1 case
Power v. City of Providence, 582 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1990).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(l)(i) — 2 cases
Mayer v. Prof'l Ambulance, LLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 408 (D.R.I. 2016).
Neri v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 897 A.2d 42 (R.I. 2006).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(l)(ii) — 2 cases
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
Wellborn v. Spurwink/Rhode Island, 873 A.2d 884 (R.I. 2005).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(l)(iv) — 2 cases
DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13 (R.I. 2005).
Beverly Ruth D'Aprile v. Fleet Servs. Corp., 92 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.