Rhode Island General Laws
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-33-7 (2026)
Prima facie evidence of consent of owner
✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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In all civil proceedings, evidence that at the time of the accident or collision the motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant, shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated with the consent of the defendant, and the absence of consent shall be an affirmative defense to be set up in the answer and proved by the defendant.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11
cases, 1965–2019 · leading case: Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 2006).
Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 2006). “Contesting the motion justice’s entry of summary judgment, plaintiffs ground their appeal on the statutory language of G.L. 1956 § 31-33-7, which governs proof of consent to operate a motor vehicle.”
Argelis Pichardo v. Julie Stevens, 55 A.3d 762 (R.I. 2012). “” Section 31-33-7. Ms. Stevens raised such an affirmative defense in her answer to Mr.”
Martin v. Lilly, 505 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 1986). “4 There was no allegation of the application of § 31-33-7 5 in the complaint, and the judge did not instruct the jury concerning § 31-33-7.”
Black v. Vaiciulis, 934 A.2d 216 (R.I. 2007). “7 In our opinion, the controlling issue in the present appeal is whether plaintiff introduced prima facie evidence of consent pursuant to § 31-33-7, and, if so, whether defendant provided any evidence to contradict it.”
Jason Puerini v. Jeanne LaPierre, 208 A.3d 1157 (R.I. 2019). “But, for the interested reader, it provides that: "In all civil proceedings, evidence that at the time of the accident or collision the motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant, shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated with the consent of the…”
LaFratta v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 751 A.2d 1281 (R.I. 2000). “2 The plaintiffs contend that G.L.1956 § 31-33-7 places the burden of proving a lack of consent to operate the vehicle on defendant, and that Budget has not satisfied its burden.”
Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., 434 A.2d 923 (R.I. 1981). “Therefore, we conclude that Narragansett was not an owner or possessor of Everson’s car within the meaning of § 31-33-6, and we furthermore conclude that Everson’s car was not on the road with Narragansett’s consent, pursuant to § 31-33-7. There is no authority under those…”
Maria Marble v. John Faelle, 89 A.3d 830 (R.I. 2014). “Nevertheless, G.L.1956 § 31-33-7 provides: “In all civil proceedings, evidence that at the time of the accident or collision the motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant, shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated with the consent of the defendant,…”
Battista v. Muscatelli, 261 A.2d 636 (R.I. 1970). “Noting inferentially that plaintiffs based their claims against Fiore on the grounds that it was the registered owner of the motor vehicle being operated by Muscatelli, and that, by virtue of §31-33-7, Muscatelli was driving with the implied consent of Fiore, which allegation of…”
Budwee v. New England Motors, Inc., 210 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1965). “” §31-33-7. “Evidence that at the time of such accident or collision the motor vehicle was registered in the name of the defendant shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated with the consent of said defendant, and absence of such consent shall be an affirmative…”
Gilbert v. Girard, 279 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1971). “The trial justice did not, however, charge that pursuant to §31-33-7 (1968 Reenactment) evidence that the vehicle was registered in defendant’s name would be prima facie evidence that it was operated with defendant’s consent.”
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