Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-7-4 (2026)

Land taken for improvements adjacent to roads

✓ text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history)
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Whenever land is taken for the establishing, laying out, widening, extending, or relocating of public highways, streets, places, parks, or parkways, the acquiring authority may take more land and property than is needed for actual construction; provided, however, that the additional land and property so acquired or taken shall be no more in extent than would be sufficient to form suitable building sites abutting on the public highway, street, place, park, or parkway. After so much of the land and property has been appropriated for the public highway, street, place, park, or parkway as is needed therefor, the remainder may be held and improved by the acquiring authority for any public purpose or purposes, or may, with the approval of the state properties committee, be sold or leased for value, with or without suitable restrictions, and in the case of any sale or lease, the person or persons from whom the remainder was taken shall have the first right to purchase or lease the property upon such terms as the acquiring authority, with the approval of the state purchasing agent, is willing to sell or lease the property. The first right to purchase or lease shall be conclusively presumed to have been waived in the event that a written offer to sell or lease the property, containing the terms of the offer, shall have been sent by registered or certified mail to the last known address of the person or persons from whom the remainder was taken and the offer shall not have been accepted within thirty (30) days from the date of the mailing, and provided further that in the event the person or persons from whom the land was originally purchased refuse or waive their right to repurchase, or lease the land or property, the city or town wherein the land is situated shall have the second right to purchase or lease the land and property upon the same terms and conditions as the acquiring authority was willing to sell or lease the land or property to the original owners thereof. A second right to purchase or lease the land or property shall be conclusively presumed to have been waived in the event a written offer to sell or lease the land or property, containing the terms of the offer, shall have been sent by registered or certified mail to the city or town clerk, as the case may be, wherein the land and property are situated and the offer shall not have been accepted within thirty (30) days from the date of the mailing.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1965–2016 · leading case: Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340 (R.I. 1983).
Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340 (R.I. 1983). · cites it 2× “1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 37-7-4 pertaining to the reinvestment in original landowners of property taken for streets and parks.”
Advisory Opinion to His Excellency, Licht, 289 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1972). · cites it 3× “Finally, we note that the 1970 Act specifically exempts any conveyance or lease made by the corporation from the provisions of §37-7-4. Section 37-7-4 stipulates that whenever land has been taken for highway or park purposes, *7 the individual from whom such land was taken shall…”
Sullivan v. Marcello, 214 A.2d 181 (R.I. 1965). “More land may be condemned than is required for highway or freeway construction and the excess may be utilized pursuant to §37-7-4 for building sites, or for any public purpose, or sold or leased for value, and under §24-8-11 for the planting of tre'es and shrubs or other…”
Est. of Richard J. Deeble v. Rhode Island Dep't of Transp., 134 A.3d 183 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 3× “Since this Court is satisfied that the plain language of article 6, section 19 is unambiguous, we need not address the estate’s alternative arguments that a comparison between G.L.1956 § 37-7-4— which tracks the language of article 6, section 19 — and other statutes demonstrates…”
M. S. Alper & Son, Inc. v. Capaldi, 206 A.2d 859 (R.I. 1965). “1956, §37-7-4. It is my opinion that the disposition of the parcel of land here being considered is within the purview of §37-7-3 but, being persuaded that the disposition of such land purported to be here made does not comply with the pertinent requirements of §37-7-3, I concur…”
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