R.I. Gen. Laws
Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13 (2026)

Suspensions

✓ current as of July 2026
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I. Suspensions — Summary punishment.

(a) The provisions of this chapter are not intended to prohibit suspensions by the chief or the highest ranking officer of the law enforcement agency.

(b) Summary punishment of up to five (5) working days’ suspension without pay may be imposed for minor violations of departmental rules and regulations.

(c) Summary punishment of up to fourteen (14) working days without pay may be imposed subsequent to a formal complaint filed with the department for the following violations of departmental rules and regulations that do not result in pending criminal charges requiring discipline pursuant to the remaining provisions of this section:

(1) The use of deadly force in violation of departmental rules and regulations;

(2) Excessive force or use of force that leads to serious physical injury or death in violation of departmental rules and regulations;

(3) Felonious conduct, including conduct that rises to a felony domestic violence as defined in § 12-29-2(a), in violation of departmental rules and regulations; and/or

(4) Professional dishonesty relating to the reporting, investigation, or prosecution of a crime or to the reporting or investigation of misconduct by another law enforcement officer in violation of departmental rules and regulations.

(d) The sole and exclusive remedy for appeals of summary punishments under subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the accused law enforcement officer’s collective bargaining agreement.

II. Suspensions — Disciplinary action.

(a) Suspension may be imposed by the chief or the highest ranking sworn officer of the law enforcement agency when the accused law enforcement officer is under investigation for a criminal felony matter. Any suspension shall consist of the accused law enforcement officer being relieved of duty, and they shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as they would receive if they were not suspended. Suspension under this subsection shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days.

(b) In cases where felonious conduct by a law enforcement officer results in a felony arrest, in which the law enforcement officer is charged, indicted, or informed against, including an arrest for a felony domestic violence offense, nothing shall prohibit the imposition of a suspension without pay. Where the law enforcement officer is acquitted of the felony charge or where the felony charge has been dismissed in its entirety, the law enforcement officer shall be entitled to be made whole.

(c) Suspension may be imposed by the chief or highest ranking sworn officer of the law enforcement agency when the accused law enforcement officer is under investigation for a misdemeanor criminal matter. Any such suspension shall consist of the accused law enforcement officer being relieved of duty, and they shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as they would receive if they were not suspended. Suspension under this subsection shall not exceed thirty (30) days; provided, however, that if an accused officer is charged with a misdemeanor offense the chief or highest ranking sworn officer of the law enforcement agency may continue said suspension with pay up to a total of one hundred and eighty (180) days. If the disposition of the criminal matter does not take place within one hundred eighty (180) days of the commencement of such suspension, the accused law enforcement officer may be suspended without pay and benefits; provided, however, that the accused officer’s entitlement to such medical insurance, dental insurance, disability insurance, and life insurance as is available to all other officers within the agency shall not be suspended. The accused law enforcement officer may petition the presiding justice of the superior court for a stay of the suspension without pay, and such stay shall be granted upon a showing that said delay in the criminal disposition was outside the accused law enforcement officer’s control. In the event the accused law enforcement officer is acquitted of any misdemeanor related thereto, the officer shall be forthwith reinstated and reimbursed all salary and benefits that have not been paid during the suspension period.

(d) Suspension may be imposed by the chief or highest ranking sworn officer of the law enforcement agency when the accused law enforcement officer is under investigation for a noncriminal matter. Any such suspension shall consist of the accused law enforcement officer being relieved of duty, and they shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as they would receive if they were not suspended. Suspension under this subsection shall not exceed fifteen (15) days or any other time frame established under the provisions of any applicable collective bargaining agreement.

(e) Suspension may be imposed by the chief or highest ranking sworn officer of the law enforcement agency upon receipt of notice or disciplinary action in accordance with § 42-28.6-4(b) in which termination or demotion is the recommended punishment. Any such suspension shall consist of the accused law enforcement officer being relieved of duty, and they shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as they would receive if they were not so suspended.

(f) Any law enforcement officer who is charged, indicted, or informed against for a felony or who is convicted of and incarcerated for a misdemeanor may be suspended without pay and benefits at the discretion of the agency or chief or highest ranking sworn officers; provided, however, that the accused officer’s entitlement to medical insurance, dental insurance, disability insurance, and life insurance as is available to all other officers within the agency shall not be suspended. In the event that the law enforcement officer is acquitted of any felony related thereto, the officer shall be reinstated and reimbursed forthwith for all salary and benefits that have not been paid during the suspension period.

(g) Any law enforcement officer who is convicted of a felony shall, pending the prosecution of an appeal, be suspended without pay and benefits; provided, however, that the accused officer’s entitlement to such medical insurance, dental insurance, disability insurance, and life insurance as is available to all other officers within the agency shall not be suspended. Whenever, upon appeal, such conviction is reversed, the suspension under this subsection shall terminate and the law enforcement officer shall forthwith be paid the salary and benefits that would have been paid to them during that period of suspension.

(h) In the disposition of a criminal case, no matter the jurisdiction, any law enforcement officer who pleads guilty, enters an Alford plea, or pleads nolo contendere to a felony charge, even if followed by a sentence of probation, or who makes an admission of sufficient facts to sustain the felony charge or charges, or whose conviction of a felony has, after or in the absence of a timely appeal, become final shall be dismissed by the law enforcement agency and, in the event of such dismissal, other provisions of this chapter shall not apply. A dismissal of a law enforcement officer pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall be immediately reported to the Rhode Island police officers commission on standards and training, established pursuant to chapter 28.2 of this title.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1978–2023 · leading case: Lori-Ann MOLLOY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Wesley BLANCHARD, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants, 115 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1997).
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Lori-Ann MOLLOY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Wesley BLANCHARD, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants, 115 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1997). · cites it 3× “On June 9, 1994, approximately a week after her suspension, Molloy, with the help of her attorney, requested a hearing concerning her suspension pursuant to the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0) (“the Officers’ Bill of Rights”).”
City of Pawtucket v. Nichalas Laprade, 94 A.3d 503 (R.I. 2014). · cites it 8× “6-1(2) (providing for the appointment of the third member of the hearing committee by the Presiding Justice if the other two members cannot agree upon a third member and either “make[s] application to the presiding justice”), with § 42-28.6-13 (stating that, if suspended without…”
Lynch v. King, 391 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1978). “While §42-28.6-13 does allow for summary action by the director in some cases, it is clear that the Officers’ Bill of Rights contemplates that the proceeding conducted by the hearing committee will be the initial adjudication of the charges lodged against the officer and that…”
Zincone v. Mancuso, 523 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987). · cites it 2× “Section 42-28.6-13(B). If the officer believes this action is unreasonable, the officer may appeal to Superior Court.”
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local No. 302 v. Town of Portsmouth, 506 A.2d 540 (R.I. 1986). “On November 28, 1984, the chief notified the committee that he was, on the advice of counsel, denying Alfonso’s hearing-committee request, discontinuing any further proceedings, and revoking the appointment of the lieutenant because the chief had been advised that Alfonso’s…”
Enrique Sosa v. City of Woonsocket (R.I. 2023). · cites it 20× “The law enforcement officer may be relieved of duty subject to § 42-28.6-13 of this chapter, and shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as he or she would have if he or she were not charged.”
Molloy v. Blanchard, 907 F. Supp. 46 (D.R.I. 1995). · cites it 2× “R.I.Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0). A few days following the suspension, Chief Blanchard met with a representative of the State Attorney General and agreed to have the State Police conduct an investigation.”
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 306 v. Town of Coventry, 792 A.2d 742 (R.I. 2002). · cites it 3× “” The union appealed, arguing that state law supersedes conflicting provisions of the CBA and that § 42-28.6-13(B) provides that disputes regarding summary punishment are to be resolved through the grievance procedures in the CBA.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0): 2 cases
Lori-Ann MOLLOY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Wesley BLANCHARD, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants, 115 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1997). “On June 9, 1994, approximately a week after her suspension, Molloy, with the help of her attorney, requested a hearing concerning her suspension pursuant to the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0) (“the Officers’ Bill of Rights”).”
Molloy v. Blanchard, 907 F. Supp. 46 (D.R.I. 1995). “R.I.Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0). A few days following the suspension, Chief Blanchard met with a representative of the State Attorney General and agreed to have the State Police conduct an investigation.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(A): 1 case
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local No. 302 v. Town of Portsmouth, 506 A.2d 540 (R.I. 1986). “On November 28, 1984, the chief notified the committee that he was, on the advice of counsel, denying Alfonso’s hearing-committee request, discontinuing any further proceedings, and revoking the appointment of the lieutenant because the chief had been advised that Alfonso’s…”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(B): 2 cases
Zincone v. Mancuso, 523 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987). “Section 42-28.6-13(B). If the officer believes this action is unreasonable, the officer may appeal to Superior Court.”
Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 306 v. Town of Coventry, 792 A.2d 742 (R.I. 2002). “” The union appealed, arguing that state law supersedes conflicting provisions of the CBA and that § 42-28.6-13(B) provides that disputes regarding summary punishment are to be resolved through the grievance procedures in the CBA.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(C): 1 case
Lori-Ann MOLLOY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Wesley BLANCHARD, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellants, 115 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1997). “On June 9, 1994, approximately a week after her suspension, Molloy, with the help of her attorney, requested a hearing concerning her suspension pursuant to the Rhode Island Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(0) (“the Officers’ Bill of Rights”).”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(d): 1 case
City of Pawtucket v. Nichalas Laprade, 94 A.3d 503 (R.I. 2014). “6-1(2) (providing for the appointment of the third member of the hearing committee by the Presiding Justice if the other two members cannot agree upon a third member and either “make[s] application to the presiding justice”), with § 42-28.6-13 (stating that, if suspended without…”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(g): 1 case
Enrique Sosa v. City of Woonsocket (R.I. 2023). “The law enforcement officer may be relieved of duty subject to § 42-28.6-13 of this chapter, and shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as he or she would have if he or she were not charged.”
R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-28.6-13(i): 1 case
Enrique Sosa v. City of Woonsocket (R.I. 2023). “The law enforcement officer may be relieved of duty subject to § 42-28.6-13 of this chapter, and shall receive all ordinary pay and benefits as he or she would have if he or she were not charged.”
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