(a) The local licensing authority of a city or town, before granting a license under this
chapter to keep an establishment or storehouse for the reception of any junk, old
metals, or other second-hand metal articles or to establish, operate, or maintain
an automobile junkyard, in any location not lawfully occupied for that purpose at
the time of the application for that license, shall hold a public hearing, notice
of which shall be posted at least seven (7) days but not more than fourteen (14) days
prior to the hearing in not less than two (2) public places in that city or town and
in a newspaper of general circulation in that city or town where the establishment,
storehouse, or junkyard is to be established, operated, or maintained. Before the
local licensing authority posts or publishes a notice of a hearing, the local licensing
authority shall collect from the applicant for the license a fee of ten dollars ($10.00),
plus the cost of posting and publishing the notice.
(b) No license shall be granted under this chapter to the keeper of any establishment
or storehouse for the reception of any junk, old metals, or other second-hand metal
articles or to a person establishing, operating, or maintaining an automobile junkyard,
in any location not lawfully occupied for that purpose at the time of the application
for the license, where the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within
two hundred feet (200′) of that building or place file with the board, city, or town
council, respectively, having jurisdiction to grant licenses, their objection to the
granting of the license. This subsection does not apply to any applicant who is the
keeper of an establishment or storehouse, or automobile junkyard, that is being acquired
under eminent domain proceedings, who is applying for licensing within § 5-21-1 within the same city or town in which he or she was formerly licensed.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
10
cases, 1959–1991 · leading case:
Bourque v. Dettore, 589 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1991).
Bourque v. Dettore, 589 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1991).
· cites it 29× “On January 4, 1990, we granted certiorari to address two issues: whether the licensing regulations of § 5-21-2 are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and whether the licensing regulations of § 5-21-2 violate either the due-process or the equal-protection…”
Goldberg v. Providence Bd. of Licenses, 525 A.2d 1295 (R.I. 1987).
· cites it 13× “For these reasons the judgment of the Board of Licenses of the City of Providence is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the papers in the case are remanded to the board with directions to recalculate the area measurements in accordance with this decision.”
Metals Recycling Co., Inc. v. Maccarone, 527 A.2d 1127 (R.I. 1987).
· cites it 4× “1985), for example, the petitioner “made some vague references to the unconstitutionality of § 5-21-2 but * * * cited no cases in support of this proposition.”
Newport Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Town Council of Portsmouth, 502 A.2d 339 (R.I. 1985).
· cites it 4× “Given the factual determination that Salvage’s application should be treated as a new application as opposed to a renewal, the granting of the license was subject to the provisions of § 5-21-2. The council found on the basis of evidence presented to it, together with tax…”
Fink v. Bureau of Licenses, 158 A.2d 820 (R.I. 1960).
· cites it 4× “In §5-21-2 it is provided that no license for such purposes shall be granted “in any location not occupied for such purpose at the time of the application for such license, where the- owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within two hundred (200) feet of such…”
Padula v. Town Council, 179 A.2d 334 (R.I. 1962).
· cites it 3× “1956, §5-21-2. They were, however, nearby residents and had a right to object as they did.”
Novak v. City Council of Pawtucket, 205 A.2d 589 (R.I. 1964).
“1956, §5-21-2, *45 which prohibits the granting of a license if the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within 200 feet of the proposed locus object thereto.”
Lambert v. Town Council, 256 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1969).
· cites it 4× “Section 5-21-2 (a), as amended, of the act provides, in part, however, that the town council before granting a license to operate an automobile junkyard “* * * in any location not lawfully occupied for such purpose at the time of the application for such license, shall hold a…”
D. O. B. Props., Inc. v. Bureau of Licenses, 153 A.2d 563 (R.I. 1959).
· cites it 3× “After a hearing on April 28, 1958 the application was denied by the bureau of licenses in accordance with the requirements of §5-21-2, because of legal remonstrances by the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within 200 feet of lot 56.”
Mase v. Exeter Town Council, 176 A.2d 389 (R.I. 1962).
“However, this general grant of power is restricted by §5-21-2 which provides that no such license shall be granted for any place not occupied for that purpose at the time of the application for the license where the owners or occupants of the greater part of the land within 200…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-21-2(a) — 1 case
Goldberg v. Providence Bd. of Licenses, 525 A.2d 1295 (R.I. 1987).
“For these reasons the judgment of the Board of Licenses of the City of Providence is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the papers in the case are remanded to the board with directions to recalculate the area measurements in accordance with this decision.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-21-2(b) — 4 cases
Bourque v. Dettore, 589 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1991).
“On January 4, 1990, we granted certiorari to address two issues: whether the licensing regulations of § 5-21-2 are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and whether the licensing regulations of § 5-21-2 violate either the due-process or the equal-protection…”
Goldberg v. Providence Bd. of Licenses, 525 A.2d 1295 (R.I. 1987).
“For these reasons the judgment of the Board of Licenses of the City of Providence is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the papers in the case are remanded to the board with directions to recalculate the area measurements in accordance with this decision.”
Newport Auto Salvage, Inc. v. Town Council of Portsmouth, 502 A.2d 339 (R.I. 1985).
“Given the factual determination that Salvage’s application should be treated as a new application as opposed to a renewal, the granting of the license was subject to the provisions of § 5-21-2. The council found on the basis of evidence presented to it, together with tax…”
Metals Recycling Co., Inc. v. Maccarone, 527 A.2d 1127 (R.I. 1987).
“1985), for example, the petitioner “made some vague references to the unconstitutionality of § 5-21-2 but * * * cited no cases in support of this proposition.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.