As used in this chapter:
(1) “Affiliate” means:
(i) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote twenty
percent (20%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than
a person who holds the securities:
(A) As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(B) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(ii) A corporation, twenty percent (20%) or more of whose outstanding voting securities
are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote by the debtor
or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote,
twenty percent (20%) or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other
than a person who holds the securities:
(A) As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(B) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(iii) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement,
or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(iv) A person who operates the debtor’s business under a lease or other agreement or controls
substantially all of the debtor’s assets.
(2) “Asset” means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
(i) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(ii) Property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(iii) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not
subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) “Claim” means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) “Creditor” means a person who has a claim.
(5) “Debt” means liability on a claim.
(6) “Debtor” means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless,
optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(8) “Insider” includes:
(i) If the debtor is an individual:
(A) A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(B) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(C) A general partner in a partnership described in subsection (8)(i)(B); or
(D) A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(ii) If the debtor is a corporation:
(A) A director of the debtor;
(B) An officer of the debtor;
(C) A person in control of the debtor;
(D) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(E) A general partner in a partnership described in subsection (8)(ii)(D); or
(F) A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(iii) If the debtor is a partnership:
(A) A general partner in the debtor;
(B) A relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of
the debtor;
(C) Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(D) A general partner in a partnership described in subsection (8)(iii)(C); or
(E) A person in control of the debtor;
(iv) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(v) A managing agent of the debtor.
(9) “Lien” means a charge against, or an interest in, property to secure payment of a
debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by
agreement; a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings;
a common-law lien; or a statutory lien.
(10) “Organization” means a person other than an individual.
(11) “Person” means an individual, estate, partnership, association, trust, business or
nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality, or other legal or commercial entity.
(12) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(13) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored
in an electronic or other medium, and retrievable in perceivable form.
(14) “Relative” means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as
determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within
the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship
within the third degree.
(15) “Sign” means with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(i) To execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(ii) To attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or
process.
(16) “Transfer” means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset,
and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and creation of a lien or
other encumbrance.
(17) “Valid lien” means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien
subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1958–2025 · leading case:
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
· cites it 12× “In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
Zahn v. Yucaipa Capital Fund, 218 B.R. 656 (D.R.I. 1998).
· cites it 5× “Choice of Law Plaintiffs fraudulent transfer claims are based on Rhode Island’s version of the UFTA, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-16-1 to 12. However, defendants argue that California’s version of the UFTA, Cal.”
Sauer Inc. v. Lawson, 791 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 2015).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. (“UFTA”), Sauer traced portions of its original judgment against James first to Commercial Construction, and then to Ms.”
Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1997).
· cites it 2× “” G.L.1956 § 6-16-1(1); see also § 6-16-6(a)(l) ("[a] transfer is made * * * when the transfer is so far perfected that a good faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset…”
Ducharme v. Champagne, 292 A.2d 224 (R.I. 1972).
· cites it 10× “1956 (1969 Reenactment) §6-16-1. The conveyance, it is not disputed, was made by the defendants, David Champagne and his'wife Jean Champagne, as joint tenants to the defendant, John T.”
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196 (R.I. 1989).
· cites it 2× “1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 6-16-1. The plaintiff asserts in counts 4 and 5 that O’Donnell, doing business as The Homestead, is liable as a successor for Orgon-ics’s debt based upon fraud and because The Homestead is a “mere continuation of Orgonics.”
Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 124 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1997).
“Fraudulent Transfer Claims Peters first contends that the jury reasonably could have found defendants’ transfer of the Anson assets fraudulent under R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-16-1 et seq., which provides that a “transfer” is fraudulent if made “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay,…”
Martin v. Lincoln Bar, Inc., 622 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Section 6-16-1(1) defines transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an *470 asset or an interest in an asset.”
Fricke v. Fricke, 491 A.2d 990 (R.I. 1985).
· cites it 2× “In situations in which it is shown that a conveyance has been made to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, a trial justice is empowered to set the conveyance aside as void against all transferees save bona fide purchasers who take without notice.”
Citibank, N.A. v. Williams (In Re Williams), 159 B.R. 648 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Rhode Island's Fraudulent Transfer Act incorporates the same, proof necessary to establish a claim under R.I.Gen.Laws § 6-16-1 as is required under Code § 548.”
United States v. Verduchi, 434 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
“As framed by the parties, this case raises a question about whether the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), in its Rhode Island incarnation, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-16-1 to -12, restricts a court, in setting aside a fraudulent conveyance, to awarding against the transferee a…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(1) — 2 cases
Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1997).
“” G.L.1956 § 6-16-1(1); see also § 6-16-6(a)(l) ("[a] transfer is made * * * when the transfer is so far perfected that a good faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset…”
Martin v. Lincoln Bar, Inc., 622 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993).
“Section 6-16-1(1) defines transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an *470 asset or an interest in an asset.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(12) — 1 case
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
“In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(2) — 1 case
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
“In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(3) — 1 case
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
“In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(4) — 1 case
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
“In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(6) — 1 case
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Capuano, 301 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2004).
“In its three-count Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that the Defendants violated three separate provisions of the Rhode Island Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “RIUFTA” *158 or “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1 et seq. In Count I of the Complaint, Rohm and Haas alleges that…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-16-1(l) — 1 case
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