Rhode Island General Laws

R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2 (2026)

Conditional immunity

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) A party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims. Such immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section, except if the petition or free speech constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. The petition or free speech will be deemed to constitute a sham as defined in the previous sentence only if it is both:

(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and

(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the governmental process itself for its own direct effects.

(b) The court shall stay all discovery proceedings in the action upon the filing of a motion asserting the immunity established by this section; provided, however, that the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion.

(c) The immunity established by this section may be asserted by an appropriate motion or by other appropriate means under the applicable rules of civil procedure.

(d) If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established by this section, or if the party claiming lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern is, in fact, the eventual prevailing party at trial, the court shall award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including those incurred for the motion and any related discovery matters. The court shall award compensatory damages and may award punitive damages upon a showing by the prevailing party that the responding party’s claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims were frivolous or were brought with an intent to harass the party or otherwise inhibit the party’s exercise of its right to petition or free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitution. Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of the party claiming lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions to any remedy otherwise authorized by law.

(e) As used in this section, “a party’s exercise of its right of petition or of free speech” shall mean any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; or any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue of public concern.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases, 1996–2019 · leading case: Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013). · cites it 17× “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 10× “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). · cites it 33× “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008). · cites it 8× “9 Section 9-33-2 provides that, when that conditional immunity attaches, it renders “the petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue of being objectively or subjectively baseless.”
Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 14× “1, as do the statutory requirements of § 9-33-2 [the anti-SLAPP statute].” 674 A.”
Hoffman v. Davenport-Metcalf, 851 A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004). · cites it 10× “Davenport-Metcalf's "false" criminal complaint filed with the Newport police destroys any immunity defendants may have had under § 9-33-2. In granting summary judgment, the motion justice explained to plaintiffs: "You have the right to sue, but if you sue over someone invoking…”
Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000). · cites it 9× “” The Mallettes, in their answer to Global’s complaint, raised the issue of then-conditional immunity provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.”
In the Matter of Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015). · cites it 16× “10 While these claims have been inserted in a piecemeal, repetitive fashion into nearly all of respondent’s filings with this Court and with the board, we have parsed them into two general areas of concern: (1) he challenges the authority of 10 The respondent has filed four…”
Bennie Sisto, as the Tr. of Goat Island Realty Trust v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 140 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 11× “G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(a). Although the plaintiff had every right to appeal from the original finding that his complaint violated the anti-SLAPP statute and - 12 - certainly presented this Court with a justiciable controversy, he did so at the risk of an additional adverse…”
Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Stefania M. Mardo, as Tr. of the Constellation Trust—2011, 140 A.3d 106 (R.I. 2016). · cites it 4× “2004) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(d)), our jurisprudence has entrusted the determination of whether to award attorneys’ fees in appropriate cases to the sound discretion of a trial justice.”
Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Companies, Inc., 90 P.3d 859 (Colo. 2004). “3211(g) (McKinney 2003); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-33-2 to -3 (2003).”
Cove Road Dev. v. W. Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674 A.2d 1234 (R.I. 1996). · cites it 3× “-(a) A party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island Constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a) — 8 cases
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013). “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000). “” The Mallettes, in their answer to Global’s complaint, raised the issue of then-conditional immunity provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004). “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). “1, as do the statutory requirements of § 9-33-2 [the anti-SLAPP statute].” 674 A.”
Bennie Sisto, as the Tr. of Goat Island Realty Trust v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 140 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016). “G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(a). Although the plaintiff had every right to appeal from the original finding that his complaint violated the anti-SLAPP statute and - 12 - certainly presented this Court with a justiciable controversy, he did so at the risk of an additional adverse…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(1) — 2 cases
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(1)(2) — 1 case
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(2) — 1 case
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(l) — 1 case
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013). “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(b) — 3 cases
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004). “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013). “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(c) — 1 case
Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). “1, as do the statutory requirements of § 9-33-2 [the anti-SLAPP statute].” 674 A.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d) — 9 cases
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008). “9 Section 9-33-2 provides that, when that conditional immunity attaches, it renders “the petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue of being objectively or subjectively baseless.”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004). “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Bennie Sisto, as the Tr. of Goat Island Realty Trust v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 140 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016). “G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(a). Although the plaintiff had every right to appeal from the original finding that his complaint violated the anti-SLAPP statute and - 12 - certainly presented this Court with a justiciable controversy, he did so at the risk of an additional adverse…”
Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Stefania M. Mardo, as Tr. of the Constellation Trust—2011, 140 A.3d 106 (R.I. 2016). “2004) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(d)), our jurisprudence has entrusted the determination of whether to award attorneys’ fees in appropriate cases to the sound discretion of a trial justice.”
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010). “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d)(2005) — 1 case
Mills v. Brown, 372 F. Supp. 2d 683 (D.R.I. 2005).
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(e) — 4 cases
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013). “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Hometown Props., Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996). “1, as do the statutory requirements of § 9-33-2 [the anti-SLAPP statute].” 674 A.”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004). “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.