(a) A party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United
States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern
shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims. Such
immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed
at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section, except if
the petition or free speech constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes
a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,
result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. The petition or free
speech will be deemed to constitute a sham as defined in the previous sentence only
if it is both:
(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of
speech or petition could realistically expect success in procuring the government
action, result, or outcome, and
(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental
process itself for its own direct effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental
process shall not constitute use of the governmental process itself for its own direct
effects.
(b) The court shall stay all discovery proceedings in the action upon the filing of a
motion asserting the immunity established by this section; provided, however, that
the court, on motion and after a hearing and for good cause shown, may order that
specified discovery be conducted. The stay of discovery shall remain in effect until
notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion.
(c) The immunity established by this section may be asserted by an appropriate motion
or by other appropriate means under the applicable rules of civil procedure.
(d) If the court grants the motion asserting the immunity established by this section,
or if the party claiming lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free
speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a
matter of public concern is, in fact, the eventual prevailing party at trial, the
court shall award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including
those incurred for the motion and any related discovery matters. The court shall award
compensatory damages and may award punitive damages upon a showing by the prevailing
party that the responding party’s claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims were frivolous
or were brought with an intent to harass the party or otherwise inhibit the party’s
exercise of its right to petition or free speech under the United States or Rhode
Island constitution. Nothing in this section shall affect or preclude the right of
the party claiming lawful exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech
under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions to any remedy otherwise authorized
by law.
(e) As used in this section, “a party’s exercise of its right of petition or of free speech”
shall mean any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any written or
oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; or
any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue of public concern.
Notes of Decisions
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
· cites it 17× “According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 10× “” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010).
· cites it 33× “) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008).
· cites it 8× “9 Section 9-33-2 provides that, when that conditional immunity attaches, it renders “the petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue of being objectively or subjectively baseless.”
Hoffman v. Davenport-Metcalf, 851 A.2d 1083 (R.I. 2004).
· cites it 10× “Davenport-Metcalf's "false" criminal complaint filed with the Newport police destroys any immunity defendants may have had under § 9-33-2. In granting summary judgment, the motion justice explained to plaintiffs: "You have the right to sue, but if you sue over someone invoking…”
Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000).
· cites it 9× “” The Mallettes, in their answer to Global’s complaint, raised the issue of then-conditional immunity provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.”
In the Matter of Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015).
· cites it 16× “10 While these claims have been inserted in a piecemeal, repetitive fashion into nearly all of respondent’s filings with this Court and with the board, we have parsed them into two general areas of concern: (1) he challenges the authority of 10 The respondent has filed four…”
Bennie Sisto, as the Tr. of Goat Island Realty Trust v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 140 A.3d 124 (R.I. 2016).
· cites it 11× “G.L. 1956 § 9-33-2(a). Although the plaintiff had every right to appeal from the original finding that his complaint violated the anti-SLAPP statute and - 12 - certainly presented this Court with a justiciable controversy, he did so at the risk of an additional adverse…”
Cove Road Dev. v. W. Cranston Indus. Park Assocs., 674 A.2d 1234 (R.I. 1996).
· cites it 3× “-(a) A party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island Constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a) — 8 cases
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
“According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208 (R.I. 2000).
“” The Mallettes, in their answer to Global’s complaint, raised the issue of then-conditional immunity provided by § 9-33-2. They subsequently and properly moved for entry of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004).
“” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(1) — 2 cases
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010).
“) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(1)(2) — 1 case
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010).
“) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(2) — 1 case
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010).
“) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(a)(l) — 1 case
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
“According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(b) — 3 cases
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004).
“” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
“According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(c) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d) — 9 cases
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144 (R.I. 2008).
“9 Section 9-33-2 provides that, when that conditional immunity attaches, it renders “the petitioner or speaker immune from any civil claims for statements, or petitions, that were not sham by virtue of being objectively or subjectively baseless.”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004).
“” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
Karousos v. Pardee, 992 A.2d 263 (R.I. 2010).
“) In my opinion, it is very much a question of fact as to whether it was defendants' subjective intention to legitimately petition the zoning board or whether, alternatively, the petition was a "mere sham.”
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(d)(2005) — 1 case
— R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-33-2(e) — 4 cases
Sisto v. Am. Condo. Ass'n, 68 A.3d 603 (R.I. 2013).
“According to § 9-33-2(a), “[a] party’s exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech [before or submitted to a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding] * * * in connection with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally…”
Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743 (R.I. 2004).
“” The next section of the statute, § 9-33-2, explains that the grant of conditional immunity will bar any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim directed at the protected activities unless the petition or speech constitutes a sham: “Conditional Immunity.”
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