U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender
(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the greatest):
(1) 16, if the defendant was required to register as a Tier III offender;
(2) 14, if the defendant was required to register as a Tier II offender; or
(3) 12, if the defendant was required to register as a Tier I offender.
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics
(1) (Apply the greatest):
If, while in a failure to register status, the defendant committed—
(A) a sex offense against someone other than a minor, increase by 6 levels;
(B) a felony offense against a minor not otherwise covered by subdivision (C), increase by 6 levels; or
(C) a sex offense against a minor, increase by 8 levels.
(2) If the defendant voluntarily (A) corrected the failure to register; or (B) attempted to register but was prevented from registering by uncontrollable circumstances and the defendant did not contribute to the creation of those circumstances, decrease by 3 levels.
Commentary
Statutory Provision: 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), (b).Application Notes:
1. Definitions.—For purposes of this guideline:“Minor” means (A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18 years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not, who a law enforcement officer represented to a participant (i) had not attained the age of 18 years; and (ii) could be provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 18 years.
“Sex offense” has the meaning given that term in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5).
“Tier I offender”, “Tier II offender”, and “Tier III offender” have the meaning given the terms “tier I sex offender”, “tier II sex offender”, and “tier III sex offender”, respectively, in 34 U.S.C. § 20911.
(A) In General.—In order for subsection (b)(2) to apply, the defendant's voluntary attempt to register or to correct the failure to register must have occurred prior to the time the defendant knew or reasonably should have known a jurisdiction had detected the failure to register.
(B) Interaction with Subsection (b)(1).—Do not apply subsection (b)(2) if subsection (b)(1) also applies.
Historical Note: Effective November 1, 2007 (amendments 701 and 711). Amended effective November 1, 2010 (amendment 746); November 1, 2018 (amendments 812 and 813).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 65
cases (13 in the last 5 years), 2008–2025 · leading case: United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Forster, 549 F. App'x 757 (10th Cir. 2013). “Forster contests the court’s conclusion that he should be considered a Tier III sex offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 and its denial of a three-level reduction for his purportedly having voluntarily corrected his registration in December 2010.”
United States v. Brian Berry, 814 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2016). “U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 cmt. And even a cursory review of New Jersey’s sex offender tier system reveals that it is grounded in criteria distinct from SORNA’s tier definitions.”
United States v. White, 782 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2015). “U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5; see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (defining tier I, tier II, and tier III sex offenders).”
United States v. Brian Johnson, 743 F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 2014). “Johnson’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a)(l) was sixteen because he had been required to register as a Tier III sex offender.”
United States v. Scott Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2017). “He argues that, in § 16911, which defines the three tiers of offense for U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5, Congress intended to capture three types of actors as Tier III offenders' — -those who actually commit the sex offense, those who attempt the offense, and those who conspire to do so — and…”
United States v. Ruben Prieto, 801 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2015). “In his written objections to the PSR, Prieto argued that he was entitled to a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2), for voluntarily correcting the failure to register.”
United States v. Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011). “The PSR found a base offense level of 16 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a)(l), since Conca was classified as a Tier III Sex Offender under the provisions of 42 U.”
United States v. Charles Mulverhill, 833 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016). “2011) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5). 3 . Mulverhill concedes that he is a "sex offender” under SORNA.”
United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014). “The Applicability of the Sentencing Enhancement Because we have determined that Lott was in failure-to-register status, we turn to Lott’s argument that the district court committed procedural error by imposing an eight-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C),…”
United States v. Joe Coleman, 681 F. App'x 413 (5th Cir. 2017). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). Coleman appeals on the grounds that the Minnesota Statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal offense of abusive sexual contact and that the categorical approach applies to determine a defendant’s tier under Guideline § 2A3.”
United States v. Rene Ramirez Gomez, 129 F.4th 954 (6th Cir. 2025). “§ 20911 (5), a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), defines “sex offense” in multiple ways—including “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(a) — 12 cases
United States v. Joe Coleman, 681 F. App'x 413 (5th Cir. 2017). “See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). Coleman appeals on the grounds that the Minnesota Statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal offense of abusive sexual contact and that the categorical approach applies to determine a defendant’s tier under Guideline § 2A3.”
United States v. Brian Berry, 814 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2016). “U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 cmt. And even a cursory review of New Jersey’s sex offender tier system reveals that it is grounded in criteria distinct from SORNA’s tier definitions.”
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Alexander, 802 F.3d 1134 (10th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Morales, 801 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2015).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(a)(1) — 11 cases
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Forster, 549 F. App'x 757 (10th Cir. 2013). “Forster contests the court’s conclusion that he should be considered a Tier III sex offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 and its denial of a three-level reduction for his purportedly having voluntarily corrected his registration in December 2010.”
United States v. Lowry, 595 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2010).
United States v. James Poynor, 678 F. App'x 435 (7th Cir. 2017).
United States v. John Francis Bolieau (11th Cir. 2023).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(a)(2) — 5 cases
United States v. Navarro, 54 F.4th 268 (5th Cir. 2022).
United States v. Lacouture, 835 F.3d 187 (1st Cir. 2016).
United States v. Nagell, 911 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 2018).
United States v. Pedro Ramirez, 677 F. App'x 575 (11th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Michael Shepard, 658 F. App'x 260 (6th Cir. 2016).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(a)(3) — 3 cases
United States v. Rosario, 535 F. App'x 662 (10th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Kirk White, 710 F. App'x 109 (3rd Cir. 2018).
United States v. Darren Shira, 286 F. App'x 650 (11th Cir. 2008).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(a)(l) — 9 cases
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Scott Cammorto, 859 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2017). “He argues that, in § 16911, which defines the three tiers of offense for U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5, Congress intended to capture three types of actors as Tier III offenders' — -those who actually commit the sex offense, those who attempt the offense, and those who conspire to do so — and…”
United States v. Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011). “The PSR found a base offense level of 16 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a)(l), since Conca was classified as a Tier III Sex Offender under the provisions of 42 U.”
United States v. Charles Mulverhill, 833 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016). “2011) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5). 3 . Mulverhill concedes that he is a "sex offender” under SORNA.”
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b) — 1 case
United States v. Ramirez (9th Cir. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(1) — 1 case
United States v. Xavier Josey (3rd Cir. 2025).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(1)(A) — 6 cases
United States v. Booker Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Clovis Schexnayder (5th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Rasaan Larrier (11th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Michael Bevins, 430 F. App'x 550 (8th Cir. 2011).
United States v. Charles Adams (7th Cir. 2014).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(1)(C) — 10 cases
United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014). “The Applicability of the Sentencing Enhancement Because we have determined that Lott was in failure-to-register status, we turn to Lott’s argument that the district court committed procedural error by imposing an eight-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C),…”
United States v. Jason Kokinda, 93 F.4th 635 (4th Cir. 2024).
United States v. Rene Ramirez Gomez, 129 F.4th 954 (6th Cir. 2025). “§ 20911 (5), a provision of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), defines “sex offense” in multiple ways—including “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”
United States v. Romeo, 385 F. App'x 45 (2d Cir. 2010).
United States v. Pedro Ramirez, 677 F. App'x 575 (11th Cir. 2017).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(2) — 5 cases
United States v. Forster, 549 F. App'x 757 (10th Cir. 2013). “Forster contests the court’s conclusion that he should be considered a Tier III sex offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5 and its denial of a three-level reduction for his purportedly having voluntarily corrected his registration in December 2010.”
United States v. Ruben Prieto, 801 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2015). “In his written objections to the PSR, Prieto argued that he was entitled to a three-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(2), for voluntarily correcting the failure to register.”
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Diaz, 313 F. App'x 735 (5th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Green, 505 F. App'x 65 (2d Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(2)(A) — 3 cases
United States v. Jeffrey Stock, 685 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012). “” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a). “‘Tier I offender’, ‘Tier II offender’, and ‘Tier III offender’ have the meaning given those terms in 42 U.”
United States v. Diaz, 313 F. App'x 735 (5th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Kirk White, 710 F. App'x 109 (3rd Cir. 2018).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(2)(B) — 2 cases
United States v. Jack Copeland (5th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Green, 505 F. App'x 65 (2d Cir. 2012).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(l) — 1 case
United States v. Martinez Rodriguez, 508 F. App'x 573 (8th Cir. 2013).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(l)(A) — 4 cases
United States v. Brian Johnson, 743 F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 2014). “Johnson’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a)(l) was sixteen because he had been required to register as a Tier III sex offender.”
United States v. Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011). “The PSR found a base offense level of 16 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(a)(l), since Conca was classified as a Tier III Sex Offender under the provisions of 42 U.”
United States v. Jon Leslie Williams, 578 F. App'x 872 (11th Cir. 2014).
United States v. James Kozohorsky, 708 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2013).
— U.S.S.G. §2A3.5(b)(l)(C) — 6 cases
United States v. Charles Mulverhill, 833 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016). “2011) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5). 3 . Mulverhill concedes that he is a "sex offender” under SORNA.”
United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014). “The Applicability of the Sentencing Enhancement Because we have determined that Lott was in failure-to-register status, we turn to Lott’s argument that the district court committed procedural error by imposing an eight-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(C),…”
United States v. Romeo, 385 F. App'x 45 (2d Cir. 2010).
United States v. Martinez Rodriguez, 508 F. App'x 573 (8th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Goguen, 218 F. Supp. 3d 111 (D. Me. 2016).
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