U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2

Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History

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(a) Prior Sentence

(1) The term "prior sentence" means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.

(2) If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether those sentences are counted separately or treated as a single sentence. Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). For purposes of this provision, a traffic stop is not an intervening arrest. If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Treat any prior sentence covered by subparagraph (A) or (B) as a single sentence. See also §4A1.1(d).

For purposes of applying §4A1.1(a), (b), and (c), if prior sentences are treated as a single sentence, use the longest sentence of imprisonment if concurrent sentences were imposed. If consecutive sentences were imposed, use the aggregate sentence of imprisonment.

(3) A conviction for which the imposition or execution of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior sentence under §4A1.1(c).

(4) Where a defendant has been convicted of an offense, but not yet sentenced, such conviction shall be counted as if it constituted a prior sentence under §4A1.1(c) if a sentence resulting from that conviction otherwise would be countable. In the case of a conviction for an offense set forth in §4A1.2(c)(1), apply this provision only where the sentence for such offense would be countable regardless of type or length.

"Convicted of an offense," for the purposes of this provision, means that the guilt of the defendant has been established, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.

(b) Sentence of Imprisonment Defined

(1) The term "sentence of imprisonment" means a sentence of incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed.

(2) If part of a sentence of imprisonment was suspended, "sentence of imprisonment" refers only to the portion that was not suspended.

Sentences for all felony offenses are counted. Sentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted, except as follows:

(1) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense:

Careless or reckless driving
Contempt of court
Disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace
Driving without a license or with a revoked or suspended license
False information to a police officer
Gambling
Hindering or failure to obey a police officer
Insufficient funds check
Leaving the scene of an accident
Non-support
Prostitution
Resisting arrest
Trespassing.

(2) Sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are never counted:

Fish and game violations
Hitchhiking
Juvenile status offenses and truancy
Local ordinance violations (except those violations that are also violations under state criminal law)
Loitering
Minor traffic infractions (e.g., speeding)
Public intoxication
Vagrancy.

(d) Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen

(1) If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, add 3 points under §4A1.1(a) for each such sentence.

(2) In any other case,

(A) add 2 points under §4A1.1(b) for each adult or juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense;

(B) add 1 point under §4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense not covered in subparagraph (A).

(e) Applicable Time Period

(1) Any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted. Also count any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, whenever imposed, that resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period.

(2) Any other prior sentence that was imposed within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted.

(3) Any prior sentence not within the time periods specified above is not counted.

(4) The applicable time period for certain sentences resulting from offenses committed prior to age eighteen is governed by §4A1.2(d)(2).

(f) Diversionary Dispositions

Diversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution) is not counted. A diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt, or a plea of nolo contendere, in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under §4A1.1(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered, except that diversion from juvenile court is not counted.

(g) Military Sentences

Sentences resulting from military offenses are counted if imposed by a general or special court-martial. Sentences imposed by a summary court-martial or Article 15 proceeding are not counted.

(h) Foreign Sentences

Sentences resulting from foreign convictions are not counted.

(i) Tribal Court Sentences

Sentences resulting from tribal court convictions are not counted.

(j) Expunged Convictions

Sentences for expunged convictions are not counted.

(k) Revocations of Probation, Parole, Mandatory Release, or Supervised Release

(1) In the case of a prior revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release, add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total is used to compute the criminal history points for §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), as applicable.

(2) Revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release may affect the time period under which certain sentences are counted as provided in §4A1.2(d)(2) and (e). For the purposes of determining the applicable time period, use the following: (A) in the case of an adult term of imprisonment totaling more than one year and one month, the date of last release from incarceration on such sentence (see §4A1.2(e)(1)); (B) in the case of any other confinement sentence for an offense committed prior to the defendant's eighteenth birthday, the date of the defendant's last release from confinement on such sentence (see §4A1.2(d)(2)(A)); and (C) in any other case, the date of the original sentence (see §4A1.2(d)(2)(B) and (e)(2)).

(l) Sentences on Appeal

Prior sentences under appeal are counted except as expressly provided below. In the case of a prior sentence, the execution of which has been stayed pending appeal, §4A1.1(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) shall apply as if the execution of such sentence had not been stayed.

(m) Effect of a Violation Warrant

For the purposes of §4A1.1(e), a defendant who commits the instant offense while a violation warrant from a prior sentence is outstanding (e.g., a probation, parole, or supervised release violation warrant) shall be deemed to be under a criminal justice sentence if that sentence is otherwise countable, even if that sentence would have expired absent such warrant.

(n) Failure to Report for Service of Sentence of Imprisonment

For the purposes of §4A1.1(e), failure to report for service of a sentence of imprisonment shall be treated as an escape from such sentence.

(o) Felony Offense

For the purposes of §4A1.2(c), a “felony offense” means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed.

(p) Crime of Violence Defined

For the purposes of §4A1.1(d), the definition of "crime of violence" is that set forth in §4B1.2(a).

Commentary

Application Notes:

1. Prior Sentence.—"Prior sentence" means a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part of the instant offense. See §4A1.2(a). A sentence imposed after the defendant's commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense. Conduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).

Under §4A1.2(a)(4), a conviction for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced is treated as if it were a prior sentence under §4A1.1(c) if a sentence resulting from such conviction otherwise would have been counted. In the case of an offense set forth in §4A1.2(c)(1) (which lists certain misdemeanor and petty offenses), a conviction for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced is treated as if it were a prior sentence under §4A1.2(a)(4) only where the offense is similar to the instant offense (because sentences for other offenses set forth in §4A1.2(c)(1) are counted only if they are of a specified type and length).

2. Sentence of Imprisonment.—To qualify as a sentence of imprisonment, the defendant must have actually served a period of imprisonment on such sentence (or, if the defendant escaped, would have served time). See §4A1.2(a)(3) and (b)(2). For the purposes of applying §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), the length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated maximum (e.g., in the case of a determinate sentence of five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence of one to five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence for a term not to exceed five years, the stated maximum is five years; in the case of an indeterminate sentence for a term not to exceed the defendant's twenty-first birthday, the stated maximum is the amount of time in pre-trial detention plus the amount of time between the date of sentence and the defendant's twenty-first birthday). That is, criminal history points are based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time actually served. See §4A1.2(b)(1) and (2). A sentence of probation is to be treated as a sentence under §4A1.1(c) unless a condition of probation requiring imprisonment of at least sixty days was imposed.

3. Application of "Single Sentence" Rule (Subsection (a)(2)).—In some cases, multiple prior sentences are treated as a single sentence for purposes of calculating the criminal history score under §4A1.1(a), (b), and (c). However, for purposes of determining predicate offenses, a prior sentence included in the single sentence should be treated as if it received criminal history points, if it independently would have received criminal history points. Therefore, an individual prior sentence may serve as a predicate under the career offender guideline (see §4B1.2(c)) or other guidelines with predicate offenses, if it independently would have received criminal history points. However, because predicate offenses may be used only if they are counted "separately" from each other (see §4B1.2(c)), no more than one prior sentence in a given single sentence may be used as a predicate offense.

For example, a defendant's criminal history includes one robbery conviction and one theft conviction. The sentences for these offenses were imposed on the same day, eight years ago, and are treated as a single sentence under §4A1.2(a)(2). If the defendant received a one-year sentence of imprisonment for the robbery and a two-year sentence of imprisonment for the theft, to be served concurrently, a total of 3 points is added under §4A1.1(a). Because this particular robbery met the definition of a felony crime of violence and independently would have received 2 criminal history points under §4A1.1(b), it may serve as a predicate under the career offender guideline.

Note, however, that if the sentences in the example above were imposed thirteen years ago, the robbery independently would have received no criminal history points under §4A1.1(b), because it was not imposed within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense. See §4A1.2(e)(2). Accordingly, it may not serve as a predicate under the career offender guideline.

4. Sentences Imposed in the Alternative.—A sentence which specifies a fine or other non-incarcerative disposition as an alternative to a term of imprisonment (e.g., $1,000 fine or ninety days' imprisonment) is treated as a non-imprisonment sentence.

5. Sentences for Driving While Intoxicated or Under the Influence.—Convictions for driving while intoxicated or under the influence (and similar offenses by whatever name they are known) are always counted, without regard to how the offense is classified. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of §4A1.2(c) do not apply.

6. Reversed, Vacated, or Invalidated Convictions.—Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law or because of subsequently discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case are not to be counted. With respect to the current sentencing proceeding, this guideline and commentary do not confer upon the defendant any right to attack collaterally a prior conviction or sentence beyond any such rights otherwise recognized in law (e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 851 expressly provides that a defendant may collaterally attack certain prior convictions).

7. Offenses Committed Prior to Age Eighteen.—Section 4A1.2(d) covers offenses committed prior to age eighteen. Attempting to count every juvenile adjudication would have the potential for creating large disparities due to the differential availability of records. Therefore, for offenses committed prior to age eighteen, only those that resulted in adult sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, or resulted in imposition of an adult or juvenile sentence or release from confinement on that sentence within five years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense are counted. To avoid disparities from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the age at which a defendant is considered a "juvenile," this provision applies to all offenses committed prior to age eighteen.

8. Applicable Time Period.—Section 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e) establishes the time period within which prior sentences are counted. As used in §4A1.2(d)(2) and (e), the term “commencement of the instant offense” includes any relevant conduct. See §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).

9. Diversionary Dispositions.—Section 4A1.2(f) requires counting prior adult diversionary dispositions if they involved a judicial determination of guilt or an admission of guilt in open court. This reflects a policy that defendants who receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes should not be treated with further leniency.

10. Convictions Set Aside or Defendant Pardoned.—A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous convictions may be set aside or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law, e.g., in order to restore civil rights or to remove the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be counted. However, expunged convictions are not counted. §4A1.2(j).

11. Revocations to be Considered.—Section 4A1.2(k) covers revocations of probation and other conditional sentences where the original term of imprisonment imposed, if any, did not exceed one year and one month. Rather than count the original sentence and the resentence after revocation as separate sentences, the sentence given upon revocation should be added to the original sentence of imprisonment, if any, and the total should be counted as if it were one sentence. By this approach, no more than three points will be assessed for a single conviction, even if probation or conditional release was subsequently revoked. If the sentence originally imposed, the sentence imposed upon revocation, or the total of both sentences exceeded one year and one month, the maximum three points would be assigned. If, however, at the time of revocation another sentence was imposed for a new criminal conviction, that conviction would be computed separately from the sentence imposed for the revocation.

Where a revocation applies to multiple sentences, and such sentences are counted separately under §4A1.2(a)(2), add the term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation to the sentence that will result in the greatest increase in criminal history points. Example: A defendant was serving two probationary sentences, each counted separately under §4A1.2(a)(2); probation was revoked on both sentences as a result of the same violation conduct; and the defendant was sentenced to a total of 45 days of imprisonment. If one sentence had been a "straight" probationary sentence and the other had been a probationary sentence that had required service of 15 days of imprisonment, the revocation term of imprisonment (45 days) would be added to the probationary sentence that had the 15-day term of imprisonment. This would result in a total of 2 criminal history points under §4A1.1(b) (for the combined 60-day term of imprisonment) and 1 criminal history point under §4A1.1(c) (for the other probationary sentence).

12. Application of Subsection (c).—

(A) In General.—In determining whether an unlisted offense is similar to an offense listed in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2), the court should use a common sense approach that includes consideration of relevant factors such as (i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense; (iv) the level of culpability involved; and (v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct.

(B) Local Ordinance Violations.— A number of local jurisdictions have enacted ordinances covering certain offenses (e.g., larceny and assault misdemeanors) that are also violations of state criminal law. This enables a local court (e.g., a municipal court) to exercise jurisdiction over such offenses. Such offenses are excluded from the definition of local ordinance violations in §4A1.2(c)(2) and, therefore, sentences for such offenses are to be treated as if the defendant had been convicted under state law.

(C) Insufficient Funds Check.—"Insufficient funds check," as used in §4A1.2(c)(1), does not include any conviction establishing that the defendant used a false name or non-existent account.

Background: Prior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not imposed.

Historical Note: Effective November 1, 1987. Amended effective November 1, 1989 (amendments 262–265); November 1, 1990 (amendments 352 and 353); November 1, 1991 (amendments 381 and 382); November 1, 1992 (amendment 472); November 1, 1993 (amendment 493); November 1, 2007 (amendment 709); November 1, 2010 (amendment 742); November 1, 2011 (amendment 758); November 1, 2012 (amendment 766); November 1, 2013 (amendment 777); November 1, 2015 (amendment 795); November 1, 2018 (amendment 813); November 1, 2023 (amendment 821); November 1, 2024 (amendment 831); November 1, 2025 (amendments 832 and 836).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 3,637 cases (314 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2008).

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United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3rd Cir. 2008). · cites it 16× “" U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 7. Therefore, for offenses committed prior to age eighteen, the Guidelines comments limit criminal history points to "those that resulted in adult sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, or resulted in imposition of an adult or…”

United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82 (3rd Cir. 2008). · cites it 20× “U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. n. 3. Based on the record before the Court, it is undisputed that Wood's commission of the prior offenses at issue was not separated by intervening arrests, nor did they occur on the same occasion or as part of the same scheme or plan.”

United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2012). · cites it 14× “2(a)(1). The Application Note to this section of the Guidelines further defines “prior sentence” as referring to “a sentence imposed prior to sentencing on the instant offense.”

United States v. Alba-Flores, 577 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2009). · cites it 28× “1 and USSG § 4A1.2. The former sets forth the number of points to be added to a defendant's criminal history category, and the latter defines terms used in the former.”

United States v. Gonzales, 506 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 18× “" U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. As used in computing criminal history, "`sentence of imprisonment' means a sentence of incarceration and .”

Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2016). · cites it 8× “7 felony conviction), or under federal law, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (excluding prior non‐felony offenses for purposes of calculating a Guidelines level if they appear on a list of petty offenses or are “similar to [those offenses appearing on the list]” unless “(A) the sentence…”

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010). · cites it 9× “2(k) applies to "revocation of probation, parole, or a similar form of release.”

United States of Am.,plaintiff-Appellee v. Reynaldo Lopez-Pastrana,defendant-Appellant, 244 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2001). · cites it 19× “1998), we held that "a defendant’s prior sentence is unimportant under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).” This holding conflicts with Martinez (Clyde) , which instructs us to consider the severity of the penalty for the prior offense when determining whether that conviction is similar to a…”

United States v. Larry Roscoe McGlocklin, 8 F.3d 1037 (6th Cir. 1993). · cites it 12× “Also, if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in the criminal history score.”

United States v. Giovanni Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). · cites it 17× “” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 2. In addition, [Revocation of .”

United States v. Marler, 527 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2008). · cites it 14× “His second contention is that the robbery conspiracy is related to the instant offense of the possession of the firearm. I. Escape and Conspiracy Convictions The criminal history guidelines are based on the principle that “[a] defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior…”

United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999). · cites it 14× “” 5 See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, application note 6. The Guidelines thus appear to preserve the dichotomy between resen-tencing after a conviction has been vacated and resentencing after a sentence has been vacated but the conviction left intact.”

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United States v. Gonzales, 506 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007). “" U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. As used in computing criminal history, "`sentence of imprisonment' means a sentence of incarceration and .”

Javier Arellano Hernandez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Martinez, 418 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 643 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2011).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(b)(2) — 51 cases

United States v. Lester Barnes, 822 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143 (6th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Miguel Monzo, 852 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2017).

United States v. Fermin Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002 (5th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Lajai Pridgette, 831 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2016).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(b)(l) — 28 cases

Chadrick Calvin Cole v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Kendal Ray Williams, AKA Wren, AKA Paris Carpenter, 291 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2002).

United States v. Kathleen Kremser Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011).

United States v. Bruce Loren Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1993).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c) — 222 cases

Nowakowski v. New York, 835 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2016). “7 felony conviction), or under federal law, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) (excluding prior non‐felony offenses for purposes of calculating a Guidelines level if they appear on a list of petty offenses or are “similar to [those offenses appearing on the list]” unless “(A) the sentence…”

United States v. Grob, 625 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Mendez-Lopez, 338 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2003).

United States of Am.,plaintiff-Appellee v. Reynaldo Lopez-Pastrana,defendant-Appellant, 244 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2001). “1998), we held that "a defendant’s prior sentence is unimportant under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).” This holding conflicts with Martinez (Clyde) , which instructs us to consider the severity of the penalty for the prior offense when determining whether that conviction is similar to a…”

Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 2009).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(1) — 211 cases

United States v. Gonzales, 506 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007). “" U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. As used in computing criminal history, "`sentence of imprisonment' means a sentence of incarceration and .”

United States v. Hall, 531 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Wahid, 614 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Justin Hawley, 919 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2019).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(1)(A) — 20 cases

United States v. Alba-Flores, 577 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2009). “1 and USSG § 4A1.2. The former sets forth the number of points to be added to a defendant's criminal history category, and the latter defines terms used in the former.”

United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2010).

United States v. Jon Tomasi, AKA John Tomasi, Jimmy Tomasi, AKA James Tomasi, & Frank Barrett, AKA Skip Barrett, 313 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 2002).

United States v. Raul Ramirez, 421 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2005).

United States v. Marco Damico, 99 F.3d 1431 (7th Cir. 1996).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(1)(B) — 4 cases

United States v. Washington, 103 F.4th 917 (2d Cir. 2024).

United States v. James McWhorter, 515 F. App'x 511 (6th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Sanford (2d Cir. 2020).

United States v. Garrett, Chaz (7th Cir. 2008).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(2) — 117 cases

United States v. Lock, Alfred, 466 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2006).

United States v. David Barnes, 883 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2018).

United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Wahid, 614 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Pinkham, 896 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2018).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(2016) — 1 case

United States v. Edmonds, 326 F. Supp. 3d 113 (E.D. Va. 2018).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(l) — 159 cases

United States v. Julius Randolph Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211 (8th Cir. 1995).

United States v. Mardisco Staples & Delwin Brown, 202 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Bonnie Hooks, 65 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 1995).

United States v. Rodney Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183 (8th Cir. 1994).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(l)(A) — 18 cases

United States v. Raul Ramirez, 421 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2005).

United States v. Jon Tomasi, AKA John Tomasi, Jimmy Tomasi, AKA James Tomasi, & Frank Barrett, AKA Skip Barrett, 313 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 2002).

United States v. Castro, 279 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2002).

United States of Am. v. Donald Paul Rosenkrans, 236 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2001).

United States v. Grundy, 178 F. App'x 509 (6th Cir. 2006).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(c)(l)(B) — 5 cases

United States v. Susan S. Hall, 71 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 1995).

United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Barron D. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1990).

United States v. James McWhorter, 515 F. App'x 511 (6th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Caesar, 124 F. App'x 60 (2d Cir. 2005).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d) — 105 cases

United States v. William Anthony Johnson (04-5110/6161) & Christopher L. Stone (04-5146), 440 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2006).

Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).

United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Reco Vondell Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

United States v. William Nielsen, 694 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2012).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d)(1) — 31 cases

United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Malik Driskell, Also Known as Max Del Valle, 277 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002).

United States v. Lavern Moorer, 383 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 2004).

United States v. Leonel Miller Hinojosa, Jr., 67 F.4th 334 (6th Cir. 2023).

United States v. Ramone Williams, 899 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2018).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d)(2) — 47 cases

United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Sampson Williams, A/K/A MacKey Sampson, 989 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Thompson, 586 F.3d 1035 (6th Cir. 2009).

United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Reco Vondell Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d)(2)(A) — 77 cases

United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 1997).

Darron Howard v. United States, 743 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Ilarraza, 963 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020).

United States v. Bernard C. Birch, Jr., AKA Chubby, 39 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 1994).

United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d)(2)(B) — 43 cases

United States v. James Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2018).

United States v. Ilarraza, 963 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020).

United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Ricardo McKoy, 452 F.3d 234 (3rd Cir. 2006).

United States v. Archuleta, 865 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(d)(l) — 26 cases

United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Robert Rodriguez Carrillo, United States of Am. v. Carlos Alonzo Garcia, 991 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Brian Jones, 415 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2005).

United States v. Conca, 635 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2011).

State v. Rideout, 933 A.2d 706 (Vt. 2007).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e) — 292 cases

United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Robert Dean Ellsworth, 456 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2006).

United States v. William Anthony Johnson (04-5110/6161) & Christopher L. Stone (04-5146), 440 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2006).

United States v. Kaya Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1991).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(1) — 176 cases

United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 633 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Rasheem Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3rd Cir. 2022).

Hayes Barker v. United States, 7 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Apolonio Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 2020).

United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2011).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(11) — 1 case

United States v. Edward Carter, 374 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2004).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(2) — 146 cases

United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2007).

United States v. McGee, 494 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Burman, 666 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2009).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(3) — 54 cases

United States v. John William Hall, 965 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2020).

United States v. Belanger, 890 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2018).

United States v. Jerry Wayne Matheny, Jr., 450 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2006).

United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Donald Lee Presley, 52 F.3d 64 (4th Cir. 1995).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(4) — 2 cases

United States v. Raymond Elmore, 108 F.3d 23 (3rd Cir. 1997).

United States v. Elmore (3rd Cir. 1997).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(S) — 1 case

United States v. Arnold, 213 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 2000).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(i) — 1 case

United States v. Bobby R. Williams, 494 F. App'x 639 (7th Cir. 2012).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(l) — 174 cases

United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Lester Barnes, 822 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Myles J. Connor, Jr., 950 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1991).

United States v. Gerald Lee Fletcher, 15 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1994).

United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2006).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e)(l)(B) — 1 case

United States v. Lock, Alfred, 466 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2006).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(f) — 110 cases

United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States v. Gonzalo De Jesus Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514 (11th Cir. 1996).

United States v. DiPina, 178 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 1999).

United States v. Mike Coffelt, 749 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2014).

United States v. James Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2018).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(g) — 7 cases

Gurson Gourzong v. Attorney Gen. United States, 826 F.3d 132 (3rd Cir. 2016).

United States v. Carlos Moreno-Cisneros, 319 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2003).

United States v. John W. Martinez, 122 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Lee Terry, 930 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1991).

United States v. Freddie Grant, 753 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2014).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(h) — 23 cases

United States v. Alan Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003).

United States v. Mohammad Azeem, Also Known as Khan Azim, 946 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1991).

United States v. Dayne Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978 (8th Cir. 2023).

United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Robert Harry Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110 (3rd Cir. 1992).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(i) — 24 cases

United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Leon Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).

United States v. Jarod White, 840 F.3d 550 (8th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Bullcoming, 579 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(j) — 77 cases

United States v. Hines, 133 F.3d 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).

United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k) — 50 cases

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010). “2(k) applies to "revocation of probation, parole, or a similar form of release.”

United States v. James Lloyd, 807 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Giovanni Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). “” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 2. In addition, [Revocation of .”

United States v. Manndrell Lee, 974 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2020).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(1) — 32 cases

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010). “2(k) applies to "revocation of probation, parole, or a similar form of release.”

United States v. Emmanuel Trencell Merritt, 102 F.4th 375 (6th Cir. 2024).

United States v. Blanco, 27 F.4th 375 (5th Cir. 2022).

United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 643 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Rivera-Berrios, 902 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2018).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2) — 12 cases

United States v. Rogelio Ruiz, 777 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Antonio Crawford, 665 F. App'x 539 (7th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Jesus Munoz-Garcia, 533 F. App'x 364 (5th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Ishmael Garrett, 504 F. App'x 132 (3rd Cir. 2012).

United States v. Barry Bays (5th Cir. 2019).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2)(A) — 7 cases

United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 623 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Terry Walker, 905 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 2018).

United States v. William Thomas Semsak, 336 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Terry Walker (7th Cir. 2018).

Whisonant v. USA-2255 (D. Maryland 2020).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2)(B) — 14 cases

United States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Dewey, 599 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Giovanni Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). “” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 2. In addition, [Revocation of .”

United States v. Bruce Loren Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Jerry Craig Coleman, 9 F.3d 1480 (10th Cir. 1993).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2)(B)(i) — 7 cases

United States v. Moreno-Padilla, 602 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Bruce Loren Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1993).

United States v. Willie F. Parson III, 288 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2002).

United States v. Alphonzo Leon Johnson, 205 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2000).

United States v. Talib, 347 F. App'x 934 (4th Cir. 2009).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2)(B)(iii) — 4 cases

United States v. Armijo, 651 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Willie F. Parson III, 288 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2002).

United States v. Donnie Ausby, 410 F. App'x 247 (11th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Morales, 232 F.R.D. 166 (E.D.N.Y 2005).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(2)(C) — 1 case

United States v. Blanco, 27 F.4th 375 (5th Cir. 2022).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(k)(l) — 42 cases

United States v. Dozier, 555 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2009).

United States v. Reginald Reed, 94 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010). “2(k) applies to "revocation of probation, parole, or a similar form of release.”

United States v. Andre Scott Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2003).

United States v. Giovanni Ramirez, 347 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). “” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 2. In addition, [Revocation of .”

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(l) — 5 cases

United States v. Jose Madrid-Becerra, 14 F.4th 1096 (9th Cir. 2021).

United States v. Owshadram Mohabir, 510 F. App'x 122 (3rd Cir. 2013).

United States v. Lanier (4th Cir. 1996).

United States v. Carter (4th Cir. 1998).

United States v. Charles Brewer (4th Cir. 1999).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(m) — 25 cases

United States v. Raymond Edward Davis, Jr., 313 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).

United States v. Blocker, 612 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Anderson, 184 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 1999).

United States v. Marcus Dwayne McCowan, 469 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2006).

Mateo v. United States, 398 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2005).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(n) — 3 cases

United States v. Casmine Terrence Aska, 314 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2002).

United States v. Fisher, 137 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998).

United States v. Mangham (10th Cir. 1997).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(o) — 20 cases

United States v. David Yepez, 704 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Holm, 745 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Restrepo Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996).

United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2010).

United States v. Michael Gorny, 655 F. App'x 920 (3rd Cir. 2016).

— U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(p) — 6 cases

United States v. Stacy Lee Peltier, 276 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2002).

United States v. William Roy Atkins, 116 F.3d 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

United States v. Lecharles Baldon (9th Cir. 2020).

United States v. Cardona-Garcia (5th Cir. 2024).

United States v. Stacy Lee Peltier (8th Cir. 2002).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.