The circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter and shall hear and decide such suits without the intervention of a jury, except as otherwise provided in § 29-20-313(b); provided, that in counties having a population of more than eight hundred fifty thousand (850,000), according to the 2000 federal census or any subsequent federal census, the general sessions court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with such circuit court over any action brought under this chapter; and provided further, that the jurisdiction conferred upon the general sessions court by this section shall not extend beyond the jurisdictional dollar limit provided in § 16-15-501(d) for such general sessions courts in civil cases generally.
Acts 1973, ch. 345, § 16; T.C.A., § 23-3319; Acts 1981, ch. 527, § 4; 1994, ch. 789, § 1; 2011 , ch. 180, § 2.
Notes of Decisions
Brown v. City of Memphis, 440 F. Supp. 2d 868 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
· cites it 5× “However, the opinion treats supplemental jurisdiction as an extra-constitutional power, and as such one that “cannot stand in the face of limitations upon suability specified in Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-307.” Id. at 1067.”
Lopez v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 646 F. Supp. 2d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
· cites it 6× “In light of the foregoing, the cross Motions for Summary Judgment on the claims of negligence asserted against Defendants Metro and Genesis will be denied.”
David G. Young v. City of Lafollette, 479 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. 2015).
· cites it 4× “§ 29-20-307 (2012). The trial court requested that the parties submit written briefs on the issue, and the City ■ subsequently moved to strike Mr.”
Beddingfield v. City of Pulaski, Tenn., 666 F. Supp. 1064 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
· cites it 6× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307 requires that actions for negligence against governmental entities are within the, “exclusive original jurisdiction” of the circuit courts and must be heard “without the intervention of a jury.”
P.G. v. Rutherford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 3d 891 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
· cites it 2× “" Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307 . This expresses a clear preference from the Tennessee legislature that claims under the GTLA be handled by state courts.”
Roberts v. Robertson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 692 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 2× “1 In accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-307, the trial court heard the proof without a jury on December 8 and 9, 1983.”
Flowers v. Dyer Cnty., 830 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1992).
· cites it 4× “Additionally, T.C.A. § 29-20-307 specifically sets forth that the circuit courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action under the GTLA.”
Holloran v. Duncan, 92 F. Supp. 3d 774 (W.D. Tenn. 2015).
· cites it 2× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-307. This provision indicates a “clear preference that [GTLA] claims be handled by [Tennessee’s] own state courts.”
Epperson v. City of Humboldt, 140 F. Supp. 3d 676 (W.D. Tenn. 2015).
· cites it 2× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-307 .' A district court may, in its discretion, decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim even if jurisdiction would otherwise be proper under § 1367(a).”
Arbuckle v. City of Chattanooga, 696 F. Supp. 2d 907 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
· cites it 3× “City of Pulaski Tennessee the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over pendent state law claims of wrongful death and violation of the Tennessee Constitution “in the face of the limitations upon suability specified in Tenn.”
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