Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (2024)
Effect of felonious and intentional killing of decedent
✓ Justia copy: laws through about 2024 (2025 and 2026 sessions missing)
- (a) For purposes of this section:
- (1) "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument;
- (2) "Felonious and intentional killing" or "feloniously and intentionally kills" includes the felonious and intentional act of conspiring with another to kill or procure the killing of an individual decedent;
- (3) "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the decedent; and
- (4) "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination, means one under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation in favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate the decedent in place of the decedent's killer and whether or not the decedent then had capacity to exercise the power.
- (b) An individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer predeceased the decedent.
- (c) The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent:
- (1) Revokes any revocable:
- (A) Disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing instrument;
- (B) Provision in a governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment on the killer; and
- (C) Nomination of the killer in a governing instrument to serve in any fiduciary or representative capacity, including a personal representative, executor, trustee, or agent;
- (2) Severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property held by the decedent and the killer at the time of the killing as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as community property with the right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the decedent and killer into equal tenancies in common; and
- (3) Eliminates any right the perpetrator of the killing otherwise has to file or maintain an action for wrongful death arising out of the death of the decedent or to share in any portion of the proceeds of any wrongful death settlement or judgment resulting from a wrongful death lawsuit.
- (1) Revokes any revocable:
- (d) A severance under subdivision (c)(2) does not affect a third-party interest in property acquired for value and in good faith reliance on an apparent title by survivorship of the killer, unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed, or recorded in records that are:
- (1) Appropriate to the kind and location of the property;
- (2) In the ordinary course of transactions involving the property; and
- (3) Recorded as evidence of ownership.
- (e) Provisions of a governing instrument are to be given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent.
- (f) A wrongful acquisition of property or interest by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit from the killer's wrong.
- (g) A judgment of conviction establishing criminal accountability for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent is conclusive evidence that the individual is the decedent's killer for purposes of this section.
- (h)
- (1)
- (A) Before the payor or other third party receives written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section, the payor or other third party is not liable for having:
- (i) Made a payment or transferred an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument affected by an intentional and felonious killing; or
- (ii) Taken any other action in good faith reliance on the validity of the governing instrument, upon request and satisfactory proof of the decedent's death.
- (B) A payor or other third party is liable for a payment made or action taken after the payor or other third party received written notice sent pursuant to subdivision (h)(2)(A) of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section.
- (A) Before the payor or other third party receives written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section, the payor or other third party is not liable for having:
- (2)
- (A) Written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under subdivision (h)(1) must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by either:
- (i) Registered or certified mail, return receipt requested; or
- (ii) Served upon the payor or other third party in the same manner as a summons in a civil action.
- (B) Upon receipt of written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under this section, a payor or other third party may pay any amount owed or transfer or deposit any item or property held by the payor to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceeding relating to the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been commenced, to or with the court having jurisdiction of the probate proceeding relating to decedents' estates in the county of the decedent's residence.
- (C) The court shall hold the funds or item of property and, upon its determination under this section, shall order disbursement in accordance with the court's determination.
- (D) Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or with the court discharge the payor or other third party from all claims for the value of amounts paid to or items of property transferred to or deposited with the court.
- (A) Written notice of a claimed forfeiture or revocation under subdivision (h)(1) must be mailed to the payor's or other third party's main office or home by either:
- (1)
- (i)
- (1)
- (A) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (i)(2), a person who purchases property for value and without notice, or who receives a payment or other item of property in partial or full satisfaction of a legally enforceable obligation, is not obligated under this section to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, and is not liable under this section for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit.
- (B) A person who, not for value, receives a payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit to the person who is entitled to it under this section.
- (2) If this section is preempted by federal law with respect to a payment, an item of property, or any other benefit covered by this section, a person who, not for value, receives the payment, item of property, or any other benefit to which the person is not entitled under this section is obligated to return the payment, item of property, or benefit, or is personally liable for the amount of the payment or the value of the item of property or benefit, to the person who would have been entitled to it as if this section was not preempted.
- (1)
Amended by 2019 Tenn. Acts, ch. 101,s 1, eff. 4/11/2019.
Amended by 2017 Tenn. Acts, ch. 290,s 8, eff. 7/1/2017.
Acts 1976, ch. 538, § 8; T.C.A., § 31-117.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 26
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1985–2025 · leading case: March v. Levine, 115 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
March v. Levine, 115 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “The two accounts described are accounts belonging to Janet Gail Levine March, his spouse, and if he is the person who has committed a homicide with regard to her, he cannot receive or inherit any property by virtue of T.C.A. § 31-1-106. Pursuant to T.C.A. § 31-1-106, if Perry A.”
Bolin v. Bolin, 99 S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “e Tennessee Code states: Any person who shall kill, or conspire with another to kill, or procure to be killed, any other person from which the first named person would inherit the property, either real or personal, or any part thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the…”
Brittany Noel Nelson v. Charles W. Myres, 545 S.W.3d 428 (Tenn. 2018). “5 The Court of Appeals has ruled that the "Slayer Statute," Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (1976), would prevent a surviving spouse who intentionally caused the death of the decedent from instituting a wrongful death action.”
Carter v. Hutchison, 707 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). “She based this assertion upon Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-1-106 which she interpreted as applying to persons claiming an inheritance through a slayer in the same way it applies to the slayer himself.”
Hicks v. Boshears, 846 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. 1993). “That legislation, as amended in 1976, is set out in T.C.A. § 31-1-106 (1984) and is declaratory of the common law enunciated in Box v.”
In re The Est. of Wanda Jeanne Starkey, 556 S.W.3d 811 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018). “] Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (c) (Supp. 2017) (emphasis added).”
Moore v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 878 S.W.2d 946 (Tenn. 1994). “This case presents for review summary judgment, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the husband, who was the primary beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the life of his wife, is barred by T.C.A. § 31-1-106 (1984) from receiving the proceeds of the policy because he was…”
Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986). “§ 29-9-1 (1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (1984 Repl.Vol.”
House v. Gibson, 827 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). “Here, however, where the death is alleged to have been the result of an intentional act on the part of the surviving spouse, we must look to the effect of T.C.A. § 31-1-106. This section provides as follows: 31-1-106.”
Cook v. Grierson, 845 A.2d 1231 (Md. 2004). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (1984). LooMng to the statute for guidance, the court noted that the slayer’s statute accomplished two things: first, it provided that the slayer forfeited all rights he might have had in the estate of the deceased, and second, it provided that the…”
Tia Gentry v. Dale Larkin, 389 S.W.3d 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (2007). Rule 60.”
Gerber Life Ins. v. Wallace, 839 F. Supp. 2d 998 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). “This interpleader action presents a straightforward question borne of tragic *999 facts: Does Tennessee’s “Slayer Statute,” Tenn.Code Ann. § 31-1-106, bar insurance recovery by parents charged with criminally negligent homicide in connection with their child’s death? The Court…”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106(a): 1 case
Transamerica Premier Life Ins. Co. v. Guy, 545 F. Supp. 3d 426 (E.D. La. 2021).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106(b): 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Ricky L. Helmick, Jr., No. E2019-02101-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2021).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106(e): 1 case
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Reed, No. 3:20-cv-00506 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2023).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.