Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (2026)

Requirement of culpable mental state

✓ current as of May 2026
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Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1990, ch. 1030, §§ 6, 7.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 284 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006).
State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). · cites it 4× “" See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2). Thus, the jury was, in essence, instructed that it must be the Defendant's "conscious objective or desire" to commit the rape in order to be convicted of felony murder.”
State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). · cites it 11× “This general proposition is embodied in our criminal code in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (1997). This statute provides in relevant part: (a)(1) A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense…”
State of Tennessee v. Fred Chad Clark, II, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014). · cites it 4× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (c). The statutory actus reus of this crime differs from the actus reus of rape of a child in a significant respect.”
State of Tennessee v. Marlo Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2015). · cites it 4× “The Defendant has cited us to no authority for this proposition, and we are aware of none.”
State v. Ballinger, 93 S.W.3d 881 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). · cites it 8× “Because there is no requirement in the statute that the proscribed sexual penetration be unlawful, and because consent of the victim is no defense, a gynecological or proctologieal examination of a child between thirteen and seventeen years of age is literally prohibited by the…”
State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). · cites it 8× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301; Tenn.Code Ann.”
State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). · cites it 4× “One such reference is found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (1991): (a)(1) A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense requires, with respect to each element of the offense.”
State of Tennessee v. Willie Duncan, 505 S.W.3d 480 (Tenn. 2016). · cites it 4× “Fayne, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c), “‘intent, knowledge^] or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable mental state’ ” for the offense.”
State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395 (Tenn. 2009). · cites it 4× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (2006); see also State v.”
State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn. 1998). · cites it 4× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (1991)("When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.”
State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). · cites it 8× “This doctrine of "transferred intent" is therefore clearly inconsistent with the concept of culpability under the Model Code.”
State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2001). · cites it 2× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (2000). 13 .”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(2) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ashley (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Joe Gentry (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(1) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2) — 40 cases
State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). “" See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2). Thus, the jury was, in essence, instructed that it must be the Defendant's "conscious objective or desire" to commit the rape in order to be convicted of felony murder.”
State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2001). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (2000). 13 .”
State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001).
State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Marlo Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2015). “The Defendant has cited us to no authority for this proposition, and we are aware of none.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(a)(2)(c) — 1 case
State v. Ferrell, 277 S.W.3d 372 (Tenn. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(b) — 13 cases
State of Tennessee v. Dylan Brewer (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
State of Tennessee v. Andy L. Allman (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).
State of Tennessee v. Eugenio Gomez Ruiz (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).
State of Tennessee v. Margaret L. Holt (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(c) — 98 cases
State of Tennessee v. Willie Duncan, 505 S.W.3d 480 (Tenn. 2016). “Fayne, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c), “‘intent, knowledge^] or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable mental state’ ” for the offense.”
State of Tennessee v. Fred Chad Clark, II, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (c). The statutory actus reus of this crime differs from the actus reus of rape of a child in a significant respect.”
Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998).
State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301; Tenn.Code Ann.”
State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). “One such reference is found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (1991): (a)(1) A person commits an offense who acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the definition of the offense requires, with respect to each element of the offense.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(e) — 1 case
State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-301; Tenn.Code Ann.”
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