Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402 (2026)
Criminal responsibility for conduct of another
✓ current as of May 2026
A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if:
- (1) Acting with the culpability required for the offense, the person causes or aids an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;
- (2) Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense; or
- (3) Having a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, or to promote or assist its commission, the person fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 747
cases (81 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 (Tenn. 2002).
State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 (Tenn. 2002). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402 states in relevant part that "A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if .”
State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004). “" Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402 (1997). Significantly, facilitation requires the lack of criminal responsibility intent.”
State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). “Therefore, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was criminally responsible for the victim's murder even if Mario had been the one to actually stab her.”
State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn. 2002). “§ 39-11-402. Indeed, "[s]ubdivision (2) [of TENN.”
State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2005). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402. Irregardless of this identification, there was ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant Thomas was guilty of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of a…”
State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370 (Tenn. 2011). “]” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997). “[U]nder the theory of criminal responsibility, presence and companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the crime are circumstances from which an individual’s participation may be inferred.”
State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). “BURNS on or about the 18th day of December, 1994, thereby becoming criminally responsible for the aforesaid conduct of MICHAEL SPADAFINA and VITO LICARI (T.C.A. 39-11-402) and committing the offense of First-degree MURDER, in violation of T.”
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., 413 S.W.3d 735 (Tenn. 2013). “§ 39-12-101(a)(3) (2010); and, if so, (3) whether Ramirez acted with sufficient premeditation in his attempts to kill Hardin and Christopher Lyons within the meaning of TenmCode Ann.”
State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2002). “" Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2). [2] The dissenting opinion concludes that the evidence does not support an instruction on facilitation.”
State v. Carson, 950 S.W.2d 951 (Tenn. 1997). “The issue presented by this appeal is whether the defendant, who assisted his co-defendants in committing an aggravated robbery, was criminally responsible under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402 (2) for additional offenses committed by them.”
State v. Maxey, 898 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “The Circuit Court at Maury County entered a jury verdict finding Donna Maxey 1 guilty of the crime of the rape of a child pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-11-402 (1991) and T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (Supp.”
State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1999). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402 (1991). As reflected in this case, criminal responsibility is not a separate, distinct crime.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(1) — 7 cases
State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). “BURNS on or about the 18th day of December, 1994, thereby becoming criminally responsible for the aforesaid conduct of MICHAEL SPADAFINA and VITO LICARI (T.C.A. 39-11-402) and committing the offense of First-degree MURDER, in violation of T.”
State v. Guy, 165 S.W.3d 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004).
State of Tennessee v. Deshaun Jantuan Lewis (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel P. Carson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Mack Tremaine Jones (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) — 421 cases
State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 (Tenn. 2002). “Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-402 states in relevant part that "A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if .”
State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. 2004). “" Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402 (1997). Significantly, facilitation requires the lack of criminal responsibility intent.”
State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). “Therefore, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was criminally responsible for the victim's murder even if Mario had been the one to actually stab her.”
State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370 (Tenn. 2011). “]” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (1997). “[U]nder the theory of criminal responsibility, presence and companionship with the perpetrator of a felony before and after the commission of the crime are circumstances from which an individual’s participation may be inferred.”
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Dickson, Jr., 413 S.W.3d 735 (Tenn. 2013). “§ 39-12-101(a)(3) (2010); and, if so, (3) whether Ramirez acted with sufficient premeditation in his attempts to kill Hardin and Christopher Lyons within the meaning of TenmCode Ann.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(3) — 11 cases
State v. Hodges, 7 S.W.3d 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999). “BURNS on or about the 18th day of December, 1994, thereby becoming criminally responsible for the aforesaid conduct of MICHAEL SPADAFINA and VITO LICARI (T.C.A. 39-11-402) and committing the offense of First-degree MURDER, in violation of T.”
Anthony Hodges v. Tony Parker, 493 F. App'x 704 (6th Cir. 2012).
State of Tennessee v. Donald Lee Harris (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
William D. Crowder v. Tre Hargett (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(3)(1989) — 1 case
State v. Jackson, 944 P.2d 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(a) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Keith Hughes, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2024).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(a)(2) — 3 cases
Chivous S. Robinson v. State of Tennessee (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014).
State of Tennessee v. Donald W. Higgins, III (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. Genore Dancy (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(a)(3) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Donald W. Higgins, III (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(b) — 4 cases
State v. Hicks, 835 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
State v. Ball (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
State v. John Charles Johnson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
State v. Seria D. Ward (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.