Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501 (2026)

Definitions for Sections 39-13-501 - 39-13-511

✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in §§ 39-13-501 - 39-13-511, except as specifically provided in § 39-13-505, unless the context otherwise requires:

Amended by 2013 Tenn. Acts, ch. 172, s 1, eff. 7/1/2013.

Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1; 1997 , ch. 256, § 2; 2005, ch. 456, § 1.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 754 cases (95 in the last 5 years), 1992–2026 · leading case: State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628 (Tenn. 2001).
State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628 (Tenn. 2001). · cites it 16× “" Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(2). [4] While the dissent characterizes our reliance upon the plural term used in the statute as a "startling conclusion," the law is clear that the plain language of a statute is the best indication of legislative intent.”
State of Tennessee v. Fred Chad Clark, II, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014). · cites it 11× “] First, this statutory definition explicitly applies to Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501 through-511 — a—range which includes aggravated sexual battery in Tenn.”
State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001). · cites it 6× “” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-502 (1997). By comparison, the elements of sexual battery are as follows: (1) An unlawful sexual contact, defined in Tenn.”
State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. 2003). · cites it 4× “Unlawful sexual contact includes “the intentional touching of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, if…”
State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). · cites it 8× “See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501(1), -503(a)(1), and - 505(a).”
State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578 (Tenn. 2003). · cites it 4× “" Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-501(7) (1997) defines sexual penetration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal…”
Hart v. State, 21 S.W.3d 901 (Tenn. 2000). · cites it 5× “In our analysis of the appellant’s argument, we note that sexual penetration, as defined in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501, means “sexual intercourse, eunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object…”
State v. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. 1997). · cites it 8× “The legislature has included aggravated assault among the "assaultive offenses" set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-101 through -107, while aggravated rape is among the "sexual offenses" listed in Tenn.”
Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998). · cites it 4× “Rather, one must ascertain the requisite mental state by referring to the definitions in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501, found in the same chapter.”
State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1996). · cites it 8× “"Sexual penetration" is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501 (7) as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim's, the…”
State v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). · cites it 4× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) (1991). (Emphasis added).”
State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1999). · cites it 8× “Thus, each of the offenses requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not, and the offenses are not the same under Block-burger. Second, to prove aggravated sexual battery the State must present evidence that the defendant intentionally touched the intimate parts…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(1) — 20 cases
State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501(1), -503(a)(1), and - 505(a).”
State of Tennessee v. Donald Wade Goff (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
State of Tennessee v. Donald Wade Goff (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).
State of Tennessee v. Tarrants Chandler (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(2) — 111 cases
State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628 (Tenn. 2001). “" Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(2). [4] While the dissent characterizes our reliance upon the plural term used in the statute as a "startling conclusion," the law is clear that the plain language of a statute is the best indication of legislative intent.”
State v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 400 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(2010) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(3) — 3 cases
State v. Schaller, 975 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
State v. Kenneth Schaller (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(4) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Cory Lamont Batey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(5) — 4 cases
United States v. Christopher James, 810 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2016).
Boone v. Commonwealth, 155 S.W.3d 727 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
State of Tennessee v. Ladarius Lockhart (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6) — 237 cases
State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628 (Tenn. 2001). “" Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(2). [4] While the dissent characterizes our reliance upon the plural term used in the statute as a "startling conclusion," the law is clear that the plain language of a statute is the best indication of legislative intent.”
State of Tennessee v. Fred Chad Clark, II, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014). “] First, this statutory definition explicitly applies to Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501 through-511 — a—range which includes aggravated sexual battery in Tenn.”
State v. Hayes, 899 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-501(1), -503(a)(1), and - 505(a).”
State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. 2003). “Unlawful sexual contact includes “the intentional touching of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, if…”
State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001). “” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-502 (1997). By comparison, the elements of sexual battery are as follows: (1) An unlawful sexual contact, defined in Tenn.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(6)(2006) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. John Davis (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) — 270 cases
State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578 (Tenn. 2003). “" Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-501(7) (1997) defines sexual penetration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal…”
State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001). “” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-502 (1997). By comparison, the elements of sexual battery are as follows: (1) An unlawful sexual contact, defined in Tenn.”
State of Tennessee v. Lemaricus Devall Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156 (Tenn. 2016).
State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. 2003). “Unlawful sexual contact includes “the intentional touching of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other person’s intimate parts, if…”
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7)(B) — 1 case
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(8) — 4 cases
State v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) (1991). (Emphasis added).”
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dean Guin (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(a) — 1 case
State v. Fitz, 19 S.W.3d 213 (Tenn. 2000).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(a)(1) — 1 case
State v. Jones, 953 S.W.2d 695 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
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