It may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance or substances were possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing. It may be inferred from circumstances indicating a casual exchange among individuals of a small amount of a controlled substance or substances that the controlled substance or substances so exchanged were possessed not with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing in violation of § 39-17-417(a). The inferences shall be transmitted to the jury by the trial judge's charge, and the jury will consider the inferences along with the nature of the substance possessed when affixing the penalty.
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
233
cases (
52 in the last 5 years), 1997–2026 · leading case:
State v. Belew, 348 S.W.3d 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
State v. Belew, 348 S.W.3d 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005).
· cites it 24× “2 Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-419. As part of its sufficiency argument, the State contends that it has no burden to prove the circumstances which give rise to the inference of intent to sell or deliver.”
State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001).
· cites it 4× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-419 (1997); State v.”
State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).
· cites it 8× “T.C.A. § 39-17-419; see also State v. Holt, 691 S.”
State v. Ostein, 293 S.W.3d 519 (Tenn. 2009).
· cites it 2× “” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-419 *530 (2003). The State must also prove, of course, that the substance collected at the scene is the controlled substance alleged and was present in the amounts alleged.”
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Robinson, 400 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. 2013).
· cites it 2× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-17-419 (2006) (stating that possession may be inferred from “relevant facts surrounding the arrest”).”
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Elliot, 366 S.W.3d 139 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
· cites it 4× “” T.C.A. § 39-17-419. Code section 39-12-103 provides: (a) The offense of conspiracy is committed if two (2) or more people, each having the culpable mental state required for the offense that is the object of the conspiracy, and each acting for the purpose of promoting or…”
State v. Hayes, 337 S.W.3d 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “” T.C.A. § 39-17-419 (Emphasis added); see also State v.”
State of Tennessee v. Jose Amates Martinez, 372 S.W.3d 598 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).
· cites it 2× “§ 39-17-419 (“It may be inferred from the amount of a controlled substance or substances possessed by an offender, along with other relevant facts surrounding the arrest, that the controlled substance ... w[as] possessed with the purpose of selling or otherwise dispensing.”
State v. Chearis, 995 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
“§ 39-17-419. Taking this information in the light most favorable to the state, evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver.”
United States v. Alexander Coleman, 977 F.3d 666 (8th Cir. 2020).
“” Tenn. Code § 39-17-419 (emphasis added). He insists that the use of “dispensing” in section 39-17-419 shows that section 39-17-417 does cover medical professionals’ conduct, and thus is too broad to be a serious drug offense.”
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Brown (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
· cites it 27× “T.C.A. § 39-17-419. First, Brown argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could infer that Brown lacked the intent to sell or deliver drugs based on circumstances indicating a casual exchange.”
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