Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (2026)
Purpose of chapter
✓ current as of May 2026
The foremost purpose of this chapter is to promote justice, as manifested by § 40-35-103. In so doing, the following principles are adopted:
- (1) Every defendant shall be punished by the imposition of a sentence justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense;
- (2) This chapter is to assure fair and consistent treatment of all defendants by eliminating unjustified disparity in sentencing and providing a fair sense of predictability of the criminal law and its sanctions;
- (3) Punishment shall be imposed to prevent crime and promote respect for the law by:
- (A) Providing an effective general deterrent to those likely to violate the criminal laws of this state;
- (B) Restraining defendants with a lengthy history of criminal conduct;
- (C) Encouraging effective rehabilitation of those defendants, where reasonably feasible, by promoting the use of alternative sentencing and correctional programs that elicit voluntary cooperation of defendants; and
- (D) Encouraging restitution to victims where appropriate;
- (4) Sentencing should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender, creed, religion, national origin and social status of the individual;
- (5) In recognition that state prison capacities and the funds to build and maintain them are limited, convicted felons committing the most severe offenses, possessing criminal histories evincing a clear disregard for the laws and morals of society and evincing failure of past efforts at rehabilitation shall be given first priority regarding sentencing involving incarceration; and
- (6)
- (A) A defendant who does not fall within the parameters of subdivision (5), and who is an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted of a Class C, D or E felony, should be considered as a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the contrary; however, a defendant's prior convictions shall be considered evidence to the contrary and, therefore, a defendant who is being sentenced for a third or subsequent felony conviction involving separate periods of incarceration or supervision shall not be considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing;
- (B) As used in subdivision (6)(A), "separate periods of incarceration or supervision" means that the defendant serves and is released or discharged from a period of incarceration or supervision for the commission of a felony prior to committing another felony;
- (C) If a defendant with at least three (3) felony convictions is otherwise eligible, that defendant may still be considered a favorable candidate for any alternative sentencing that is within the jurisdiction of and deemed appropriate by a drug court;
- (D) A court shall consider, but is not bound by, the advisory sentencing guideline in this subdivision (6).
Acts 1989, ch. 591, § 6; 1990, ch. 980, § 21; 1994, ch. 736, § 1; 2005, ch. 353, § 1; 2007, ch. 512, § 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3,076
cases (273 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case: State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991).
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). “Similar to the 1982 Act, the 1989 Act listed its purposes, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (1990), and specifically recognized “that state prison capacities and the funds to build and maintain them are limited.”
State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; See State v.”
State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2008). “Rather, a defendant may now appeal on the basis (among others) that the sentence “is excessive under the sentencing considerations set out in §§ 40-35-102 and 40-35-210,” id. § 40-35-401(b)(2) (2006), and the State may now appeal on the added basis (among others) that the…”
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). “Acts 788 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) (2006)). Our General Assembly removed the original language creating a “presumption” that certain defendants qualified as favorable candidates for alternative sentencing and adopted a merely advisory “consideration” of whether…”
State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, *372 -103 and -210; see State v.”
State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (5) (1997). A defendant who does meet the criteria of section 40-35-102(5) and who is an especially mitigated or standard offender of a Class C, D, or E felony is “presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing options.”
State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1998). “The sentencing considerations generally used in determining the manner of service for both misdemeanors and felony sentences are codified at Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103. See Tenn.”
State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102, -103, & -210 (1990).”
State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (6). See also Bing-ham, 910 S.”
State v. Fields, 40 S.W.3d 435 (Tenn. 2001). “In addition, although the trial judge found that Fields was entitled to the presumption of alternative sentencing, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (1997), he nevertheless determined that the presumption had been overcome and that confinement was a more appropriate sentence.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1) — 308 cases
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1998). “The sentencing considerations generally used in determining the manner of service for both misdemeanors and felony sentences are codified at Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103. See Tenn.”
State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
State v. Rhoden, 739 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1)(1997) — 2 cases
State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999).
State v. Charles A. Dailey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1)(2010) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Mousen Yisak Aden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1)(5) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Gregory A. Shaver (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(1)(B) — 1 case
State v. Lane (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(2) — 27 cases
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State v. Jenkins, 733 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316 (Tenn. 2014).
State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn. 2001).
State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(2)(1990) — 1 case
State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3) — 87 cases
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2008). “Rather, a defendant may now appeal on the basis (among others) that the sentence “is excessive under the sentencing considerations set out in §§ 40-35-102 and 40-35-210,” id. § 40-35-401(b)(2) (2006), and the State may now appeal on the added basis (among others) that the…”
State of Tennessee v. Robert Fusco, 404 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1996).
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Nathaniel Nance, 393 S.W.3d 212 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(1997) — 1 case
State v. Smith, 993 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1999).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(2010) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Mousen Yisak Aden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(A) — 13 cases
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). “Similar to the 1982 Act, the 1989 Act listed its purposes, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (1990), and specifically recognized “that state prison capacities and the funds to build and maintain them are limited.”
State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102, -103, & -210 (1990).”
State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2012).
State v. Mathes, 114 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2003).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(B) — 9 cases
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; See State v.”
State of Tennessee v. William Benning (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
State of Tennessee v. James Lee Simmons, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(C) — 50 cases
State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; See State v.”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Moss, 727 S.W.2d 229 (Tenn. 1986). “The intermediate court concluded that the approach adopted by the trial court failed to consider certain provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, which in their opinion embodied the policy that the starting point in all sentencing determinations would be the minimum sentence for…”
State v. Taylor, 744 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).
State v. Huff, 760 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(D) — 5 cases
State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1997). “Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102, -103, & -210 (1990).”
State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (6). See also Bing-ham, 910 S.”
State v. Mathes, 114 S.W.3d 915 (Tenn. 2003).
State v. Millsaps, 920 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State of Tennessee v. Robert Wayne Cooper (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(a) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Jason Erik Redden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(3)(c) — 3 cases
State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
State v. Millsaps, 920 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
State v. Thomas Cunningham, 995 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(4) — 5 cases
State of Tennessee v. Jose Gonzalez Bonilla (Tenn. Crim. App. 2020).
State of Tennessee v. Karl Daniel Forss (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Earl McKay (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007).
State v. Smiley (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Graham (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5) — 290 cases
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; See State v.”
State v. Zeolia, 928 S.W.2d 457 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). “” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102 (6). See also Bing-ham, 910 S.”
State v. Bottoms, 87 S.W.3d 95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335 (Tenn. 2008). “Rather, a defendant may now appeal on the basis (among others) that the sentence “is excessive under the sentencing considerations set out in §§ 40-35-102 and 40-35-210,” id. § 40-35-401(b)(2) (2006), and the State may now appeal on the added basis (among others) that the…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(5)(6) — 1 case
State v. Brown, 832 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) — 500 cases
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). “Acts 788 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) (2006)). Our General Assembly removed the original language creating a “presumption” that certain defendants qualified as favorable candidates for alternative sentencing and adopted a merely advisory “consideration” of whether…”
State v. Hartley, 818 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, *372 -103 and -210; see State v.”
State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102, -103 and -210; See State v.”
State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991). “T.C.A. § 40-35-102 (Supp.1989). These rehabilitative alternative sentencing options “are specifically encouraged.”
State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(1997) — 1 case
State v. Gutierrez, 5 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 1999).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(2006) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Rhonda Brown-Montague aka Rhonda Brown (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(2010) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Dante Devon Omar Truitt (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
State of Tennessee v. Teresa Turner (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(A) — 121 cases
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273 (Tenn. 2012). “Acts 788 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) (2006)). Our General Assembly removed the original language creating a “presumption” that certain defendants qualified as favorable candidates for alternative sentencing and adopted a merely advisory “consideration” of whether…”
State of Tennessee v. Ioka Kimbuke Kyles (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Gardner Ford (Tenn. Crim. App. 2026).
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Marie Harbison (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Marie Harbison (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(B) — 4 cases
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jones (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
State of Tennessee v. William Alexander Beasley, IV (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Jennifer Lee Dickey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2015).
State of Tennessee v. William Roger Henderson, III (Tenn. Crim. App. 2013).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(C) — 4 cases
State of Tennessee v. Brian Garwood (Tenn. Crim. App. 2017).
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Jarrod Alexander (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Lavon Denise Ransom (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).
State of Tennessee v. Sean Brett Browder (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(D) — 77 cases
State of Tennessee v. Tan Vo (Tenn. Crim. App. 2014).
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Marie Harbison (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Marie Harbison (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Hollis Fisk, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Alderson (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6)(a) — 4 cases
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Wayne Evans (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Tuvarey Gilmore (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
State of Tennessee v. Tyrone De Angelo Shaw (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
State of Tennessee v. Robert Shane Cole (Tenn. Crim. App. 2022).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(b) — 2 cases
State of Tennessee v. Karl Daniel Forss (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008).
State of Tennessee v. Linda Gail Philpot (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(b)(6) — 1 case
State v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(c) — 2 cases
Joe Clark Mitchell v. Debra Johnson, Warden (Tenn. Crim. App. 2018).
State of Tennessee v. Allen Fitzgerald Ailey (Tenn. Crim. App. 2025).
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(l) — 1 case
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Shellhouse, Jr. (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002).
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