Tennessee Code Annotated
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2026)
Statute of limitations in contracts for sale
✓ current as of May 2026
- (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.
- (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
- (3) When an action is commenced within the time limited by subsection (1), but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff upon any ground not concluding his right of action, or when the judgment or decree is rendered in favor of plaintiff, and is arrested or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff or his representatives or privies as the case may be, may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year after the judgment, reversal or arrest.
- (4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before midnight (12:00 midnight) June 30, 1964.
- (5) A counterclaim or third-party complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations provided by this section if it was not barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed. If a nonsuit is taken as to the original civil action, any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint arising from such action shall not be terminated but may proceed as an original civil action. However, if a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint is filed as a civil action as permitted by this subsection and such action does not proceed to an adjudication on the merits of such claim, the defendant shall have the right to file a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint within the time allowed for the filing of a responsive pleading only if the original action is reinstituted pursuant to § 28-1-105. Any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint arising from an action or suit originally commenced in general sessions court and subsequently recommenced as an original action or as a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint pursuant to this section in circuit or chancery court according to the provisions of § 28-1-105, shall not be subject to the monetary jurisdictional limit originally imposed in general sessions court.
Acts 1963, ch. 81, § 1 (2-725); 1978, ch. 758, § 2; 1984, ch. 520, §§ 3, 5; 1985, ch. 344, § 3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 56
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1968–2025 · leading case: Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, Div. of Bluff City Buick Co., 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, Div. of Bluff City Buick Co., 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). “The trial court found that the four-year statute of limitations provided by Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1979), began to run on June 25, 1973, when tender of delivery was made and that the instant action was not filed within the original limitations period, nor was it filed within…”
Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1996). “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2) (1992). Under Tenn.”
Elec. Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). “1979), and T.C.A. § 47-2-725). Subsection (2) of T.C.”
McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1975). “Therefore, the Court concludes: (W)e are of the opinion that Section 47-2-725 should control in all actions wherein *492 a breach of warranty of a contract of sale is alleged, irrespective of whether the damages sought are for personal injuries or injuries to property.”
Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). “Turner filed his warranty claims within the period permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1). We cannot determine with any certainty when “tender of delivery” of the doors took place or whether the parties had explicitly reduced the limitation period to less than four years.”
Evelyn Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2011). “3 four-year statute of repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-202 (2000) and that her breach of warranty claim was barred by the statute of limitations under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-725 (2001). The trial court granted summary judgment to North Brothers…”
Cnty. of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). “§ 28-3-105; (4) the claim based upon warranty is barred by T.C.A. § 47-2-725; (5) the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in connection with its warranty theory since privity of contract is not alleged between the plaintiff and any of the…”
Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 455 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1970). “See T.C.A. 47-2-725. Of course, the construction and application of this statute of limitations will be for determination in future litigation in which it is invoked.”
Baptist Mem'l Hosp. v. Argo Constr. Corp., 308 S.W.3d 337 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). “The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment as to the general contractor’s indemnity claim, arguing that the claim was barred by (1) the one-year limitations period contained in the parties’ contract, as permitted under Tennessee Code Anno *339 tated § 47-2-725, and…”
In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001). “2725(2); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2). “Accrue” is defined as “to come into existence as a claim that is legally enforceable.”
Com. Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765 (Tenn. 1979). “It reversed as to five of the defendants in the personal injury action, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action for breach of the statutory warranties, and that this aspect of the suit was governed by the four-year statute of limitations contained in the…”
Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1977). “§ 28-309, the six (6) year statute of limitations for contract; T.C.A. § 47-2-725, the Tennessee Commercial Code statute of limitations for sales and T.”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725(1) — 11 cases
Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). “Turner filed his warranty claims within the period permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1). We cannot determine with any certainty when “tender of delivery” of the doors took place or whether the parties had explicitly reduced the limitation period to less than four years.”
In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001). “2725(2); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2). “Accrue” is defined as “to come into existence as a claim that is legally enforceable.”
Damron v. Media Gen., Inc., 3 S.W.3d 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Elec. Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). “1979), and T.C.A. § 47-2-725). Subsection (2) of T.C.”
Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, Div. of Bluff City Buick Co., 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). “The trial court found that the four-year statute of limitations provided by Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1979), began to run on June 25, 1973, when tender of delivery was made and that the instant action was not filed within the original limitations period, nor was it filed within…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725(2) — 10 cases
Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. 1996). “See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (2) (1992). Under Tenn.”
Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, Div. of Bluff City Buick Co., 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). “The trial court found that the four-year statute of limitations provided by Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1979), began to run on June 25, 1973, when tender of delivery was made and that the instant action was not filed within the original limitations period, nor was it filed within…”
Elec. Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). “1979), and T.C.A. § 47-2-725). Subsection (2) of T.C.”
Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). “Turner filed his warranty claims within the period permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1). We cannot determine with any certainty when “tender of delivery” of the doors took place or whether the parties had explicitly reduced the limitation period to less than four years.”
Cnty. of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Tenn. 1984). “§ 28-3-105; (4) the claim based upon warranty is barred by T.C.A. § 47-2-725; (5) the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in connection with its warranty theory since privity of contract is not alleged between the plaintiff and any of the…”
— Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-725(3) — 1 case
Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, Div. of Bluff City Buick Co., 658 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). “The trial court found that the four-year statute of limitations provided by Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-2-725 (1979), began to run on June 25, 1973, when tender of delivery was made and that the instant action was not filed within the original limitations period, nor was it filed within…”
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