Tennessee Code Annotated

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (2024)

Right to compensation exclusive

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Acts 1919, ch. 123, § 8; Shan. Supp., § 3608a157; Code 1932, § 6859; Acts 1961, ch. 184, § 2; impl. am. Acts 1980, ch. 534, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 50-908; Acts 1985, ch. 326, § 1; 2013, ch. 289, § 13.


Notes of Decisions
Cited in 126 cases (22 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 21× “The principal defense with which this Court is concerned on appeal is the contention of defendant that plaintiffs’ remaining claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Worker’s Compensation Act (“TWCA”), codified as T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The chancellor…”
Clawson v. Burrow, 250 S.W.3d 59 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 24× “The STI argued that the exclusivity provision of the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Law, T.C.A. § 50-6-108, barred the Clawsons' tort claim.”
Gonzales v. Alman Constr. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 7× “§ 50-6-108.” Alman filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.”
Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1997). · cites it 6× “Of course, the employer cannot be found to be the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiffs injuries because the employer is immune from tort liability under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a). By enacting Tenn.”
Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 155 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. 2005). · cites it 4× “1996) (discussing the underlying policy of the workers’ compensation system); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a) (1999) (providing that the right to receive workers’ compensation benefits “shall exclude all other rights and remedies” of the injured employee); Snyder v.”
Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996). · cites it 4× “Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (b) (1991). 2 .”
Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239 (Tenn. 2003). · cites it 5× “We granted this appeal to determine whether the judicially-created exception to the exclusive remedy requirement of workers’ compensation law, which requires “actual intent,” should be broadly interpreted to include an employer’s conduct that is “substantially certain” to cause…”
Leatherwood v. United Parcel Serv., 708 S.W.2d 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 8× “In support of their summary judgment motions the defendants relied upon the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108, maintained that the previous judgment in the workers’ compensation case was res adjudicata, and contended that plaintiff…”
Barber v. Ralston Purina, 825 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 8× “The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that plaintiff’s suit is barred by the exclusive remedy clause in T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The facts are generally undisputed.”
Ana R. Padilla v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 324 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2010). · cites it 4× “at 224 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (a) (2005)). For an injury to be compensable under the Act, it must both arise out of and occur in the course of employment.”
Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14 (Tenn. 2000). · cites it 4× “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a) (1999). While an employee cannot proceed with a tort action against the employer, the employee may seek damages from some person other than the employer.”
Brewer v. Monsanto Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1986). · cites it 6× “Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (1983). The “rights and remedies” barred are those that arise because the employee has suffered “personal injury or death” under cir *1274 cumstances covered by the worker’s compensation statute.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a): 36 cases
Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn. 1997). “Of course, the employer cannot be found to be the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiffs injuries because the employer is immune from tort liability under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a). By enacting Tenn.”
Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 155 S.W.3d 877 (Tenn. 2005). “1996) (discussing the underlying policy of the workers’ compensation system); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a) (1999) (providing that the right to receive workers’ compensation benefits “shall exclude all other rights and remedies” of the injured employee); Snyder v.”
Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14 (Tenn. 2000). “See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a) (1999). While an employee cannot proceed with a tort action against the employer, the employee may seek damages from some person other than the employer.”
Valencia v. Freeland & Lemm Constr. Co., 108 S.W.3d 239 (Tenn. 2003). “We granted this appeal to determine whether the judicially-created exception to the exclusive remedy requirement of workers’ compensation law, which requires “actual intent,” should be broadly interpreted to include an employer’s conduct that is “substantially certain” to cause…”
Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996). “Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (b) (1991). 2 .”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a)(2008): 1 case
Clawson v. Burrow, 327 S.W.3d 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(b): 1 case
Williams v. Ludlow Corp., 806 F. Supp. 101 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
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